# The Triumph of the Therapeutic

USES OF FAITH AFTER FREUD

Philip Rieff

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# *The Triumph of the Therapeutic*

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*Philip Rieff*

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*Uses of Faith After Freud*





HARPER TORCHBOOKS
Harper & Row, Publishers
New York, Hagerstown, San Francisco, London

To the memory
of my parents

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*First* HARPER TORCHBOOK *edition published in 1968 by Harper & Row, Publishers, Incorporated, New York, N.Y. 10022.*

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# *Preface*

"The Emergence of Psychological Man" was written as a coda to *The Mind of the Moralist;*[1] it is often assigned to students and read separately now from the main body of the text. I have thought it important to amplify the concept of psychological man for a reason stated most succinctly by two historians in their appraisal of my work and its implications. "If the dominant character type of the twentieth century is really what Rieff calls 'psychological man,' the consequences for western society are quite incalculable."[2]

As a calculus of the incalculable, *The Triumph of the Therapeutic* is more than amplification of what has gone before; it signifies a beginning as well as an end. I have tried to say something about the consequences of psychological man for Western society—but not everything, for I do not consider the advance of the social sciences toward a theory of culture yet sure enough to convey such an attempt. Nevertheless, my assessment of these consequences has led me nearer the task of helping to develop an adequate sociological theory of culture. The theory adumbrated in the present volume is offered as a recent phase in a continuing address to that theoretical problem, which I consider the central one in sociology; I am aware that I am far from having said even my own last word on the subject.

Problems treated as fully as I know how in *The Mind of the*

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*Moralist* are not examined here again, useful though such treatment might be to the thrust of the present book to anyone not acquainted with the earlier. A certain dependence does obtain between this book and its predecessor. But, like any full-fledged offspring, *The Triumph of the Therapeutic* must stand, for the reader if not entirely for the author, on its own feet.

Drafts and fragments of a number of chapters have appeared in *Encounter*, *Commentary*, *The American Scholar*, in my ten-volume student's edition of Freud's *Collected Papers*, and elsewhere. I have to thank those editors and publishers for permitting me to exercise my ideas in their precincts.

PHILIP RIEFF

*Peru, Vermont*
*June 1965*

*No one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or whether there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals, or, if neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance. For of the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: "Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved." But this brings us to the world of judgments, of value and of faith. . . .*

—Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*

*That we are passing through a cultural crisis of unprecedented magnitude and of a definitely putrid quality nobody doubts, except, of course, the 999 in 1000 intellectual ostriches who prefer to remain head in sand rather than to face realities. . . . [I] can see only one way out . . .—the establishment of a . . . scientific control of human affairs. This is the faith of those united in the present intellectual venture. . . .*

—Malinowski, "Culture as a Determinant of Behavior"

# *Introductory: Toward a Theory of Culture*

*Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;*
*Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,*
*The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere*
*The ceremony of innocence is drowned;*
*The best lack all conviction, while the worst*
*Are full of passionate intensity.*

*Surely some revelation is at hand;*
*Surely the Second Coming is at hand.*
*The Second Coming! Hardly are those words out*
*When a vast image out of* Spiritus Mundi
*Troubles my sight: somewhere in sands of the desert*
*A shape with lion body and the head of a man,*
*A gaze blank and pitiless as the sun,*
*Is moving its slow thighs, while all about it*
*Reel shadows of the indignant desert birds.*
*The darkness drops again; but now I know*
*That twenty centuries of stony sleep*
*Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle,*
*And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,*
*Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?*

—Yeats, "The Second Coming"

Literature and sociology have long supplied eloquent and knowing professional mourners at the wake for Christian culture. After Matthew Arnold, much of modern poetry constitutes an elegiac farewell (mixed with powerful feelings of good riddance) to the religious culture of the West. After Auguste Comte, much of modern sociology has struggled for diagnostic

ideas refined and yet wide enough to encompass the spectacle of a death so great in magnitude and subtlety. Now the dissolution of a unitary system of common belief, accompanied, as it must be, by a certain disorganization of personality, may have run its course. The long period of deconversion, which first broke the surface of political history at the time of the French Revolution, appears all but ended. The central symbolism of personal and corporate experience seems to me well on its way to being differently organized, with several systems of belief competing for primacy in the task of organizing personality in the West. Beyond its concern with the dynamics by which Christian culture has been displaced, the present volume will concentrate upon a struggle within the camp of one among these displacing systems of belief; I intend drawing certain implications for the reorganization of Western culture and personality from the divergence between Freud and those of his most powerful successor-critics studied in this book—C. G. Jung, Wilhelm Reich, and D. H. Lawrence. In Freud's analytic attitude and in the efforts exerted by his successor-critics to go beyond it, to post-communal faiths, there are concentrated some aspects of a theoretical problem that interests me greatly, well beyond the limits of this book: the problem of explaining cultural change. These preliminary studies in the psychohistorical process are not aimed primarily at fellow theorists interested in the problem, but at those troubled readers in whose minds and hearts one culture is dying while no other gains enough power to be born.

As cultures change, so do the modal types of personality that are their bearers. The kind of man I see emerging, as our culture fades into the next, resembles the kind once called "spiritual"—because such a man desires to preserve the inherited morality freed from its hard external crust of institutional discipline. Yet a culture survives principally, I think, by the power of its institutions to bind and loose men in the conduct of their affairs with reasons which sink so deep into the self that they become commonly and implicitly understood—with that understanding

of which explicit belief and precise knowledge of externals would show outwardly like the tip of an iceberg. Spiritualizers of religion (and precisians of science) failed to take into account the degree of intimacy with which this comprehensive interior understanding was cognate with historic institutions, binding even the ignorants of a culture to a great chain of meaning. These institutions are responsible for conveying the social conditions of their acceptance by men thus saved from destructive illusions of uniqueness and separateness. Having broken the outward forms, so as to liberate, allegedly, the inner meaning of the good, the beautiful, and the true, the spiritualizers, who set the pace of Western cultural life from just before the beginning to a short time after the end of the nineteenth century, have given way now to their logical and historical successors, the psychologizers, inheritors of that dualist tradition which pits human nature against social order.[1]

Undeceived, as they think, about the sources of all morally binding address, the psychologizers, now fully established as the pacesetters of cultural change, propose to help men avoid doing further damage to themselves by preventing live deceptions from succeeding the dead ones. But, in order to save themselves from falling apart with their culture, men must engender another, different and yet powerful enough in its reorganization of experience to make themselves capable again of controlling the infinite variety of panic and emptiness to which they are disposed. It is to control their dis-ease as individuals that men have always acted culturally, in good faith. Books and parading, prayers and the sciences, music and piety toward parents: these are a few of the many instruments by which a culture may produce the saving larger self, for the control of panic and the

[1] From its beginnings, sociological theory has argued against dualist oppositions of human nature and social order, and against individualist conceptions of the self. For a discussion of these arguments, see my two studies on the thought of Charles Horton Cooley, published as introductions to reprints of his major works, *Social Organization* (New York, 1962), pp. v–xx, and *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York, 1964), pp. ix–xx. Both essays are thematically related to the present volume.

filling up of emptiness. Superior to and encompassing the different modes in which it appears, a culture must communicate ideals, setting as internalities those distinctions between right actions and wrong that unite men and permit them the fundamental pleasure of agreement. Culture is another name for a design of motives directing the self outward, toward those communal purposes in which alone the self can be realized and satisfied.

A reorganization of those dialectical expressions of *Yes* and *No* the interplay of which constitutes culture, transforming motive into conduct, is occurring throughout the West, particularly in the United States and in England. It is to be expected that some instruments appropriate to our inherited organization of permissions and restraints upon action will not survive the tension of fundamental reorganization. But, suppose the tension is driven deeper—so deep that all communications of ideals come under permanent and easy suspicion? The question is no longer as Dostoevski put it: "Can civilized men believe?" Rather: Can unbelieving men be civilized?

To raise again the question of nihilism, as sociologists since Auguste Comte have done, demonstrates a major change in tone: the note of apprehension has gone out of the asking. We believe that we know something our predecessors did not: that we can live freely at last, enjoying all our senses—except the sense of the past—as unremembering, honest, and friendly barbarians all, in a technological Eden. Comte would have substituted a religion of humanity for its enfeebled predecessor; Max Weber proposed no substitute religion. Matthew Arnold could still listen for distant echoes of the sea of faith; Yeats knew there was a desert where once that sea might have been. To raise up faith from its stony sleep encourages the possibility of living through again the nightmare history of the last half century. Yeats did not hope for either restoration or parody of the established faiths. Rather, he prayed for a very modern sort of Second Coming, in which men would recover their innocence,

chiefly by accepting the fact that it is self-delighting, self-appeasing, self-affrighting—"and that its own sweet will is Heaven's will." In our recovered innocence, to be entertained would become the highest good and boredom the most common evil.

The best spirits of the twentieth century have thus expressed their conviction that the original innocence, which to earlier periods was a sinful conceit, the new center, which can be held even as communities disintegrate, is the self. By this conviction a new and dynamic acceptance of disorder, in love with life and destructive of it, has been loosed upon the world. Here literature and sociology converge; for the ultimate interest of sociology, like that of psychiatry when it is not lost in a particular patient, turns on the question whether our culture can be so reconstructed that faith—some compelling symbolic of self-integrating communal purpose—need no longer superintend the organization of personality.

So long as a culture maintains its vitality, whatever must be renounced disappears and is given back bettered; Freud called this process sublimation. But, as that sage among psychiatrists Harry Stack Sullivan once said, "if you tell people how they can sublimate, they can't sublimate." The dynamics of culture are in "the unwitting part of it."[2] Now our renunciations have failed us; less and less is given back bettered. For this reason, chiefly, I think, this culture, which once imagined itself inside a church, feels trapped in something like a zoo of separate cages. Modern men are like Rilke's panther, forever looking out from one cage into another. Because the modern sense of identity seems outraged by imprisonment in either old church or new cage, it is the obligation of sociologists, so far as they remain interested in assessing the quality of our corporate life, to analyze doctrinal as well as organizational profiles of the rage to be free of the inherited morality, the better to see how these differ from what is being raged against. I shall attend to a few of the exemplarily

[2] Harry Stack Sullivan, "The Illusion of Personal Individuality," *Psychiatry* (1950), Vol. 13, No. 1, p. 323.

enraged, and to the sense in which it may be said that they express general sentiments.

If the question "How are we to be saved?" cannot be asked in traditional ways, or need not be asked at all, then it is still the professional obligation of sociologists, who are specially interested in the behavior of collectivities, to investigate the ensuing honest silence in which the communal gods have imitated the most cultivated men. And, indeed, this is the sort of investigation that sociologists have pursued ardently, from the time of Comte through that of Weber to my contemporaries.[3] Perhaps no

[3] Alfred Weber's contributions to *Kultursoziologie* merit more attention than they have received. It was Alfred Weber's judgment (a judgment shared by his older brother, Max) that the "inherent forms" of our culture "seem to be dissolving . . . into something new: utter decline or the emergence of another historical organism."

It is helpful to have Robert K. Merton restate the established position beyond which sociology has not yet advanced: that the "key concept" in sociological theory, "bridging the gap between statics and dynamics," is "that of strain, tension, contradiction or discrepancy between the component elements of social and cultural structure." (Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, New York, 1962, p. 122.) Perhaps, in order to understand how tensions *between* social and cultural structures exert "pressures for change" (Merton, *ibid.*), it may be necessary to develop a theory of tensions *within* a culture. Suppose it is from the superior level of the cultural system that organizing (and disorganizing) higher principles thrust into the social structure. That thrust of higher (cultural) principles into the myriad particular activities of men, enacted by cultural elites even in the most highly differentiated social structure, would then establish the modalities of societal integration and disintegration. Moreover, the study of smaller units of the social self would also take its direction from these modalities. But, further discussion would carry me too far from the immediate subject of the present volume, and too near the twin subjects of another book: on sociological theory as ineluctably normative and on the "structure" of culture. These twin subjects are merely adumbrated here.

See A. L. Kroeber and C. Kluckhohn, *Culture, A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions* (New York, 1963), for a compendium of culture theories that repeats the deficiencies of approaches from the social sciences, while too easily dismissing important contributions from the humanities.

Freud's position on the importance of a theory of culture is well summed up in the following passages. First on the normative aspects of Freudian theory, the famous passage on the therapeutic "intention" of psychoanalysis, "to strengthen the ego, to make it more independent of the super-ego, to widen its field of perception and enlarge its organization, so that it can appropriate fresh portions of the id. Where id was, there ego shall be. It is a work of culture." Then, second, on the explanatory potential of a theory of culture—

other problem than that of the changing moral configuration of modern culture has so engaged the interest of sociological theorists.

During the nineteenth century, when sociology helped in a major way to construct the central experience of deconversion toward an anti-creedal analytic attitude, that discipline suffered from a vast overconfidence both about its own advance and about the progress of the culture, which it understood as undergoing varieties of such deconversions. "Progress," wrote Spencer,[4] "is not an accident, but a necessity. Surely must evil and immorality disappear; surely must men become perfect." A basic transformation of culture appeared both inevitable and desirable.

Running parallel with and in the opposite direction from the process of deconversion was that process of conversion to a

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and on its scientific base—"we must not forget that the mass of human beings who are subjected to economic necessities also undergo the process of cultural development—of civilization, as other people may say—which, though no doubt influenced by all the other factors, is certainly independent of them in its origin, being comparable to an organic process and very well able on its part to exercise an influence on the other factors. It displaces instinctual aims and brings it about that people become antagonistic to what they had previously tolerated. Moreover, the progressive strengthening of the scientific spirit seems to form an essential part of it. If anyone were in a position to show in detail the way in which these different factors—the general inherited human disposition, its racial variations and its cultural transformations—inhibit and promote one another under the conditions of social rank, profession and earning capacity—if anyone were able to do this, he would have supplemented Marxism so that it was made into a genuine social science. For sociology too, dealing as it does with the behaviour of people in society, cannot be anything but applied psychology. Strictly speaking, there are only two sciences: psychology, pure and applied, and natural science." Sigmund Freud, "New Introductory Lectures," in Standard Edition of *Complete Psychological Works*, Vol. XXII, ed. James Strachey (London, 1964), pp. 80 and 179. Note Freud's vacillation between a reductionist (to the psychological level) theory of culture and one in which culture is a phenomenon *sui generis*. This vacillation he never resolved. But there is everything still to be gained, I think, from using Freudian models in further developing a theory of culture.

[4] Herbert Spencer, *Social Statics* (London, 1892), p. 32. Some doubts occurred to Spencer about the pace of progress toward a culture freed from faith, but not about its inevitability or eventual terminus. (See the note he added to the passage quoted.)

superior system of symbols--Science—which would supply the next predicate for the cultural organization of personality. Comte, for example, understood his own time as one of transition between two cultures. It was more generally proposed by students of our collective condition not merely that the old religious culture was dying but that the new scientific one had quite enough power already to be born.[5] Thus Comte concluded that only because of the "coexistence" of these two cultures did the "grand crisis now experienced by the most civilized nations" persist.[6] Freud was less sanguine. He believed that the crisis of coexistence was probably a permanent mode of the relation between personality and culture.

I question whether the "grand crisis," our deeper trouble, can be attributed to "coexistence," as major figures among the nineteenth-century intellectuals, culminating in Freud, insisted. It is less the lingering of the old culture than the emergence of the new that needs diagnosis. In fact, evil and immorality are disappearing, as Spencer assumed they would, mainly because our culture is changing its definition of human perfection. No longer the Saint, but the instinctual Everyman, twisting his neck uncomfortably inside the starched collar of culture, is the communal ideal, to whom men offer tacit prayers for deliverance from their inherited renunciations. Freud sought only to soften the collar; others, using bits and pieces of his genius, would like to take it off. There have been forerunners of this movement—Rousseau, Boehme, Hamann, or Blake. But never before has there been such a general shifting of sides as now among intellectuals in the United States and England. Many have gone over to the enemy without realizing that they, self-considered the cultural elite, have actually become spokesmen for what Freud called the

[5] The birth pangs might be those caused by a proletariat emerging out of the womb of history, as Marx thought. But this proletariat would dominate a culture even more scientific in its substantial nature and social organization than that envisaged by Comte.

[6] Auguste Comte, "Plan of the Scientific Operations Necessary for Reorganizing Society," Frederick Harrison (ed.), *Early Essays of Comte* (London, n.d.) p. 88.

instinctual "mass." Much of modern literature constitutes a symbolic act of going over to the side of the latest, and most original, individualist.[7] This represents the complete democratization of our culture.

It was in order to combat just such talented hostility to culture that Freud emphasized coercion and the renunciation of instinct as indispensable elements in all culture. Freud was neither an eroticist nor a democrat. His theory of culture depended upon a crossing between his idea of moral authority and an elitist inclination. "It is just as impossible," he writes, "to do without control of the mass by a minority as it is to dispense with coercion in the work of civilization." By "mass" Freud means not merely the "lazy and unintelligent," but, more importantly, those who "have no love for instinctual renunciation" and who cannot be "convinced by argument of its inevitability." That such large numbers of the cultivated and intelligent have identified themselves deliberately with those who are supposed to have no *love* for instinctual renunciation, suggests to me the most elaborate act of suicide that Western intellectuals have ever staged—those intellectuals, whether of the left or right, whose historic function it has been to assert the authority of a culture organized in terms of communal purpose, through the agency of congregations of the faithful.

[7] But not all modern literature, of course. There remains a strong mood of dejection at the passing of the old culture, that mood memorably expressed by Rose Macaulay, in her novel, *Potterism* (London, 1920). "It was a curious age, so near and yet so far, when the ordered frame of things was still unbroken, and violence a child's dream, and poetry and art were taken with immense seriousness. Those of us who can remember it should do so, for it will not return. It has given place to the age of melodrama, when nothing is too strange to happen, and no one is ever surprised. That, too, may pass, but probably not, for it is primeval. The other was artificial, a mere product of civilisation, and could not last." But Rose Macaulay was mistaken. Her nostalgia was itself a Potterism, a snobbish and mean dislike of the fact that poetry and art were to be taken, as they are now, with immense seriousness—piously—by the many as well as the few. It is the truly catholic character of the modern religion of art that annoys old catholics, such as Miss Macaulay and Bernard Berenson, not the religion itself. (Cf. Footnote 1, Chap. 8, pp. 232–233.)

Of course, this suicide is intended only as an exciting pose. Renunciations of instinct, as Freud wrote, "necessarily must remain." For these renunciations, the individual must be compensated by pleasures at once higher and more realizable than the pleasure of instinctual gratification. In compensation, and in place of where faith once was, men are offered Art and/or Science. It is true that new religions are constantly being born. But modern culture is unique in having given birth to such elaborately argued anti-religions, all aiming to confirm us in our devastating illusions of individuality and freedom. I suspect the children of Israel did not spend much time elaborating a doctrine of the golden calf; they naïvely danced around it, until Moses, their first intellectual, put a stop to the plain fun and insisted on civilizing them, by submerging their individualities within a communal purpose. Now, although there is some dancing again, the intellectuals mainly sit around and think in awe about the power and perversity of their instincts, disguising their rancorous worship of self in the religion of art. Confronted thus with a picture gallery as the new center of self-worship, civilized men must become again anti-art, in the hope of shifting attention toward modalities of worship wholly other than that of self.

In my chapters on Reich and Lawrence, I shall represent some ways in which art and science have come to serve the contemporary aversion to culture. This aversion has grown less naïve, more doctrinal, and therefore more dangerous. For these are doctrines of psychological man—the latest, and perhaps the supreme, individualist—opposed in depth to earlier modes of self-salvation: through identification with communal purpose. Jung is the most interesting case. As a cultural conservative, his psychology is para-religious, striving as it does to re-establish various corporate identities and communal purposes as purely therapeutic devices. In contrast to the conservative Jung, Reich and Lawrence are moral revolutionaries in a more straightforward way: neither proposes to defend common purposes which once persisted through the individualization of those energies

called "conscience," generated for the saving of selves precisely by means of a communal purpose.

The debts incurred by conscience through warped and atrophied communal purposes are now being paid off at a usurious rate of interest. The lingering death of authoritarian love has left behind hatred and violence, twin widows of dead love, free to stimulate in the culturally impoverished or disenchanted energies emancipated from conviction. It is not class or race war that we have to fear so much as deadly violence between the culture classes. But the upper culture classes have already lost this most fundamental of all class struggles by their admiration for the "vitality" of the lower, that vitality being a mirror image of their own earlier dynamism. A social structure shakes with violence and shivers with fears of violence not merely when that structure is callously unjust, but also when its members must stimulate themselves to feverish activity in order to demonstrate how alive they are. That there are colonies of the violent among us, devoid of any stable sense of communal purpose, best describes, I think, our present temporarily schizoid existence in two cultures—vacillating between dead purposes and deadly devices to escape boredom.

A full transition to a post-communal culture may never be achieved. It is a persuasive argument, still, that maintains there are safeguards, built into both human nature and culture, limiting the freedom of men to atomize themselves. Perhaps human nature will revolt, producing yet another version of second nature with which to fend off and curb the vitality of the present assault upon the moralizing functions of our past. Every culture must establish itself as a system of moralizing demands, images that mark the trail of each man's memory; thus to distinguish right actions from wrong the inner ordinances are set, by which men are guided in their conduct so as to assure a mutual security of contact. Culture is, indeed, the higher learning. But, this higher learning is not acquired at universities; rather, it is assimilated continuously from earliest infancy when

human beings first begin to trust in those familiar responses others make to their overtures. In every culture, there stands a censor, governing the opportunity of recognizing and responding to novel stimuli. That governor, inclined always to be censorious about novelty, we may call "faith." Faith is the compulsive dynamic of culture, channeling obedience to, trust in, and dependence upon authority. With more or less considered passion, men submit to the moral demand system—and, moreover, to its personifications, from which they cannot detach themselves except at the terrible cost of guilt that such figures of authority exact from those not yet so indifferent that they have ceased troubling to deny them.

Now, contradicting all faiths, a culture of the indifferent is being attempted, lately using a rhetoric of "commitment" with which to enlarge the scope of its dynamism. Such a credo of change amounts to a new faith—more precisely, to a counter-faith. This counter-faith intimates the next culture; for faith, or its negative, is always and everywhere the generating and corrupting agent of culture. This is not to say that contemporary culture is corrupt; what appears to some as corruption indicates the generation of yet another culture, for none is immortal. While disassociating itself from the high costs of old doctrinal seriousness and lonely lives, the emergent culture nevertheless produces books and music, art and science, an endless ambiance of fun and boredom—everything in fact, including moral passion and communal purpose, as varieties of an antitypal therapy of self. To call corrupt a culture purchased at lower cost to our nerves, and at larger magnitudes of self-fulfillment, would show a lamentable lack of imagination. The look of the future need not be blank and pitiless. Intelligence may work more efficiently, after all, than compassionate solidarity. Counter-transference may succeed where less calculated loves have failed. If the religious imagination is purblind, and its obstinate visionaries take risks resulting in such personifications of the Parousia as Yeats saw slouching toward Bethlehem, then we will have to

make our way to a more pleasant city, using our secular vision of comforts that render all salvations obsolete.

I, too, aspire to see clearly, like a rifleman, with one eye shut; I, too, aspire to think without assent. This is the ultimate violence to which the modern intellectual is committed. Since things have become as they are, I, too, share the modern desire not to be deceived. The culture to which I was first habituated grows progressively different in its symbolic nature and in its human product; that double difference and how ordained augments our ambivalence as professional mourners. There seems little likelihood of a great rebirth of the old corporate ideals. The "proletariat" was the most recent notable corporate identity, the latest failed god. By this time men may have gone too far, beyond the old deception of good and evil, to specialize at last, wittingly, in techniques that are to be called, in the present volume, "therapeutic," with nothing at stake beyond a manipulatable sense of well-being.[8] This is the unreligion of the age, and its master science. What the ignorant have always felt, the knowing now know, after millennial distractions by stratagems that did not heighten the more immediate pleasures. The systematic hunting down of all settled convictions represents the anti-cultural predicate upon which modern personality is being reorganized, now not in the West only but, more slowly, in the non-West. The Orient and Africa are thus being acculturated in a dynamism that has already grown substantial enough to torment its progenitors with nightmares of revenge for having so unsettled the world. It is a terrible error to see the West as conservative and the East as revolutionary. We are the true revolutionaries. The East is swiftly learning to act as we do,

[8] Yeats's "A Prayer for My Daughter" makes an immediate pendant to "The Second Coming":

> I have walked and prayed for this young child. . . .
> Considering that, all hatred driven hence,
> The soul recovers radical innocence
> And learns at last that it is self-delighting,
> Self-appeasing, self-affrighting,
> And that its own sweet will is Heaven's will. . . .

which is anti-conservative in a way non-Western peoples have only recently begun fully to realize for themselves.

In the regular acting out of mandatory therapies of commitment[9] built into the charter of his society, man, as a creation of affectionate and censorious authority, once organized for himself modes of willing obedience, or faith, in which he found his sense of well-being and, also, his freedom from that singular criterion. Culture without cultus appears, in almost all historical cases, a contradiction in terms. Within the mechanisms of cult, culture was organized, consisting mainly of ritual efforts to elicit and produce stable responses of assurance to more or less fixed wants—fleshly and spiritual, as it used to be said. There was, then, a standard range of expectations from which reassurance was elicited, even though the responses of the eliciting agencies, rendered "sacred" by their supreme function of organizing a life worth living, might at any moment offer admonitions rather than consolations to the seeker. Thus the sacred socializing agencies composed a moral order.

[9] Nietzsche, the greatest of the nineteenth-century moral revolutionaries, generally opposed all mandatory systems of commitment. Yet even he cannot but proclaim, at times, the cultural necessity of such systems: "In contrast to *laisser-aller*, every system of morals is a sort of tyranny against 'nature' and also against 'reason'; that is, however, no objection, unless one should again decree, by some system of morals, that all kinds of tyranny and unreasonableness are unlawful. What is essential and invaluable in every system of morals, is that it is a long constraint. In order to understand Stoicism, or Port-Royal, or Puritanism, one should remember the constraint under which every language has attained to strength and freedom. . . . How much trouble have the poets and orators of every nation given themselves. . . . [to be free] 'from submission to arbitrary laws,' as the anarchists say, and thereby fancy themselves 'free,' even free-spirited. The singular fact remains, however, that everything of the nature of freedom, elegance, boldness, dance, and masterly certainty, which exists or has existed, whether it be in thought itself or in administration, or in speaking and persuading, in art just as in conduct, has only developed by means of the tyranny of such arbitrary law; and in all seriousness, it is not at all improbable that precisely this is 'nature' and 'natural' and not *laisser-aller!* . . . The essential thing 'in heaven and earth' is apparently (to repeat it once more) that there should be long obedience in the same direction; there thereby results, and has always resulted in the long run, something which has made life worth living." In *Beyond Good and Evil*, transl. Helen Zimmern (London, 1907), section 188, pp. 106–9.

One main clue to the understanding of social organization is to be found in its symbolic of communal purpose; this, in turn, operates through a social system enacting that symbolic in a way at once admonitory and consoling. Each culture is its own order of therapy—a system of moralizing demands, including remissions that ease the pressures of communal purposes. Therapeutic elites before our own were predominately supportive rather than critical of culture as a moral demand system. Admonitions were the expectable predicates of consolations; that is what is meant, nowadays, by "guilt" culture. Whenever therapeutic elites grow predominately critical then a cultural revolution may be said to be in progress. Ours is such a time. The Occident has long been such a place.

Until the present culture rose to threaten its predecessor, our demand system could be specified by the kind of creedal hedges it raised around impulses of independence or autonomy from communal purpose. In the culture preceding our own, the order of therapy was embedded in a consensus of "shalt nots." The best never lacked binding convictions, for they were the most bound, mainly by what they should not do—or even think, or dream. "Thou shalt" precipitated a sequence of operative "shalt nots." Cultic therapies of commitment never mounted a search for some new opening into experience; on the contrary, new experience was not wanted. Cultic therapy domesticated the wildness of experience. By treating some novel stimulus or ambiguity of experience in this manner, the apparently new was integrated into a restrictive and collective identity. Cultic therapies consisted, therefore, chiefly in participation mystiques severely limiting deviant initiatives. Individuals were trained, through ritual action, to express fixed wants, although they could not count thereby upon commensurate gratifications. The limitation of possibilities was the very design of salvation.

To the ironic question "And, being saved, how are we to behave?" Western culture long returned a painfully simple answer: "Behave like your Savior." Christian culture, like other

organizations of moral demand, operated, however imperfectly, through the internalization of a soteriological character ideal carrying tremendous potentials for fresh intakes of communal energy; the highest level of controls and remissions (which together organized systems of moral demands) experienced an historical and individualized incarnation. Such euhemerist processes may have been indispensable to the vitality of the old culture. To adjust the expression of impulses to the controlling paragon, or character ideal, defines the primary process in the shaping of our inherited culture; the arts and sciences define the secondary process, in which exemplary modes of action are extended further, into a central moralizing experience, thus transforming individual into institutional action.

In the classical Christian culture of commitment, one renunciatory mode of control referred to the sexual opportunism of individuals. Contemporary churchmen may twist and turn it while they try to make themselves heard in a culture that renders preaching superfluous: the fact remains that renunciatory controls of sexual opportunity were placed in the Christian culture very near the center of the symbolic that has not held. Current apologetic efforts by religious professionals, in pretending that renunciation as the general mode of control was never dominant in the system, reflect the strange mixture of cowardice and courage with which they are participating in the dissolution of their cultural functions. Older Christian scholarship has known better than new Christian apologetics.[10]

> At bottom, only a single point was dealt with, abstinence from sexual relationships; everything else was secondary: for he who had renounced these found nothing hard. Renunciation of the servile yoke of sin (*servile peccati iugum discutere*) was the watchword of Christians, and an extraordinary unanimity prevailed as to the meaning of this watchword, whether we turn to the Coptic porter, or the learned Greek teacher, to

[10] J. A. T. Robinson, *Honest to God* (London, 1963) is an excellent example of that mixture of cowardice and courage in contemporary Christian apologetics.

the Bishop of Hippo, or Jerome the Roman presbyter, or the biographer of Saint Martin. Virginity was the specifically Christian virtue, and the essence of all virtues; in this conviction the meaning of the evangelical law was summed up.[11]

Historically, the rejection of sexual individualism (which divorces pleasure and procreation) was the consensual matrix of Christian culture. It was never the last line drawn. On the contrary, beyond that first restriction there were drawn others, establishing the Christian corporate identity within which the individual was to organize the range of his experience.[12] Individuality was hedged round by the discipline of sexuality, challenging those rapidly fluctuating imperatives established in Rome's remissive culture, from which a new order of deprivations was intended to release the faithful Christian believer. Every controlling symbolic contains such remissive functions. What is revolutionary in modern culture refers to releases from inherited doctrines of therapeutic deprivation; from a predicate of renunciatory control, enjoining releases from impulse need, our culture has shifted toward a predicate of impulse release, projecting controls unsteadily based upon an infinite variety of wants raised to the status of needs. Difficult as the modern cultural condition may be, I doubt that Western men can be persuaded again to the Greek opinion that the secret of happiness is to have as few needs as possible. The philosophers of therapeutic deprivation are disposed to eat well when they are not preaching. It is hard to take Schopenhauer at his ascetic word when we know what splendid dinners he had put on, day after day, at the Hotel Schwan in Frankfort.

The central Christian symbolic was not ascetic in a crude

[11] Adolf von Harnack, *History of Dogma*, English translation (London, 1894–99), III, p. 128.

[12] Genius strives to dramatize and clarify the symbolic which is its predicate. Augustine tried to formulate the Christian symbolic in a motif of polarized images that occurs over and over again in Christian tradition. "Two loves have built two cities: the love of self carried unto the contempt of God has built the city of this earth; the love of God carried unto the contempt of self has built the heavenly city." *The City of God*, XIV, 28.

renunciatory mode which would destroy any culture. Max Scheler described that culture accurately, I think, when he concluded that "Christian asceticism—at least so far as it was not influenced by decadent Hellenistic philosophy—had as its purpose not the suppression or even extirpation of natural drives, but rather their *control* and complete *spiritualization.* It is positive, not negative, asceticism—aimed fundamentally at a liberation of the highest powers of personality from blockage by the automatism of the lower drives."[13] That renunciatory mode, in which the highest powers of personality are precisely those which subserve rather than subvert culture, appears no longer systemically efficient. The spiritualizers have had their day; nowadays, the best among them appear engaged in a desperate strategy of acceptance, in the hope that by embracing doctrinal expressions of therapeutic aims they will be embraced by the therapeutics; a false hope—the therapeutics need no doctrines, only opportunities. But the spiritualizers persist in trying to maintain cultural contact with constituencies already deconverted in all but name. Even the Roman Catholic clergy must now confront their own constituencies, as their Protestant and Jewish colleagues have had to do long before. Nevertheless, the religious professionals have reason to hope for survival, precisely because they have come to be aware of their situation and are seeking ways to alter it, in the direction of a fresh access of communal purpose, centered in the Negro protest movement, or in some other movement of protest against the effects of that very dead culture which they think, by protesting so belatedly, to survive.

The death of a culture begins when its normative institutions fail to communicate ideals in ways that remain inwardly compelling, first of all to the cultural elites themselves. Many spokesmen for our established normative institutions are aware of their failure and yet remain powerless to generate in themselves the

[13] Max Scheler, *Vom Umsturz der Werte* (Bern, 1955), p. 114. (Author's translation.)

necessary unwitting part of their culture that merits the name of faith. "Is not the very fact that so wretchedly little binding address is heard in the church," asked Karl Barth, rhetorically, in 1939, "accountable for a goodly share of her misery—is it not perhaps *the* misery?"[14] The misery of this culture is acutely stated by the special misery of its normative institutions. Our more general misery is that, having broken with those institutionalized credibilities from which its moral energy derived, new credibilities are not yet operationally effective and, perhaps, cannot become so in a culture constantly probing its own unwitting part.

It may be argued against this position that Western culture was never deeply believing—at least not in the Christian manner which, in a number of its most persuasive varieties, encouraged the seeking after individual salvations at the expense of a collective one. Even so, Christian culture survived because it superintended the organization of Western personality in ways that produced the necessary corporate identities, serving a larger communal purpose institutionalized in the churches themselves. Ernst Troeltsch was correct in his institutional title for the moral demand system preceding the one now emerging out of its complete ruin: a "church civilization," an "authoritarian and coercive culture." What binding address now describes our successor culture? In what does the self now try to find salvation, if not in the breaking of corporate identities and in an acute suspicion of all normative institutions?

Western culture has had a literary canon, through which its character ideals were conveyed. What canons will replace the scriptural? None, I suppose. We are probably witnessing the end of a cultural history dominated by book religions and word-makers. The elites of the emergent culture—if they do not destroy themselves and all culture with a dynamism they appear unable to control—are being trained in terminologies that have

[14] Karl Barth, *The Church and the Political Problem of Our Day* (New York, 1939), pp. 82–3.

only the most tenuous relation to any historic culture or its incorporative self-interpretations.

It needs to be noted that in particular on the geographic margins of our moral demand system, and in the Orient, the rejection of religious culture, even in principle, is far from complete. By contrast, the Communist movement may be viewed as culturally conservative,[15] belonging to the classical tradition of moral demand systems. The revolution in the West is profoundly cultural whereas that in the East, withal its defensive doctrine of the cultural as a mere superstructure of the techno-political class system, has been less certainly so. Of the two, our revolution is, I think, the more profound one. Communist culture, no less than the Christian, is in trouble; it cannot stave off a revolution coming out of the West, in part as a repercussion, in that it renounces the renunciatory mode of Communism. The Russian cultural revolution is already being signaled by the liberation, however grudgingly, of the intellectuals from creedal constraints.

The new religiosity is remissive. It represents no mere literary challenge, as in the time of the Enlightenment. The would-be instinctual Everyman and his girl friend are the enlightened ones

[15] Communism, both doctrinally and institutionally, is here taken in its Leninist form, in which the Party takes up functions once performed by the teaching Church, as the dominant *cultural* as well as *political* institution in Russian society. It is impossible to conceive of a vital Christian culture without a teaching Church. As the inheritor of the churches' ambition, the Communist Party has sought to function as a normative institution, unlike Western political parties.

In documenting his assertion that Lenin's elder brother, Alexander (Sasha), was a Marxist, Louis Fischer has unwittingly helped demonstrate the validity of analyzing Communist movements as primarily cultural—however strenuously and systematically Marxist theory itself contradicts the proposition, and persists in turning the truth upside down. Fischer quotes from Sasha's trial, when the elder brother proclaimed that "every change in the social system is a result of a change in the consciousness of society." The original Marxist Ulyanov thus expressed the true revolutionary doctrine, from which Marxists, entrapped in a moral indifferentism derived from the rejection by Karl Marx of the "utopianism" and moralism of Moses Hess and other early Communist theorists, have long drawn their implicit knowledge, of what revolutions really are. See Louis Fischer, *The Life of Lenin* (New York, 1964), p. 15.

now; a Freud would be quite superfluous, specially in view of the fact that he sought to find ways other than neurotic of supporting renunciations.

Indeed, Freud has already receded into history. His problems are not ours. The psychoanalytic movement, no less than its rationalist predecessors, has been ruined by the popular (and commercial) pressure upon it to help produce a symbolic for the reorganization of personality, after the central experience of deconversion, of which Freud was the last great theorist, had been completed. Fixed as they are at the historical stage of deconversion, responsible psychotherapists continue to struggle confusedly to discover their own proper attitude toward renunciatory moral demand systems even as the normative character of their abandonment has altered both the theoretical and working conditions of clinical practice. So confused, psychiatrists and clinical psychologists, in their hospitals and consulting rooms, stand almost as helpless as their functional predecessors and sometime cultural opponents, the clergy. But other therapeutic elites are not in a better condition, as I have tried to bring out more elaborately in the final chapter.

Our cultural revolution does not aim, like its predecessors, at victory for some rival commitment, but rather at a way of using all commitments, which amounts to loyalty toward none. By psychologizing about themselves interminably, Western men are learning to use their internality against the primacy of any particular organization of personality. If this re-structuring of the Western imagination succeeds in establishing itself, complete with institutional regimens, then human autonomy from the compulsions of culture may follow the freedoms already won from the compulsions of nature. With such a victory, culture, as previously understood, need suffer no further defeats. It is conceivable that millennial distinctions between inner and outer experience, private and public life, will become trivial. The individual heart need have no reasons of its own that the corpo-

rate head cannot understand and exploit for some augmentation of the individual's sense of well-being. Thinking need not produce nausea or despair as its final answer to the assessment of communal purpose because men will have ceased to seek any salvation other than amplitude in living itself. Faith can then grow respectable again, as one entertainable and passing personal experience among others, to enhance the interest of living freed from communal purpose. The significance Marx attached to the division of labor for the organization of society may have bearing in our emergent culture on the variety of entertainments. To paraphrase Marx and Engels, all morality, be it ascetic or hedonistic, loses its force with a therapeutic outlook.

Like its predecessors, the emergent culture must formulate its own controls, no less than the preceding one defined its own remissions; it is in the process of doing so already. We are, I fear, getting to know one another. Reticence, secrecy, concealment of self have been transformed into social problems; once they were aspects of civility, when the great Western formulary summed up in the creedal phrase "Know thyself" encouraged obedience to communal purposes rather than suspicion of them. Self-knowledge again made social is the principle of control upon which the emergent culture may yet be able to make itself stable. Indeed, with the arts of psychiatric management enhanced and perfected, men will come to know one another in ways that could facilitate total socialization without a symbolic of communal purpose. Then the brief historic fling of the individual, celebrating himself as a being in himself, divine and therefore essentially unknowable, would be truly ended—ending no less certainly than the preceding personifications of various renunciatory disciplines. Men already feel freer to live their lives with a minimum of pretense to anything more grand than sweetening the time. Perhaps it is better so; in cultures past, men sacrificed themselves to heroic and cruel deceptions, and suffered for glories that once mirrored their miseries. Not until psychological men overcome lives of squalor can they truly test their assumption that the inherited ideals of glory are no longer

required. Affluence achieved, the creation of a knowing rather than a believing person, able to enjoy life without erecting high symbolic hedges around it, distinguishes the emergent culture from its predecessor. The new anti-culture aims merely at an eternal interim ethic of release from the inherited controls.

Who is to say that these controls are eternal? I do not think so; even Christian theologians no longer say so with any confidence—and some are saying, rather, that new releases are holier than old controls. Yet even among churchmen there are those who understand anew that their religion is nothing if not the organization of communal purpose and the conservation of inherited culture; they therefore place desperate hope in the movement of which Dr. Martin Luther King is chief spokesman. Increasing numbers of churchmen have allied themselves with the Negro religious leader in what they have reluctantly understood must be a common struggle, for the rebirth of their moral demand system, against vastly superior numbers of nominally Christian (or Jewish) barbarians. This slowly reforming Christian cultural elite, apparent fellow travelers of the movement of Negro non-violent protest but in reality its critical aggregate, may yet save the United States from a barbarism long evident in the conduct of their own churches' members, in ordinary American commercial activity, and in the extraordinary incivilities of the American social manner. Yet there may be little power of Christian renewal in the movement of Negro protest. For the American Negro has been a focus for *releasing* images in the dominant white culture. Affluent white society, as it grows more affluent, may draw nearer their *idea* of the Negro as a model enjoyer of the relaxed life, but that idea is profoundly prejudicial to the renewal sought by the religious leadership, black and white.[16]

[16] Compare the white idea of the Negro with their idea of the Jews, who, throughout Western cultural history, have been feared and hated as personifications of *controlling* motifs. In the light of their personifications in terms of releasing motifs, American Negroes are stuck with a double-edged motto: "Freedom Now" aptly expresses the nervousness and furtive envy of white American ideas about Negro behavior.

The present releases, in growing more dominant, must achieve institutional affirmations of the prevalent feeling. Critically to elaborate such affirmations has been the historic function of Western intellectuals. But, not yet able to produce imagery that would mark a trail for many memories, contemporary writers and artists, all those intellectuals slightly ahead of their time, mainly produce moods of solicitude about themselves, as if they could not bear the weight of the freedom from their inherited role upon which they themselves insist. This temper against moralizing has its justifications. The Germans recently manipulated all corporate identities and communal purposes with a thoroughness against which the analytic attitude may be our surest protection.

Under such protection, it may not be possible to organize our culture again as an unwitting dynamic of moral demands claiming the prerogatives of truth, exercised through creedally authoritative institutions. Where family and nation once stood, or Church and Party, there will be hospital and theater too,[17] the normative institutions of the next culture. Trained to be incapable of sustaining sectarian satisfactions, psychological man cannot be susceptible to sectarian control. Religious man was

[17] In a passage of his *Italienische Reise* (Stuttgart, 1862) dated May 27, 1787, Goethe remarks: "Speaking for myself, I too believe that humanity will win in the long run; I am only afraid that at the same time the world will have turned into one huge hospital where everyone is everybody else's humane nurse." See the translation by W. H. Auden and E. Mayer (New York, 1962) p. 312. This is the earliest prophecy of the emergent culture of which I am aware. But Goethe was not the last member of a cultural elite to dread or wish for such an institutional development. Coleridge once suggested, in a letter, the founding of a "new charitable institution . . . for lunacy and idiocy of the *will*, in which, with the full consent of, or at the direct insistence of the patient himself, and with the concurrence of his friends, such a person under the certificate of a physician might be placed under medical and moral coercion. I am convinced that London would furnish a hundred volunteers in as many days from the gin-shops, who would swallow their glass of poison in order to get courage to present themselves to the hospital in question. And a similar institution might exist for a higher class of will-maniacs or impotents. Had such a house of health been in existence, I know who would have entered himself as a patient some five and twenty years ago." *Letters*, II, pp. 767–8. Quoted in Kathleen Coburn (ed.), *Inquiring Spirit: Coleridge from his Published and Unpublished Prose Writings* (New York, 1951), pp. 36 ff.

born to be saved; psychological man is born to be pleased. The difference was established long ago, when "I believe," the cry of the ascetic, lost precedence[18] to "one feels," the caveat of the therapeutic. And if the therapeutic is to win out, then surely the psychotherapist will be his secular spiritual guide.

However one may judge the validity of the multiple truths at which science and history arrive, my interest is in their social viability. The next culture may be viable without being valid; on the other hand, the old faiths could be judged valid even by those who consider them now no longer viable. In order to attend fairly to the competing beliefs and unbeliefs, one must struggle to use neutral terms. A sociological vocabulary keeps a certain distance from both new permissions and old inhibitions. This distance is the only possible justification for such jargon as I have used in the present volume; except as a device for gaining perspective, sociological jargon is a curse, first of all upon the intellectual lives of sociologists. Sociological writing itself is ineluctably part of the psychohistorical process, engaged as it is in persuasive redefinitions of action that alter the action.

Can the present releases become the predicates of new controls? Viewed traditionally, the continuing shift from a controlling to a releasing symbolic may appear as the dissolution of culture. Viewed sociologically, the dominance of releasing motifs, in which the releasers themselves evolve as new modes of control, with patterns of consumption as our popular discipline, implies a movement of Western culture away from its former configuration, toward one in which old ideological contents are preserved mainly for their therapeutic potential, as interesting deposits of past motifs of moralizing. No imperative can then develop a monopoly on sentiment, because none will be backed by a deeply ingrained system of inner ordinances.

[18] For example, it is evident in the apologetics preached by Friedrich Schleiermacher to the cultured despisers of religion at the end of the eighteenth century; Schleiermacher's *Reden* (1799) were a brilliant effort to turn the deconversion experience of the highly cultured against itself.

I do not refer to a "sensualist" culture but to one that prepares for adaptability in matters of the "spirit." There is no special affection reserved in this volume for the superiority usually claimed for "spiritual" over "sensual" concerns. In the emergent culture, a wider range of people will have "spiritual" concerns and engage in "spiritual" pursuits. There will be more singing and more listening. People will continue to genuflect and read the Bible, which has long achieved the status of great literature; but no prophet will denounce the rich attire or stop the dancing. There will be more theater, not less, and no Puritan will denounce the stage and draw its curtains. On the contrary, I expect that modern society will mount psychodramas far more frequently than its ancestors mounted miracle plays, with patient-analysts acting out their inner lives, after which they could extemporize the final act as interpretation. We shall even institutionalize in the hospital-theater the *Verfremdungseffekt*, with the therapeutic triumphantly enacting his own discovered will.

The wisdom of the next social order, as I imagine it, would not reside in right doctrine, administered by the right men, who must be found, but rather in doctrines amounting to permission for each man to live an experimental life. Thus, once again, culture will give back what it has taken away. All governments will be just, so long as they secure that consoling plenitude of option in which modern satisfaction really consists. In this way the emergent culture could drive the value problem clean out of the social system and, limiting it to a form of philosophical entertainment in lieu of edifying preachment, could successfully conclude the exercise for which politics is the name. Problems of democracy need no longer prove so difficult as they have been. Psychological man is likely to be indifferent to the ancient question of legitimate authority, of sharing in government, so long as the powers that be preserve social order and manage an economy of abundance. The danger of politics lies more in the ancient straining to create those symbols or support those institutions that narrow the range of virtues or too narrowly define

the sense of well-being; for the latter seems to be the real beatitude toward which men have always strained. Psychological man, in his independence from all gods, can feel free to use all god-terms; I imagine he will be a hedger against his own bets, a user of any faith that lends itself to therapeutic use.

Culture as therapy becomes realizable in part because of the increasing automaticity of the productive system. But without the discipline of work, a vast re-ritualization of social life will probably occur, to contain aggression in a steady state and maintain necessary levels of attention to activity. The rules of health indicate activity; psychological man can exploit older cultural precepts, ritual struggle no less than play therapy, in order to maintain the dynamism of his culture. Of course, the newest Adam cannot be expected to limit himself to the use of old constraints. If "immoral" materials, rejected under earlier cultural criteria, are therapeutically effective, enhancing somebody's sense of well-being, then they are useful. The "end" or "goal" is to keep going. Americans, as F. Scott Fitzgerald concluded, believe in the green light.

I am aware that these speculations may be thought to contain some parodies of an apocalypse. But what apocalypse has ever been so kindly? What culture has ever attempted to see to it that no ego is hurt? Perhaps the elimination of the tragic sense—which is tantamount to the elimination of irreconcilable moral principles—is no tragedy. Civilization could be, for the first time in history, the expression of human contents rather than the consolatory control of discontents. Then and only then would the religious question receive a markedly different answer from those dominant until recently in our cultural history.

confused!

Freud proclaimed no
ideal character type

Jung did

# CHAPTER I

## *The Analytic Attitude: Freud's Legacy and Its Inheritors*

*Consolation . . . at bottom this is what they are demanding . . . the wildest revolutionaries no less passionately than the most virtuous believers.*

—Freud, *Civilisation and Its Discontents*

The religious question: How are we to be consoled for the misery of living? may be answered by a culture, thus self-defined, in various ways; in terms of the good, the beautiful, and the true (the wordiness of Socrates); by a reference to how and by whom we are to be saved (the terseness of Christ); by tracing a line of historical development toward justice (the ponderous irony of Marx). Because Freud as a therapist refused even to ask the religious question, or proclaim a characterological ideal, he earned the polemical hatred of the best who came after him—Jung, for example, as well as Lawrence and Reich—all of whom tried to envision the next culture. The prophet in all three of Freud's most powerful successor-critics was much stronger than the scientist. Jung could not avoid finding a theology at the end of his therapy nor Reich an ideal character at the end of his analytic theory. Later on in this volume, I shall

consider various struggles by Freud's successors to frame the great question in a culturally compelling way, illustrating thereby how powerfully psychotherapy may be tempted to go beyond the grim safety of diagnostic analysis to seek out the danger of creative doctrinal synthesis. All the post-Freudians treated in this volume were similarly tempted. Their psychologies became modes of consolation. Instead of raising Freud's lack of conviction into a doctrine, leaving the ruins of the old renunciatory culture by the wayside, mitigating merely its discomforts as was done by Freud, these post-Freudians tried to create a releasing conviction—a new culture, or, as in the case of Jung, a simulacrum of the old one.

Freud never felt tempted in this way. His genius was analytic, not prophetic. At its best, psychoanalytic therapy is devoted to the long and dubious task of rubbing a touch of that analytic genius into less powerful minds. Here is no large new cosset of an idea, within which Western men could comfort themselves for the inherent difficulties of living. Freud's was a severe and chill anti-doctrine, in which the awesome dichotomy with which culture imposes itself upon men—that between an ultimately meaningful and a meaningless life—must also be abandoned. This, then, was Freud's prescription to mankind as the patient, so that by the power of the analytic attitude a limit be set to the sway of culture over mankind.

With such an attitude, men could not change the dynamics of culture (which were unchangeable anyway),[1] but they could change at least their own relationship to these dynamics. They could become more diplomatic in their transactions with the moral demand system: not rebels but negotiators. To maintain the analytic attitude, in the everyday conduct of life, becomes the most subtle of all efforts of the ego; it is tantamount to

[1] "What would be the use of the most correct analysis of social neuroses, since no one possesses authority to impose such a therapy upon the group?" To change the dynamics of culture, the analytic attitude would have to become a moral demand, and thus it would cease to be analytic. Cf. Sigmund Freud, *Civilisation and Its Discontents*, Standard Edition (London, 1961), XXI, p. 144.

limiting the power of the super-ego and, therewith, of culture. The analytic attitude expresses a trained capacity for entertaining tentative opinions about the inner dictates of conscience, reserving the right even to disobey the law insofar as it originates outside the individual, in the name of a gospel of a freer impulse. Not that impulse alone is to be trusted. It is merely to be respected, and a limit recognized of the ability of any culture to transform the aggressiveness of impulse, by an alchemy of commitment, into the authority of law. Freud maintained a sober vision of man in the middle, a go-between, aware of the fact that he had little strength of his own, forever mediating between culture and instinct in an effort to gain some room for maneuver between these hostile powers. Maturity, according to Freud, lay in the trained capacity to keep the negotiations from breaking down.

Does not such a doctrine of maturity, which cannot lead beyond the difficult and unstable condition of being mature, lead instead to fresh outbursts of hope for the victory of culture or that of impulse—or, as in the case of Freud's critical successors, to the wild hope of a culture dominated by impulse? Freud's doctrine of psychological manhood has itself contributed to a resurgence of anxiety on both sides, with some accusing him of being a conservative of culture (e.g., Lawrence) and others accusing him of being a nineteenth-century radical of impulse (e.g., Jung). In time, it may become apparent that Freud and his doctrine have undergone an inexorable disciplining by the culture, and that the exemplary cast of Freud's mind and character is more enduring than the particulars of his doctrine. In culture it is always the example that survives; the person is the immortal idea. Psychoanalysis was the perfect vehicle for Freud's intellectual character. When, at last, Freud found himself, having searched systematically but in vain in various disciplines, he established a new discipline, first of all for himself.

Later, as psychoanalysis became more adaptable, the hidden force of Freud's character began to be effective through the

discipline, detached from his person. Psychoanalysis became a transferable art, and therefore a cultural force, which, dealing as it does in moral suasion, does not distinguish between science and art.[2] In sociological terms, psychoanalysis became what we shall call the symbolic mode of a "negative community." It is held together by the analytic attitude, as most moderns are who think too much about themselves. Psychoanalysis is yet another method of learning how to endure the loneliness produced by culture. Psychoanalysis is its representative therapy—in contrast to classical therapies of commitment. It is characteristic of our culture that there is no longer an effective sense of communion, driving the individual out of himself, rendering the inner life serviceable to the outer. This has led to cultural artifacts like psychoanalysis, devised primarily to protect the outer life against further encroachments by the inner and to minimize the damage caused by disorders among the parts inside. When so little can be taken for granted, and when the meaningfulness of social existence no longer grants an inner life at peace with itself, every man must become something of a genius about himself. But the imagination boggles at a culture made up mainly of virtuosi of the self. It is precisely the authority of culture that limits the need for such virtuosi.

Just this threat to the authority of culture is the reason why psychoanalysis appealed so immediately to the modern intellectual, who prides himself first of all on his independence of mind and conduct. Now, there is a curious resemblance between the futility felt by the analyst and the modern intellectual: both have the analytic attitude as the very basis and limit of their

[2] The distinction between science and art takes on sociological importance only inasmuch as the one or the other is diagnosed as having more or less cultural force. For the rest, the distinction breaks down into pedantries about the differences of method or procedure, when in fact the creative effort differs only in its object of address and not in its ways of constituting realities not immediately available to common sense. Yet even common sense is a residue of old arts and sciences, something like a cultural deposit of perception. Every brave art or new science, however, departs from common sense and thus must appear in the beginning, before it is established, as culturally subversive.

vocations. Precisely for this reason both, analyst and modern intellectual, feel the futility built into their vocations. They are charter members of the negative community, in which membership carries precious few obligations and the corporate effort is devoted mainly to objecting to the rules. Yet, despite growing regret among its critics, the civilization of authority continues to fade into history; more accurately, it has become dysfunctional. Freud was acutely aware of this. Seen from the vantage point of membership in the negative community, all positive ones appear either fraudulent or stupid; despite a massive effort by professional psychoanalysts to remain clinical therapists rather than culture critics, there is nothing in psychoanalysis that makes them any the less so.

Since a less negative sense of vocation can be instilled only in a community blessed with both a rank order of vocations and some objective means of assigning vocations, as in a civilization of authority, the patient, when he is sent out "cured," can only make himself his own vocation. To the extent of his intellectual and emotional capacity, he joins the negative community; he settles down to limit more or less capably the power of the culture in which he lives to sink deeper into his self. A certain autonomy from the penetrative thrust of culture: this is the characteristic of the new individuality. Freud himself realized this. When Freud rejected the notion of psychoanalysis as a propaedeutic to accepting one or another religious community, he imagined an ideal patient, one so strengthened that he could tolerate a return to nothing more compelling than an environment in which the ego could fight more capably for itself in the subtle and universal war of all against all.

I have summed up, elsewhere,[3] Freud's attack on the moralizing function of modern culture. It was not always the case; but nowadays, in the circumstances of modernity, to be religious is, he thought, to be sick: it is an effort to find a cure where no one

[3] "The Analytic Attitude," *Encounter*, Vol. XVII, No. 6 (June, 1962), pp. 22–28.

can possibly survive. For Freud, religious questions induce the very symptoms they seek to cure. "The moment a man questions the meaning and value of life," Freud wrote (in a letter to Marie Bonaparte),[4] "he is sick, since objectively neither has any existence." The analyst, proudly, needs no synthesis. But, in scorning a synthesis, he is opposing the dynamics of culture. It is precisely as the culture fails that "not only the patient's analysis but that of the analyst himself has ceased to be terminable and become an interminable task."[5] The exercise of reason is transformed into a parody of that contemplative way of life which characterizes most religious representatives of the old culture. Faith develops a simulacrum in analysis; the churches break up into warring sects. Here is the first step toward trying to explain the "psychoanalytic movement," which is a subtle contradiction in terms.

To be analytical is to be a realist. It is not required of a realist to be hopeful or hopeless, but only truthful. Among Freud's first and most important followers there were those who considered his realism therapeutically limiting; nor did they find that the dynamics of the transference supplied an adequate substitute. They refused to approach reality in Freud's neutralist terms. Faith reappeared, understood in terms of therapy. This was done rather easily, for religion has always had a therapeutic aspect, in one of two ways which it is important to review.

It is essential to the understanding of the function of religion that it presents jointly and in fusion two analytically discernible alternatives: either a therapeutic control of everyday life or a therapeutic respite from that very control. On the one hand, faith is doctrinal, and that doctrine is internalized thus becoming functionally anti-instinctual. On the other hand, faith is ecstatic, or erotic; there is a relative absence of doctrinal internalization,

[4] *Letters of Sigmund Freud*, ed. by Ernst L. Freud (New York, 1960), p. 436.

[5] "Analysis Terminable and Interminable," *Collected Papers* (London, 1950), Vol. 5, p. 353.

and the religious mood covertly provides an opportunity for the instincts to express themselves more directly—for example, in orgiastic behavior, or in mystical states of mind which release the subject from traditional authority.

Defined as control of conduct in everyday life, faith tends to be methodical and systematic. Defined as remission of that control, faith tends to be anti-methodical and unsystematic. To the extent that a system of faith spreads, the line between usual and unusual religious experience grows fuzzy. In effect, religious experience becomes less unusual as it becomes functionally more influential on the conduct of everyday life—this will apply not to all elements, of course, but precisely to those which give some assurance of being saved, whatever that may mean in a particular religious system. This assurance is then taken as a basis of good—because efficacious—behavior.

In order to assure a continuity of mood, there must be limits to its expression. Religious emotionalism may lead to psychic collapse—to that desolate feeling Christians once experienced as "abandonment by God." Historically, various methods are known to exist for keeping up a sense of assurance, which may have had its origin in a state of ecstasy. These methods may be fairly called "ascetic": for example, various forms of abstinence, control of breathing, and even semi-starvation. Such ascetic devices, if they are functional, prolong, even regularize, the subjective feeling of security. To preserve this sense of ultimate security is thus the first function of all asceticism and of the classical disciplines of thought-training—now called "brainwashing." To perpetuate themselves, religious doctrines ordinarily develop modes of psychological retraining; conversely, all psychological retraining develops some of the characteristics of religious doctrine. History supplies enough examples of that deliberate emptying of consciousness, which may be the essential characteristic of all systems of therapy.

If successful, these therapeutic controls tend to spread out into the culture as a whole. Everyone, in every activity of life

should have the correct attitude; and, moreover, every activity of life should be brought to terms with the system of control. Any type of action that seems to subvert these controls must either be ruled as incorrect and dangerous, or else sanctioned and brought within the system of control. For example, in the Chinese arts, the pentatonic scale was decreed as correct by Confucian doctrine.

All such systems of therapeutic control, limiting as they do the area of spontaneity, are anti-instinctual; what we mean, ordinarily, by cultures, are just these systems. We call these systems "therapeutic" because these controls are intended to preserve a certain established level of adequacy in the social functioning of the individual, as well as forestall the danger of his psychological collapse. Needless to say, such systems of control—whether Christian, Buddhist, or any other—are authoritarian. The classical modes of anti-authoritarianism revolve around therapeutic respites from control; anti-authoritarianism, therefore, has always been vulnerable to the charge of being culturally (i.e. morally) subversive.

In Freud's conception, therapy is indeed a mechanism for establishing self-control. But this therapy is morally neutral. Faith, however, even one that accents the remission of control, is never neutral. The analytic attitude is an alternative to all religious ones.

Yet, being alternatives, psychoanalytic and religious therapies bear curious resemblances. Both demand complete honesty in performance; only thus can both become ways of finding out what is wrong with oneself. The process of receiving help in finding out what is inwardly wrong presupposes establishment of that inner attitude whereby the patient, or the worshiper, may become more receptive to the sources of help. Finally, psychoanalysis and faith converge as ways in which character can be transformed. Being interested in the transformation of character, both are essentially cultural in nature. If psychoanalysis is to be a

science, it must be a moral science no less than a science of morals, as Freud tried to have it. After Freud, all the figures discussed in the following chapters have tried, in their disparate ways, to go so far beyond psychologizing that it would become a way of life, that culture would be destroyed as a system of controlling consolations and reconstructed as a system of more immediate releases of impulse. Freud was mistaken in his judgment of "the wildest revolutionaries." They did not so much seek some new consolation as that culture of release which would render the many consolations of high culture unnecessary. However, what they achieved was new consolations, locked forever in a struggle against defensive cultural ideologies. In this light, Freud appears as the critical defender of high culture, attacked in different ways by Jung, Reich and Lawrence.

Arguments are ineffectual unless supported by events. The Freudian argument, orthodox and schismatic, had been persuasive among certain sectors of the educated classes in combination with historical circumstances. It has been adapted to the American scene, in ways Freud would not approve,[6] for purposes Freud would have approved, so that those who must rid themselves of the burden of their atavistic self-identities, can now do so.

In other parts of the world, an identical process of cultural disemburdenment is taking place under bureaucratic auspices, forcing cultural change through the political apparatus. Entire societies are being pruned—of dead literature, of withering attachments. The weight of the past has suddenly been felt on entire continents. The urge to cast off the yoke has spread very far—it can be called "progressive" in a subtle and misleading sense only. Hitler destroyed the German past as thoroughly as the Asian Communists are destroying theirs. But the revolution of our time has gone beyond politics; it is being waged as

[6] *I.e.*, by vulgar and partial incorporations into popular culture.

fiercely in the Asias of the mind—Freud, not Marx, is the dominant figure here. Freud's legacy is still a vitally growing thing, particularly in its misuse as a modality of faith.

That our inherited moral systems have failed us, that we have been thrown back on our own psychological resources precisely in an era when other resources have been socialized, accounts in a measure for the appeal of Freud. His work was an attempt to strengthen our inner resources against what he considered obsolete cultural systems of inhibitions. Our inherited moral systems have not been either alive enough or dead enough to permit fulfillment of our rising expectations of happiness. Formerly, if men were miserable, they went to church, so as to find the rationale of their misery; they did not expect to be happy—this idea is Greek, not Christian or Jewish. Freud embarked on a modest experiment: his doctrine promises not more happiness but less misery. He fought for human freedom in its plainer negative sense. Like those who worked for shorter hours but nevertheless feared what men might do with more leisure, Freud would have welcomed more constructive releases from our stale moralities but did not propose to substitute a new one. Our private ethics were his scientific problem; he had no new public ethic to suggest, no grand design for the puzzle of our common life. He will not help those who suffer from residual beliefs to find new beliefs; he can only help us in our unbelief. Whether, and by what criteria, his method of moral re-education will succeed or fail in a given case, depends on the soundness of his analysis of culture; that he was engaged in a great pacifying cultural mission, the moral disarmament of Western man, no student of the warring beliefs against which Freudianism is a reaction can shrug off. We may disagree with Freud on one point or another; we cannot dismiss him, except so far as he has succeeded and there changed the nature of our common problem. Nor can Freud's contribution to the new history of our old emotions be dismissed by a mere gesture of respect toward his greatness. There have been other great psychologists; they have

not perceptibly affected our daily conduct—more particularly, our view of our daily conduct. Indeed, psychology need not have anything at all to do with morals, no more than religion need have anything to do with God. Much of what is still taught in our schools as psychology revolves around problems other than those of moral conduct; lobotomists of pigeons, e.g., are entirely within their rights in calling themselves psychologists—insofar as their observations of the learning behavior of pigeons might be used to form hypotheses about the learning behavior of men. But Freud's is a psychology that matters culturally. His psychology not only studies the conduct of life but seeks also to affect it. For that reason alone, it is just to call Freud's a moral psychology,[7] whatever one's judgment as to its scientific merits.

Social scientists have not quite caught up with Freud. When they will, they might find he has upset their disciplines. His roving genius is one reason for the indiscipline that overcame the psychoanalytic movement. To some, his example was contagious; they too roved. For others, he roved too much; they became more orthodox than Freud. Neither rationalist nor romantic, neither realist nor nominalist, neither progressive nor reactionary—all and none—Freud belongs to the succession of great minds from Rousseau through Nietzsche: these are the psychologues who would transform our emotions into ideas, who would spin new universes of discourse out of their own seething discontent. This is more than science, more than art—it is another sort of reality into which it is said one must enter personally in order to comprehend it. It is another kind of self-consciousness. Such genius can change a culture. I shall try to indicate in a preliminary way the character-type of this emergent culture as reflected in the Freudian and post-Freudian genius.

Psychological man is, of course, a myth—but not more of a myth than other model men around whom we organize our self-interpretations. This is the time to evoke this new man, tease him

[7] Cf. *Freud: The Mind of the Moralist*, Chap. 1.

out as the holder of the reins, to assume command of our emotional chaos. He is the sane self in a mad world, the integrated personality in the age of nuclear fission, the quiet answer to loud explosions. All this may be too ephemeral, as yet, to lay out the psychological man for an anatomy lesson as economic man has been laid out—his anxious Protestant heart, his open Enlightenment eyes, his democratic accents dissected and probed now by every student doctor of the social sciences. It may be too early to squeeze my fragile conception dry between the hard covers of a book. I am merely announcing his presence, fluttering in all of us, a response to the absent God. In so doing, I say that the modern man is not in the position of a wise man exhibiting a fool, or that of a healthy man examining the sick; we are all fools, all sick—and until we can control the shock of this recognition we shall not be able to assess the character of our age correctly. That a new myth of man is developing, at least among the educated classes, seems evident to me. It is a response to the divisiveness and destruction without and to the chaos within. But we are ourselves involved in the creation of this new myth of man and cannot be expected to see the type in clear perspective.

Nevertheless, psychological man can already be approached with the confidence that he is alive and prospering among us, nurturing his sense of well-being, the healthy hypochondriac who rightly expects to survive all interpretation. Who, without Freud, would so well know how to live with no higher purpose than that of a durable sense of well-being? Freud has systematized our unbelief; his is the most inspiring anti-creed yet offered a post-religious culture. Throw away all the old keys to the great riddles of life; depth in psychology brings men's minds around from such simplicities to the complexity of everyday tournaments with existence, to an active resignation in matters as they are, to a modest hope, and to satisfiable desires. Balance is the delicate ethic Freud proposes, balance on the edge that separates futility and ultimate purposelessness from immediate

effectiveness and purpose. Psychological man may be going nowhere, but he aims to achieve a certain speed and certainty in going. Like his predecessor, the man of the market economy, he understands morality as that which is conducive to increased activity. The important thing is to keep going.

In retrospect, of course, it seems inevitable that some of Freud's followers should have grown dissatisfied with the restlessness of the analytic attitude and its terrifying acceptance of so much effort without a unifying aim. The chief gentile of the psychoanalytic attitude, Jung, did not tolerate for long the healthy-mindedness that Freud had imposed upon his science. Jung's premature restiveness led him to propose, instead, the "adapted attitude." Therapeutically adapted, men could at least reconcile their own particular fantasy life with the one or the other of those universal and historic forms of fantasy, sometimes memorialized in religions, called "archetypes" by Jung. The "adapted attitude" would permit the patient to see the analyst with his professional guard down, as just another man, no less puzzled and in search than the patient himself. Patient and analyst might even continue that search for guiding principles beyond therapy, together. Jung represents a conservative, or traditionalist, trumping of the psychoanalytic game. He is perhaps the most subtle of modern conservatives, trying to save not this tradition or that, but the very notion of tradition, which can be defined, in Jungian terms, as shared archetypes internalized. When the theologians will finally catch up with Jung, they might discover in him that particular psychology for which they have been seeking, in a prolonged agony, a substitute for all those ontologies crumbling at the foundation of theology.

For more than a century now, theologians have been screening psychologists in the hope of finding one who could rescue theology for them. Writing to his old Oxford tutor in 1857, one of the more honest religious figures of the century, the first Archbishop Temple, put into clear English what had been muddled in German ever since the time of Schleiermacher:

> Our theology has been cast in a scholastic mould, all based on logic. We are in need of, and we are actually being forced into, a theology based on psychology.[8]

Following Pascal, both Schleiermacher and Kierkegaard had tried to psychologize the old theology; both failed because both remained, like Pascal, too apologetically Christian. The religious feelings needed a psychological renaissance less traditionally Christian and yet broad enough to permit a fresh Christian apologetic to be read into it. Jung has supplied that psychology; for apologists there remains only the task to use it for their own purposes.

The greatest psychologist of our century, Freud, was all but oblivious to this need among the religious. When Freud did hear the call, late in life, he anathematized it in *The Future of an Illusion* and rendered it peculiarly Jewish in *Moses and Monotheism.* Jung, his one-time heir apparent, was never hostile to theology—only to the theologians. It is not that in his writings on religion Jung had played the believing Protestant, as Freud played the unbelieving Jew. Jung was far too intent on supplying a new basis for culture to be either extremely polemical or mysteriously personal, as Freud was with *Moses:* there Freud made a final but ambivalent effort to dismiss the religious question in his own life by transforming it into a psychohistorical process.

No one can know the exact wording of Jung's title to greatness. However it may be explained and qualified, the legitimacy of that title will depend in part upon the success of his attempt to install a psychology where ontology once reigned.

Religious appreciation of Jung grows slowly. The simple and the sophisticated are both rightly suspicious, and they are so for what amounts to the same reason: the simple because Jung encourages a religiosity other than their own, the sophisticated because Jung encourages religiosity per se, as if all forms of it were merely therapeutic. Religion, thus rendered functional,

[8] *Memoirs of Archbishop Temple* (London, 1859), II, p. 517.

loses, however, its therapeutic effect. For the sophisticated, Jung would be a godsend. Yet they are deterred from accepting him by a prevailing suspicion of precisely his traditionalist revision of psychoanalysis. The professionally religious, timid, overworked, and poorly educated as they are, have had neither the time nor the intellectual stamina necessary to realize that the man for whom they had been waiting for more than a century was recently among them, that a placable psychology of archetypes stands ready waiting for them to adapt and make comprehensible the concepts to which they once could point only as archaic theologies, stiff and unresponsive even to the warmest, most personal appeals.

Jung himself well understood the importance of what he had to offer. In his own experience as a therapist, he discovered a fresh source for the familiar mood of discontent among the civilized. That discontent was no longer with rigid and outworn meanings impinging upon our vital impulses. It is not the repressions that trouble us now but the permissions. It is "the meaninglessness of life that causes the disturbance in the unconscious." For Jung's patients past the age of thirty-five, as for a mature civilization in general, the "problem in the last resort" consists in finding "a religious outlook on life." This is no doctrine of maturity like that of Freud, with its acceptance of meaninglessness as the end product of analytic wisdom. As a protestant against the severity of the analytic attitude, Jung took a dangerous road, toward some new summit of saving nonsense. The normality of disillusion and a controlling sense of resignation, which was the most for which Freud had hoped, appeared to Jung the beginning rather than the end of therapy. He proposed to continue beyond the point where Freud felt any honest analyst must leave off. Therefore, Jung went about his self-appointed task of finding a new "meaning" for it all, and was paradoxical enough to be at once analytic and religious. Jung pushed the therapeutic question beyond the limit set by Freud. Once having raised for therapeutic considerations the

question of community, Jung never managed to escape and hide himself behind the professional *persona* of the analyst. He became, instead, to the limit of his ability, a synthetist. His constructions may be shaky, the community mysterious—but this revision of Freud is undoubtedly important, at least to those who cannot sustain an analytic attitude, interminably, in a culture perpetually claiming the prerogatives of youthfulness.

For a reader accustomed to the elegance and coherence of Freud's style, or indeed to the clean lines of good English prose, a few pages of Jung can be a discouraging experience. He is discursive, pompous; his style meanders from a sermonette through excursus and back to the main point again, which is then repeated as though the writing were the transcript of a long hortatory conversation with a sleepy disciple. Jung was an erudite scholar in the eighteenth-century sense of the word.[9] Instead of Freud's interminable analysis he had the habit of interminable associations. Probably, he left no note unused; nothing could be left out because, being analytically sophisticated, Jung knew that nothing historical, viewed psychologically, has merely antiquarian interest. Filled on almost every page with the heaped rubble of incidental erudition, all made relevant and connected by Jung's sense of its import as a stratum of psychological meaning, his collected works are formidable for the wrong reason. He drives ploddingly an overloaded tumbril of traditions along a highway built for swifter traffic, as if to stop the modern rush forward toward a form of culture he did not approve of—and which, he believed, cannot endure man because man cannot endure such an "unspirituality." Delighting in the past, Jung arraigned the present with anecdotes about archaic superiorities. Antiquarian learning clutters his pages. But the modern reader has been trained to treat as an obstacle to comprehension just that form of erudition in which eighteenth-century readers delighted, as ancient road signs indicating which

[9] For a detailed analysis of Jung's erudition, see Chap. 5, pp. 126–129.

way to truth was worth taking, the longer way round deemed to be the better. Too often, Jung dogmatizes where the reader of English prose expects to find an explanation or at least a tight argument. This dogma, however, is a plastic bag made to hold any fluid content.

Given Jung's conservative purpose, he cannot be considered a dogmatic writer. His ventures into the field of direct religious commentary are more tentative and exploratory, because more questing than those of Freud. He tried something that Freud, in his professional neutralism with respect to values, deliberately avoided: a psychotherapeutics that leads beyond itself toward a reintegration of our culture. To those who have abandoned the quest altogether, or reformulated it, so that the direction is neither upward toward God nor downward toward the Unconscious, Jung's total effort can mean little or nothing—and may appear outright nonsensical.

There are those who suffer from what Jung called "the urban neurosis of atheism," for whom this suffering is less painful than the cure of faith. Travelers toward the emotional left of the moral value scale will not readily agree that the historic gods, far from being a negation of the individual's desire to complete himself, are "actually the strongest and most effective 'position' the psyche can reach." Jung is here assuming that every man and every culture has, built in, a god-term. From this it follows, for him, that the "strongest and therefore the decisive factor in any individual psyche compels the same belief or fear, submission or devotion which a God would demand from man." The object of therapy, in the Jungian sense, is, therefore, to reconcile the individual to whatever authority he carries within himself. Such an authority is inescapable; the wise man adapts himself to it. Indeed, in therapy one seeks just that authority which experience, now set in a confusedly anti-authoritarian frame, has hidden from the individual, sick to that degree in which he cannot find the authority directing his inner life.

Jung could not have moved any further than this from Freud's position. Culture, Freud thought, may be inherently authoritarian; but for just this reason it is the interminable task of analysis to break the strangleholds of authority on the psyche. To learn, from Jung, that "anything despotic and inescapable is in this sense 'God,'" will amuse the majority who believe that, with or without Freud, they have escaped their "God," but it will alienate the minority still anxious to learn a method of escape. Freud has instructed a generation no longer willing to commit itself, as Freud himself did, to the belief that culture must be accepted as a despotic and inescapable god. The uncommitted may be called post-Freudians, but they trust instinct as much as they suspect culture. Of course Freud prepared the way for the post-Freudians; the price to be paid for being cultured is, after all, a doctrinal point of major consequence to Freud. On the other hand, Freud's view of culture as despotic was never complemented by a doctrine of the instincts as benign. The post-Freudians could be called more accurately Reichians, for it was Reich who first shifted the Freudian attack entirely from instinct to culture.

There is a curious Marxism among the post-Freudians that calls for an explanation. Reich may well have been the first Freudo-Marxist, as he titled himself; but he was not the last. In contrast to Reich's original Bolshevik stridency, the post-Freudians have been democratic and socialist—though Marxist, nonetheless.

In Jung, Adler, Reich, and in many others among his major followers as well as opponents, Freud's analytic patience ran out. Only the minor followers remained orthodox; the others wanted something more than a middle way between emergency treatment and the illusion of a permanent cure. Each sought to combine analysis with a therapy of commitment, complete with symbolic, or a real return to some saving community—Christian, Marxist, or merely Reichian, for example. The schismatics have a certain analytic power, although far inferior to Freud's; more

importantly, all have the authority of experience on their side, for it is probably the community that cures.[10]

Freud never objected to alternative therapies, if they worked. His rejection of commitment therapies derives not so much from wounded vanity at having been abandoned by favored disciples as from his belief that there were no longer extant any communities wherein men could safely invest their troubled emotions in the hope of higher dividends.

[10] On the general relation between therapy and community, see especially Chap. 3.

# CHAPTER 2

## *The Impoverishment of Western Culture*

*We are very often obliged, for therapeutic purposes, to oppose the super-ego, and we endeavor to lower its demands. Exactly the same objections can be made against the ethical demands of the cultural super-ego.*

—Freud, *Civilisation and Its Discontents*

The higher dividends are essentially symbolic in nature. They are, in Freudian terms, the cultural equivalents of dividends which might be experienced more directly—if only a culture could stand the strain of immediate satisfactions. By setting a limit on the functional value of the higher dividends for most men, Freud declared that the religious question, in its inherited form, as a self-abnegation achieved with moral artistry, was no longer worth asking. This total rejection of the religious question gives even Marxism a pious look. By such a rejection psychoanalysis contributes to that symbolic impoverishment which is the only poverty a culture, as distinct from either a society or an individual, may suffer.

Wealth may define a status, or enhance a role, in the social system. Analysis may supply the energy an ego needs to strengthen its control over the deceits lodged in the unconscious by the failing means through which salvation was purchased, in the inherited culture. Both affluence and analysis may be viewed,

especially in the United States, as intimations of successor modes to a culture defined by its particular symbolic of inner ordinances. Where those inner ordinances become subject to diagnostic control, as themselves conducive to suffering, there are forceful symbolisms operating against that culture itself. Of course, to suggest the relief of suffering by diagnosing the failure of the inner ordinances is no revolutionary departure from the way successor symbolics always have struggled for cultural ascendancy—except when that successor symbolic was unable to offer a superior set of ordinances. But this describes the modern condition. The emergent symbolic is radically different from its predecessors.

Heretofore, the saving arrangements of Western culture have appeared as symbol systems communicating demands by stoning the sensual with deprivations, and were thus operated in a dynamically ambivalent mode. Our culture developed, as its general technique of salvation, assents to moral demands that treated the sensual part of the self as an enemy. From mastery over this enemy-self there developed some triumphant moral feeling; a character ideal was born. Every man was thus born twice, the second time as a creature aspiring to a moral artistry trained by deprivations. In sum, the classical character ideals were all personifications of a release from a multitude of desires.

Not only our Western system but every system of integrative moral demand, the generative principle of culture, expressed itself in positive deprivations—in a character ideal that functioned to commit the individual to the group. Culture was thus the establishment and organization of restrictive motives. Men engaged in disciplines of interdiction. The dialectic of deprivation and remission from deprivation was in the service of those particular interdicts by which a culture constituted itself. The analytic attitude does contain a certain time-element of asceticism, but it points toward a character ideal that is in principle anti-ascetic and therefore revolutionary if viewed from perspectives formed in the inherited moral demand system. The dialec-

tic of perfection, based on a deprivational mode, is being succeeded by a dialectic of fulfillment, based on the appetitive mode.

The analytic attitude is a doctrine developed for the private wants of private men, and shifts with the individual. In trying to describe this doctrinal aspect of psychological manhood, it appears to me as an anti-doctrine, one that dismisses the therapeutic compulsions of all doctrines as ultimately ineffective. Psychological man takes on the attitude of a scientist, with himself alone as the ultimate object of his science. If the analytic therapy has been effective, the therapeutic learns to keep in touch with the options around which the conduct of his life might be organized; ideally, all options ought to be kept alive because, theoretically, all are equally advisable—or inadvisable, in given personal circumstances. Not all homosexuals ought to be cured, nor should all stabilities, which may be achieved painfully and at great cost, be disturbed because of the pain that accompanies their achievement. Life is individual. Well-being is a delicate personal achievement, and only a vulgarization of the analytic attitude would permit easy or general judgments on any such achievement. No analyst or trained student of the painful ambiguities that have contributed to some individual sense of well-being would be so foolish as to tamper with it—so long as it works. Since no firm social standards for treatment have yet been erected, some grave ambiguities persist regarding the question of just who should be treated. There may be a kindness that is neurotic, if it develops out of unconscious compulsions, and a cruelty that is normal, if it is freely and consciously determined upon. So far as sainthood is determined by unconscious and uncontrolled motives, it is neurotic; so far as sinning, as usually understood, is determined by conscious and rational choice, it is normal. One difficulty with the criteria of rationality and consciousness is that Eichmann, for instance, might well be considered quite without need of treatment. He knew what he was

doing; indeed, he wanted to be a great success in his career. Freud was honest enough to discover that there was no inherent relation between normality and the norm, such as had been established, in the age of political and religious man, through the mediating myth that there were natural laws. The analytic attitude has discovered no natural harmony of goals, no hierarchy of value inscribed upon the universe. Confronted by the equality of choice, the individual could resort to the analytic attitude in order to limit the folly of being drawn too far outside the protective management of his own pleasures.

To reserve the capacity for neutrality between choices, even while making them, as required by this new science of moral management, produces a strain no less great than choosing itself. The analytic capacity demands a rare skill: to entertain multiple perspectives upon oneself, and even upon beloved others. A high level of control is necessary in order to shift from one perspective to another, so to soften the demands upon oneself in all the major situations of life—love, parenthood, friendship, work, and citizenship. Such conscious fluidity of commitment is not easily acquired. In fact, the attainment of psychological manhood is more difficult than any of the older versions of maturity; that manhood is no longer protected by a fantasy of having arrived at some resting place where security, reassurance, and trust reside, like gods in their heavens. The best one can say for oneself in life is that one has not been taken in, even by that "normal psychosis," love.

Freud understood the dangers inherent in a situation in which the precious individual was vulnerable to the charge that his life had become meaningless. In answer, he asserted that no fresh access of doctrine could for long decrease that vulnerability. In such cases, the individual merely built his neurosis the more deeply into his character, hiding it behind some unstable equilibrium of faithful action. All such action systems of faith, with the neurotic factor as the mediating agent, brought more grief than relief to the modern individual in search of a cure for

himself. Faith could not enter deeply enough. The internalities, being weak, had sickened, where they had not (to the betterment of the patient) died. The old therapies of action, based upon some saving truths (and authoritative institutions), no longer relieved the individual of the most oppressive of his tensions—those developing in his own private circles of love and friendship. For these therapies were based on now ineffectual attempts to bring the individual far out of himself, into some relation with an order of institutions that underwrote his sense of well-being. With the decline of a civilization of authority, the therapeutic requirement shifted toward an action which would take place, first, within the circle of personal relations; after this first level of private re-education had been successfully negotiated, the public life could then in time be altered. A new kind of community could be constructed, one that did not generate conscience and internal control but desire and the safe play of impulse. From this *pneuma* pulsing through the intimate world of friendship and love, the next culture gives signs that it will emerge—a culture that would not oppose the self but express more fully its varieties.

Dichotomies between an ultimately meaningful and meaningless existence belong to the eras of public philosophies and communal theologies. Ecologically, this transitional civilization is becoming one vast suburbia, something like the United States, populated by divided communities of two, with perhaps two junior members caught in the middle of a private and not always civil war; in relation to these intimate, though divided, communities of two, the public world is constituted as one vast stranger, who appears at inconvenient times and makes demands viewed as purely external and therefore without the power to elicit a genuinely moral response.

In the time of public philosophies and social religions, the great communities were positive. A positive community is characterized by the fact that it guarantees some kind of salvation to

the individual by virtue of his membership and participation in that community. That sort of community seemed corrupt to the economic man, with his particular version of an ascetic ideal tested mainly by self-reliance and personal achievement. The positive community was displaced, in social theory, by the neutral market. Now, in the middle of the twentieth century, the market mechanism appears not so much corrupt as a fiction to psychological man, with his awareness of how decisions are made in the social system. In order to participate self-protectively in the manipulative and acquisitive game, psychological man builds his tight family island, living for the remainder of his time in negative communities. But these collections of little islands surrounded by therapeutic activities, without any pretense at a doctrine of salvation, are themselves infected by the negativity of the larger community and become manipulative arenas themselves, rather than oases of escape from the larger arena.

The indefinite prolongation of psychoanalytic therapy is itself a form of membership in the negative community. Positive communities were, according to Freud, held together by guilt; they appear attractive only now, in distant retrospect, but the modern individual, faced with the necessity of merging his own life into communal effort, would have found them suffocating. Instead, the modern individual can only use the community as the necessary stage for his effort to enhance himself—if not always, or necessarily, to enrich himself.

In one certain way, the therapeutically inclined individual resembles his predecessor, the ascetic. That resemblance can be best sketched historically.

Once launched into some activity, conceiving of himself as an instrument of God's will, the ascetic did not stop to ask about the meaning of it all. On the contrary, the more furious his activity, the more the problem of what his activity meant receded from his mind. In time, the Western ascetic ceased cultivating his doctrinal imagination. For a time, perhaps for a

century, the sheer intensity of his action carried him along to greater power and prosperity; the atrophy of doctrinal imagination caused only mild alarms. But, in the nineteenth century, there were signs of trouble all over this failing ascetic culture. Questions were being raised, at first by literary men; symptoms were being observed, by all manner of men.

The most congenial climate for the training of the therapeutic has been in a waning ascetic culture like that of Protestant America. It is specially true of this Calvinist culture that it proved a breeding ground for remissive equivalents to the original ascetic motives in which the emphasis is on retraining for a fuller activity and not on the achievement of some new general meaning. One permitting condition for this therapeutic successor to the ascetic was already present in the assumption of the Protestant activist that the will, or motive, of his God was unsearchable and His ways quite inexplicable, so that they could not be understood by any human standard. To meet the demands of the day was as near as one could come to doing the pious thing, in this—God's—world. To trouble about meaning was really an impiety and, of course, frivolous, because futile. For the question of meaning, therefore, neither the ascetic nor the therapeutic type feels responsible, if his spiritual discipline has been successful. The recently fashionable religious talk of "ultimate concern" makes no sense either in the ascetic or in the therapeutic mode. To try to relate "ultimate concern" to everyday behavior would be exhausting and nerve-shattering work; indeed, it could effectively inhibit less grandiose kinds of work. Neither the ascetic nor the therapeutic bothers his head about "ultimate concern." Such a concern is for mystics who cannot otherwise enjoy their leisure. In the workaday world, there are no ultimate concerns, only present ones. Therapy is the respite of every day, during which the importance of the present is learned, and the existence of what in the ascetic tradition came to be called the "ultimate" or "divine" is unlearned. Those remote areas of experience are brought up only in order to be

put in their proper place, as dead events and motives rather than as the models for events and motives of the present life. Analytic therapy is thus a form of re-education; Freud specifically called it that. It is re-education so far as it eliminates those symptoms through which the patient has tried, mistakenly, to resolve the contradictions in his life.

Therapeutic re-education is therefore at once a difficult and yet modest procedure. It teaches the patient-student how to live with the contradictions that combine to make him into a unique personality; this it does in contrast to the older moral pedagogies, which tried to re-order the contradictions into a hierarchy of superior and inferior, good and evil, capabilities. To become a psychological man is thus to become kinder to the self as a whole, to the private parts of it as well as to the public ones, to the once inferior as well as to the formerly superior. While older character types were concentrating on the life task of trying to order the warring parts of the personality into a hierarchy, modern pedagogies, reflecting the changing self-conception of this culture, are far more egalitarian: it is the task of psychological man to develop an informed (i.e., healthy) respect for the sovereign and unresolvable basic contradictions that make him the singularly complicated human being he is.

Freud's most important ideas finally may have less to do with the repression of sexual impulses (which explains neither the past discontents of our civilization nor the present ones), than with ambivalence. It is their capacity to reverse feelings that is the human problem and hope. What hope there is derives from Freud's assumption that human nature is not so much a hierarchy of high-low, and good-bad, as his predecessors believed, but rather a jostling democracy of contending predispositions, deposited in every nature in roughly equal intensities. Where there is love, there is the lurking eventuality of hatred. Where there is ambition, there is the ironic desire for failure. Although he wishes not to know it, a sore loser may be sore mainly because he almost won and is reacting against his wish to lose.

Psychoanalysis is full of such mad logic; it is convincing only if the student of his own life accepts Freud's egalitarian revision of the traditional idea of an hierarchical human nature.

Yet, although Freud had proclaimed this major revision in the Western self-image, he was himself sentimentally attached to the old hierarchical assumption. On the one hand, he analyzed the damage done by this hierarchical structuring of human nature into pejoratively toned "higher" and "lower" categories —indeed, it was precisely this damage that he made it his business to mend. On the other hand, he hoped that somehow, despite the near equality of our warring emotions, reason would cleverly manage to reassert itself, despite its congenital weakness—not in the high and mighty way preached by Plato and his Christian successors but in a modest, even sly manner that would alternately dazzle and lull the more powerful emotions into submission. This way actually demands, it seems, the kind of character ideal we have called the "therapeutic" in order to contrast it with the more rigid character ideal produced by the moral demand systems preceding modernity. In the age of psychologizing, clarity about oneself supersedes devotion to an ideal as the model of right conduct.

We can now understand better why Freud was an inveterate finder of double meanings, even of some that may not be there; why the latent makes sense only as it contradicts the manifest; why the aggressive movement behind the friendly gesture needs the complement of the friendly gesture. For thus Freud succeeded in challenging simplicity, in particular moral simplicity. He encouraged a tolerance of what used to be called, in general, the "low," just as he encouraged a new respect for the young, for the deviant, and for the shocking. There was about Freud a calm anticipation of the unexpected that subverted the expectations of a life based on older schemes of an authoritative, set, hierarchical order of conduct.

On the institutional level, the Freudian analysis reduced most obviously the hierarchical order of the family and, moreover, of

the "head" of the family. This reductionism applied specially to the position of the father. In the European context, the father appeared also as the personification of all those heights of repressive command from which, Freud decided, the rules of the moral game could no longer effectively be handed down. Much as he admired the Moses-figures in our culture, Freud considered their techniques of exercising authority too costly.

A tolerance of ambiguities is the key to what Freud considered the most difficult of all personal accomplishments: a genuinely stable character in an unstable time. Yet, just this rare and fine capacity, rejecting as it does the value of ignorance, encourages an equally dangerous attitude when viewed from the perspective of the instability of the times: namely, an attitude of deliberate acquiescence. Being able to recognize the equivocations of which behavior is composed need not, however, mean their encouragement.

Nevertheless, there is a sound basis for what are otherwise hypocritical objections to the immorality of interpretation with which Freudians rip away the façades of moral action. Hypocrisy is a precious thing in any culture. Like reticence, it may help build up those habits of avoidance that swerve us from honest, but head-on, collisions with one another. Nothing in psychoanalytic therapy encourages immoral behavior. The immorality of interpretation aims merely at revealing moralized compulsions behind even the most correct and apparently straightforward behavior. This means that psychoanalysis discourages moral behavior on the old, self-defeating grounds—out of what is now called a *sense* of guilt rather than guilt.

To help us distinguish between guilt on the one hand and a sense of guilt on the other, between responsibility for an offense committed and fantasies about offenses intended or merely imagined, seems a moral as well as a therapeutic aim. To suffer from scrupulosity is, after all, a well-known perversion of moral ambition, even according to the most elaborate of our established casuistries. But psychoanalysis is more than a mere scru-

tiny of handwashing. Freud went more deeply than that. His ambition to exhaust the sense of guilt by clinical exposures of all details may be dangerous, as he himself realized, to the life of a culture that is on the defensive. If a self-trained casuist gets along better by resolving his guilt into a sense of guilt, then he is the healthier for that resolution. This is a vulgar and popular misinterpretation of Freud; but there is something about the presuppositions of psychoanalytic therapy that encourages just such misinterpretations. A man can be made healthier without being made better—rather, morally worse. Not the good life but better living is the therapeutic standard. It is a popular standard, not difficult to follow, as Americans, despite Freud's wish to make it difficult, were the first to recognize in any significant number.

Americans no longer model themselves after the Christians or the Greeks. Nor are they such economic men as Europeans believe them to be. The political man of the Greeks, the religious man of the Hebrews and Christians, the enlightened economic man of eighteenth-century Europe (the original of that mythical present-day character, the "good European"), has been superseded by a new model for the conduct of life. Psychological man is, I suggest, more native to American culture than the Puritan sources of that culture would indicate.

The therapeutic as an American type has outgrown his immediate ancestor in one clear sense, for both Socrates and Christ taught economic man to be at least slightly ashamed of himself when he failed to sacrifice the lower capacity to the higher. Freud is America's great teacher, despite his ardent wish to avoid that fate. For it was precisely the official and parental shams of high ideals that Freud questioned. In their stead, Freud taught lessons which Americans, prepared by their own national experience, learn easily: survive, resign yourself to living within your moral means, suffer no gratuitous failures in a futile search for ethical heights that no longer exist—if they ever did. Freud proclaims the superior wisdom of choosing the second best. He

is our Crito, become intellectually more subtle than the sick and old Socrates, who was still foolish enough to justify his own death sentence rather than escape from the prison of his own inhibitions about the sanctity of the state, which he mistakes for his father. Freud appeals to us because his wisdom is so cautious. Surely he is not to be blamed for living at a time when the inherited aspirations of the Greek, Christian, and Humanist past had gone stale, when both Athens and Jerusalem, not to mention Paris, Oxford, and the Italian Renaissance cities, have become tourist spots rather than shrines of pilgrims in search of spiritual knowledge. With no place to go for lessons in the conduct of contemporary life, every man must learn, as Freud teaches, to make himself at home in his own grim and gay little Vienna.

The alternatives with which Freud leaves us are grim only if we view them from the perspective of some past possibility, as though we were either political or religious men. Assuming that these character ideals are, in Freud's terms, regressive, the grimness is relieved by the gaiety of being free from the historic Western compulsion of seeking large and general meanings for small and highly particular lives. Indeed, the therapy of all therapies, the secret of all secrets, the interpretation of all interpretations, in Freud, is not to attach oneself exclusively or too passionately to any one particular meaning, or object. There is discernible in those who practice professionally the analytic attitude, that is, in the psychoanalysts themselves, a certain cultivated detachment and calm that is perhaps the highest expression of that individualism to which De Tocqueville first referred. In the most intimate of modern relations, the psychoanalytic transaction between analyst and patient, one of the members of that unique community of two must remain an almost total stranger to the other; only if the analyst draws a veil across his own life does he maintain his therapeutic effectiveness. In turn, the patient must learn how to draw the veil properly around himself. To accomplish this, he needs to develop the full power and liberty of his emotions, without paying the price of

fixing them too firmly on any object or idea. This he is taught by the experience of ending his relation of intimacy to the analyst himself. Here, again, is the ascetic ideal, shorn of any informing goal or principle; thus divested of the need for compulsive attachments, the ascetic becomes the therapeutic. With Freud, individualism took a great and perhaps final step: toward that mature and calm feeling which comes from having nothing to hide. The individual need no longer keep a safe distance from the mass of his fellows. In therapy, developed as a social process, he will be so trained that vulnerability is minimized. To live on the surface prevents deep hurts. With Freud, Western man has learned the technical complexity of externalizing his inwardness, and has been able at last to usher out that crowd of shadows urging him to turn inward, so as to live in the bright, sober light of the present, where, ideally, the moment is always high noon. This is not isolation, for it is no longer confining. Nor is it a participation mystique, for the participatory action has nothing self-abnegating about it. Rather, the social therapy is liberating, rendering all objects of commitment instrumental to the therapeutic process itself. Such a clear-cut externalization as suggested here could characterize a culture developed far more highly than our present one. Doctrinal intimations along these lines are dealt with in the second half of this volume.

To be truly free and yet social means to cultivate detachment, as opposed to alienation. The therapeutic, even in erotic action, can do without attachment—indeed, he can do with and do without it, simultaneously, for relations that are too near and too fixed may lead to symptoms that destroy the capacity of an individual to live out his own life in ways of his own choosing. This is not to say that to live thus, detachedly, implies an absence of erotic company, or even an absence of the erotic manner. On the contrary, the therapeutic treats love instrumentally. He is likely to be more circumspect and better behaved than his ascetic forebear, who was subject to mood fluctuations between wild passion and *accidie*, due in part to the

rigid system of controls and overburdened devices of release. With a shift in the system, giving greater amplitude to the releasing devices, the subject personalities are likely to develop a more measured, calculated capacity in the use of their spontaneity.

Freed from all suspicions of divinity, psychological man can continue to work efficiently in all kinds of institutions, but without permitting his feelings to be entrapped by institutional service. The ascetic was limited, and often broken, in his organizational usefulness by a naïve dedication to principle. It was as if man were made to be used by the organization, rather than the organization made to be used by man. For this character ideal of an autonomous man, using but unused, Americans already have put vulgar understandings of the analytic anti-symbolic to full use.[1]

There is a sense in which culture is always at one with the social system. In a society with so many inducements to self-interest, "self-realization" seems a noble and healthy end. The least valuable competitive position is to be self-defeating. The therapeutic cannot conceive of an action that is not self-serving, however it may be disguised or transformed. This is a culture in which each views the other, in the fullness of his self-knowledge, as "trash." Freud used the word to summarize his general opinion of people. But, the question remains: How to discipline the "trash"? To be liberated from renunciatory character ideals by the analytic attitude might give the "trash" (Freud's term) too much liberty to do its worst, whereas in the older system the "trash" would not do its best. One may think, therefore, an ethic of perfection to be more prudent, even on Freud's own assumptions about the human animal, than an ethic of tolerance.

Yet, probably the ethic of tolerance is the one more appropriate and safe for use in the age of psychological man. It is the ethic of a wayfarer rather than that of a missionary; it is the

[1] Certainly, this was done without Freud's intention or approval. Representing Freud as a prophet of non-culture contradicts his own highest intentions.

ethic of a pilgrim, who, out of his experience, became a tourist. Unfortunately for culture and good taste, the salesman cruelly parodies the preacher without being able to help doing so, for cultural history has allotted to the salesman the rhetorical style of a missionary. Freud distrusted that style, even in medical missionaries—or, more precisely, in missionaries of a non-saving medicine; he himself never tried to "sell" his doctrine, as now many of his successors have done, to their indubitable gain, with the nostrums known as "self-realization" and/or "self-fulfillment." What would suit the therapeutic ideal better than the prevalent American piety toward the self? This self, improved, is the ultimate concern of modern culture. If this culture develops further along lines indicated here, and if the social order moves in a parallel line, toward wider distribution of plenitude, then that general condition of detachment which prevents religious outburst and political revolution may well be established. Finally, even world government may come—with universal indifference as its cultural predicate.

Every culture is an institutionalized system of moral demands, elaborating the conduct of personal relations, a cosset of compelling symbols. Every culture is thus safely strapped to its functions. Its mode of integration defines also its limitations. For an individual to engage in a self-therapeutic effort, which must either ignore or contradict the meanings by which his character was molded, suggests either that the therapy must fail or that the culture is in the process of a change as to its control mechanism.

Thus, analyzing the analytic attitude, we may conclude, quite tentatively, that the American culture is in a remissive phase of transition to a new system of moral demands. Assuming this, the best strategy for the polemicists of the therapeutic, no less than for the ascetic, may be the playing of a waiting game: the former can use the analytic attitude to militate against renewals of the moral demand system, while the latter may seek to

encourage renewals.[2] The power of the analytic attitude rests on the assumption that its proper exercise can cut off revitalization movements of the classical moral demand system. It was Freud's thought that no moral demand system could ever again compel at least the educated classes to that inner obedience which bound men to rules they themselves had made but then could not change except at the expense of spirit, far beyond the usefulness of such rules to the continuance of cultural achievement. The waiting game has thus become the permanent strategy of the contending polemicists. It remains to be seen which side is waiting in vain—that which hopes for a vital faith or that which places its hopes in vitality itself.

The revolution of rising expectations is a major weapon in the warfare of the therapeutic against the ascetic. After all, there is something to the notion that the rich—even the rich Communists—cannot take their respective religion too seriously. Even now, the rich Marxists must stave off the fanatics from poor Marxist countries. Comfort is the great social tranquilizer. This, in fact, sums up the revolutionary attitude of the rich and psychoculturally educated in the United States nowadays. Symbolic impoverishment ceases to be a problem precisely because the rich have found functional equivalents for a system of compelling moral demands, in analysis and in art, which may be said to be a mode of self-reverence. The old form of culture criticism, to the effect that our plenitude of things lies wasting and useless in a desert of belief, thus becomes irrelevant, being based on the outmoded assumption that a moral demand system must be hard and unyielding like the Sinai desert in order to be effective. On

[2] There is a widespread hope among the more thoughtful and committed American Christian clergy that the Negro agitation will serve, providentially, to revitalize the moral demand system in the white American culture. Of course, there are religious motives among the Negroes. But the national good demands that they be educated up to the post-religious level of the whites as quickly as possible, if further civil disorder is to be avoided. Moreover, the Negro demand is for nothing less than what "integration" implies: their fair share of the national substance.

the contrary, Freud's theory was that, under present and foreseeable conditions, only a yielding demand system—more prudent than principled—would be capable of sustaining itself.

When combined with the analytic attitude, affluence may be the alternative to questionable renewals of religion, taking the form of excessive moral demands, by which this culture has been regularly carried away in the past. Educated as they are, the rich have no need of religious renewals. In classical cultures, an ascended class had to justify itself before those below in the social structure. But the culture revolution of our time has eliminated this need for class- as well as self-justification. Nevertheless, those below still seek to emulate the ascendant social class, without being convinced of its superiority. And just as the rich have lost their idea of superiority, so have the poor lost their idea of religion. Poverty is no longer holy; the poor, insofar as they are educated in the new doctrine, have no motive for projecting onto society a new set of strict moral demands that might infuse society with the kind of impetus needed to end symbolic poverty.

According to my reading of the past psychohistorical process, members of an ascending class would mobilize their spiritual energies by representing themselves as the carrier of new moral demands. This is the classic way in which, for example, the Puritan revolution occurred. Finally, after the revolutionary releasing phase had passed, the ascending class would use the symbol system as a control device; the same symbols that once justified its revolutionary attacks on the culture served later as control devices for the preservation and expansion of the system of moral demands the ascending class had first established for itself.

In time, every revolutionary renewal of moral demands appears to exhaust itself. The ascending class would take on some of the dominant characteristics of the class it replaced. Revolutions end in some form of restoration. Thus, a revival of faith comes to its end, as a rule, in a remissive establishment. In this

perspective, the price of revivalist revolutions will always appear too high. And by this rationalization the system of moral demands as such is cast into doubt. What is at stake, in this elaboration of the theory of ambivalence, is the Western capacity for mounting new moral demands as inherently superior to those established minimally and sanctioned in the past.

It follows from this interpretation that the present struggle between the United States and the post-Stalinist Soviet Union is based on their being in different phases in the psychohistorical process, a difference which may be further resolved when both would understand that they share the same cultural aims. Both issue from the assumption that wealth is a superior and adequate substitute for symbolic impoverishment. Both American and Soviet cultures are essentially variants of the same belief in wealth as the functional equivalent of a high civilization. In both cultures, the controlling symbolism has been stripped down to a belief in the efficacy of wealth. Quantity has become quality. The answer to all questions of "what for?" is "more." The faith of the rich has always been in themselves. Rendered democratic, this religion proposes that every man become his own eleemosynary institution. Here is a redefinition of charity from which the inherited faith of Christianity may never recover. Out of this redefinition, Western culture is changing already into a symbol system unprecedented in its plasticity and absorptive capacity. Nothing much can oppose it really, and it welcomes all criticism, for, in a sense, it stands for nothing.

# CHAPTER 3

## *Community and Therapy*

*–such a price*
*The Gods exact for song:*
*To become what we sing.*

–Arnold, *The Strayed Reveller*

All symbols systems are therapeutic if they are compelling enough, and especially so if they serve to introduce a character ideal. Even the members of opposing schools will agree to this proposition. It is to the import of this agreement on a theory linking modern therapies and modern culture that this chapter will be devoted.

Freud himself considered it "justifiable to resort to more convenient methods of healing [than psychoanalysis] as long as there is any prospect of attaining anything by their means." We may consider, therefore, a typology of those means, including the psychoanalytic, as well as the difference of ends to be thus attained. By elucidating what was to be cured, we may come to understand some varieties of historical relationships between types of psychotherapy on the one hand and culture on the other.

From its classical origins, sociological theory was interested in the relation between that sense of well-being which defines the

health of the individual and his membership in the community. Indeed, the former was considered dependent upon the latter. In order to produce the conditions of this dependence, philosophers have elaborated systems of symbolic integration, useful to the few or the many, varying in this respect with the level of symbolism elaborated. Being a Kantian, or Hegelian, may thus be integrative; and, being integrative, therapeutic. Moreover, what is philosophy for the few may be magic for the many. In general, all cultures have a therapeutic function, insofar as they are systems of symbolic integration—whether these systems be called religious, philosophical, ideological, or by any other name.

Among social theorists, Plato was the first to build his symbol system deliberately upon the integrative function. Indeed, his *Republic* is one such attempt to link the health and stability of the person to his place in a right social order. Only the examined life is worth living, according to Plato's mentor, Socrates; but, what is important to the purpose of this chapter is that Socrates, having examined his life, willingly sacrificed himself to the community. Later, in his own life, Plato was not at all willing to stop at the Socratic doctrine of the examined life. As E. R. Dodds pointed out, Plato held in his *Laws* that "the majority of human beings can be kept in tolerable moral health only by a carefully chosen diet of 'incantations'—that is to say, edifying myths and bracing ethical slogans." What the superior and intelligent few may achieve through the examined life, the many must have achieved for them through education in "salutary" beliefs. Moral evil is equated, on the one hand, with psychological conflict and, on the other, with social conflict. The task of the theorist is to reduce this conflict: theory was to serve as a therapy. Conservative theorist-therapists from Plato to Jung have maintained a keen sense of what it is that really cures.

In Aristotle, man is naturally a citizen; the diagnosis of his psychological condition begins from this essential point. Whether a man can fully express his manhood, in every respect, depends upon his membership in the political community—and,

first of all, on the existence of a community, which was defined by Aristotle as the "city-state." Only within the precincts of the city-state is there a field for the full exercise of those gifts and powers that make a man fully human and not a being crippled or arrested in his humanity. From Plato and Aristotle, through Burke and De Tocqueville, the therapeutic implication of social theory is remarkably consistent: an individual can exercise his gifts and powers fully only by participating in the common life. This is the classical ideal. The healthy man is in fact the good citizen. The therapeutic and the moral were thus connected in the Western tradition of social theory.

In the Middle Ages, this tradition was institutionalized in a church civilization, with the therapeutic functions reserved to functionaries of the churches. On the symbolic level, the integrative functions were expressed in doctrines such as that of natural law. Disagreement was largely about means, not ends. Through an elaborate mechanism of institutional authority, church civilization preserved those conventional understandings by which men hold together in communities, granting to the individual only a limited range of alternatives in belief and action. Where disagreement or ambiguity occurred, this church civilization resorted to authority figures—those who really did have the answers, in an official sense—who could resolve the conflict. Should one ask of the classical social theory: "What cures?" the answer will be frequently tantamount to the question: "Who cures?"

Ultimately, it is the community that cures. The function of the classical therapist is to commit the patient to the symbol system of the community, as best he can and by whatever techniques are sanctioned (e.g., ritual or dialectical, magical or rational). All such efforts to reintegrate the subject into the communal symbol system may be categorized as "commitment therapies." Behind shaman and priest, philosopher and physician, stands the great community as the ultimate corrective of personal disorders. Culture is the system of significances attached to

behavior by which a society explains itself to itself. A culture that is not thus self-explicative must be undergoing, in the measure of the negative condition, a profound change.[1]

What happens, however, if the community itself is disordered? Plato and his successors faced this question. They tried to construct models for a re-ordering of the community and, therewith, for that of a personal life worth living. They assumed that personal and moral perfection would go parallel with insight into the right social order. Yet, suppose there occurred some disorder so fundamental in nature as to destroy the therapeutic function of the community per se? Suppose, for a variety of examined reasons, the community were no longer able to supply a system of symbolic integration? Here, then, in the destruction of all idealizations upon which traditional and classical communities were based, in theory and practice, is to be sought the origin of modernity.

Of nineteenth-century social theorists, De Tocqueville is relevant here. Two others may be referred to here in an equally preliminary way: Rousseau and Marx. Rousseau tried to meet modern conditions by a polemical analysis of the community as a burden from which the individual had to free himself if he was to achieve a sense of well-being. To be a broken link in the chain of the community was the first requirement for being a therapist of the free individual. Not binding sentiment but critical detachment was the attitude most conducive to a sense of well-being. It is noteworthy how De Tocqueville took up this Rousseauean polemic and turned it around in his remarkable dissection of the Rousseauean doctrine of democratic individualism. Like his predecessors in the classical tradition, De Tocqueville was well aware of the specific connection between conditions of the psyche and the structure of society. In ages of equality, he remarks, the feelings of each man are turned toward himself alone. It is in ages of inequality that public spirit runs high, for

[1] This is a book about one major aspect of culture change; I cannot undertake to examine here the relation between cultural and social change.

only by transforming society can each man transform his own personal relations. As an aristocratic liberal trained in the classical tradition, De Tocqueville, like John Stuart Mill and liberals to this day, worried about what would happen to public life once individualism had sapped its virtues. For the individual would no longer feel committed to the "chain of all the members of the community." "Democracy," De Tocqueville concluded, "breaks that chain and severs every link of it." The individual is thus, in De Tocqueville's grand diagnosis, the defaulted citizen; he has cut off his feelings from communal affections. Individuals learn to feel that "they owe nothing to any man, they expect nothing from any man; they acquire the habit of always considering themselves as standing alone, and they are apt to imagine that their whole destiny is in their own hands." In a highly differentiated democratic culture, truly and for the first time, there arose the possibility of every man standing for himself, each at last leading a truly private life, trained to understand rather than love (or hate) his neighbor.

Within such privacies, can a man feel well? This question has been debated ever since the beginnings of modern social theory. The standard answer has been that he cannot. Such a life was "corrupt," defined by that term Socrates used in speaking to Crito, in analogy for organic corruption. The parts of an organism cannot be healthy if the whole was corrupt, and the whole cannot be but corrupt if the parts were not integrated positively into a whole. The view elaborated most thoroughly in our historic social theories, whatever their other differences, was that men were healthy only when they were good citizens. In short, security cured; and security came through membership in an "organic" community. This was the basis of conservative and radical political theory alike: community cures through the achievement by the individual of his collective identity. To cure a man, one need only return him to his community or construct a new one. By constructing dual communities, the philosophers of society were trying to cure themselves, first of all.

To this should now be added the Marxist diagnosis, as a counter to both Rousseau and De Tocqueville: the community, Marx told us, has been destroyed and an impersonal cash nexus rules in its place. Men are being treated not as persons but as things. Marx's argument, as outlined in the *Communist Manifesto,* is too familiar to bear repeating here. In the Marxist view, the old communal frame, within which men had found security, has now been destroyed. Marx's importance lies not merely in his diagnosis of the processes leading to that destruction, but primarily in his prophecy of a new form of community. Marxist diagnosis, without the Marxist ideal of a new community, would be not socialism but sociology. Marx's utopian vision of a Communist identity, predicate of true individuality, combines both the radical and conservative traditions. Marxism is more than theory; at the same time it is a type of commitment therapy.

It is now possible to move nearer to the main point of this survey. We have seen that in the classical tradition of social theory the sense of well-being of the individual was dependent on his full, participant membership in a community. The other traditional theory, also powerful and by now equally venerable, was that men must free themselves from binding attachments to communal purposes in order to express more freely their individualities. A third view entered at this point: that there is no positive community now within which the individual can merge himself therapeutically. Freud adheres to this third view. Indeed, if the theory developed in this volume is to define the relationship between therapy and culture, then it may be said that Freud came on the scene not long after a new type of therapeutic effort became necessary, that is, one suitable for the development of individualistic culture.

The older therapeutic efforts can be ordered, as suggested, under "therapies of commitment." Such therapies of commitment were characteristic of positive communities. By positive communities are meant those that offer some sort of salvation to the individual through participant membership.

Ritual participation is an extreme form of commitment therapy. But, what ritual participation is to the group, mysticism is, functionally, to the individual. Operationally defined, mysticism is always a form of unification with a saving agency. The mystic inclines to achieve his self-awareness by coming as close to a condition of inaction as he can. Historically, Oriental moral demand systems such as Buddhism have exalted the mystic as a therapeutic type. The tendency to inaction itself has a supportive value, for once the mystical union with the saving symbol, and with the community that stands behind it, has been achieved, a climax of inner stability has been reached; there is no place to go further except down, so to speak, toward alienation from the integrative god-term with which the mystic has been infused.

Ecstatics constituted probably the first therapeutic type, communicating ecstatically their sense of release from established patterns of control to others. If the earliest religious leader was the ecstatic, then the first religious institution may have been the orgy. Understood thus, it may be said that faiths develop first as primary modes of release from earlier uses of faith, and then develop their own control functions.

The ascetic would be as characteristic of symbol systems in which the therapeutic function would be that of control as the ecstatic would be characteristic of systems with releasing functions. It is significant that asceticism in Roman Catholic doctrine is considered a propaedeutic to a mystical commitment experience. But asceticism is not merely preparatory. It constitutes also a tie in its own right, binding the individual to the community or organization. The first organization men were ascetics: the clergy. Asceticism inclines the individual to a therapy of dedicated action, within which he can lose or limit his sense of individuality.

A culture will lose its therapeutic effect on the individual if it loses its primary power of integrating an individual under the sway of its communal purposes. An endemic individualism, such

as that in the United States, whether doctrinally elaborated or not, may prevent a commitment therapy from taking full effect. Because of this preventive, long culturally dominant, another kind of therapeutic effort has become necessary, uniquely modern, and different in kind from the classical therapies of commitment. This new attitude underlying the therapeutic effort may be termed "analytic." The chief and greatest of these therapies is the Freudian. The analytic therapy developed precisely in response to the need of the Western individual, in the Tocquevillean definition, for a therapy that would not depend for its effect on a symbolic return to a positive community; at best, analytic therapy creates negative communities. The distinction between positive and negative communities, in the usage here intended, is as follows: positive communities are characterized by their guarantee of some kind of salvation of self; and by salvation is meant an experience which transforms all personal relations by subordinating them to agreed communal purposes; negative communities are those which, enabled to survive almost automatically by a self-sustaining technology, do not offer a type of collective salvation, and in which the therapeutic experience is not transformative but rather informative. Commitment therapies can prove efficacious only in positive communities; this type of therapy would also be transformative, as in various kinds of religious conversion, when the personality is supposed to undergo profound changes, so that even the name of the subject may be changed. This may happen, however, as we are aware, also in various secular revolutionary movements, and may include name-changing not merely as a means of deception but as a mark of profound inner change. Without salvational goals, action as such will become therapeutic.

Advanced industrial communities are no longer culturally positive. Under this general condition, controls must be established in a way other than that of transformative experiences. The ways suitable to modern culture are generally classifiable as "informative," aiming at a strengthening of ego-controls over

inner conflicts. As a result, there emerges a more purely therapeutic type, complete with doctrines intended to manage the strains of living as a communally detached individual. The social type most obviously so detached is the intellectual. By our time, the detachment of the late nineteenth-century intellectual from a predominantly middle-class culture has been rendered general; the sight of vast numbers of middle-class intellectuals *manqués* is terrible indeed, and culturally self-destructive.

Within the analytic tradition there arise various strains and tensions, as one therapist after another makes an effort to combine the analytic with commitment therapy. Adlerian therapies are forms of return to community, as are Jungian therapies, though far more subtly so. Moreover, therapists such as Reich and Rosen actually attempted founding new communities, or make full use at least of the model therapeutic community of two. The chief moral implication of Freud's achievement will become apparent in this perspective of analytic therapies as contrasted to commitment therapies. Freud's genius is partly a matter of its appropriateness to his time. He developed the concept of the analytic therapy as a functional alternative to preceding commitment therapies, which by and large had become dysfunctional. The details of his psychoanalytic therapy bear out its informative and neutral, rather than transformative and committed, character. Analytic therapy appeals to persons living in an already highly individualistic and democratic culture, like the American. The mechanics of confirming and strengthening democratic individualism is best seen in two aspects of the analytic relationship: the transference and the fee.

The very basis of the transference is that it must be resolved. In no sense, moreover, is the therapist of the analytic school an exemplary man, as he inclines to be in commitment therapies. The analysand is to imitate the analyst only in his mature and calm detachment, and is to extend this attitude to the analyst himself. Yet, the analytic relationship is to serve as a model. In

detaching himself from the analyst, the analysand will be learning that particular style of detachment in which his individuality can function within a greater range of alternatives and yet do so with a more conscious sense of personal limitations.

From the point of view of commitment therapies, by which we are still influenced, the analytic attitude of detachment is itself a symptom of illness. But Freud saw no alternative to a strengthening of the individual ego, for he lacked a constructive social theory and saw no therapeutically effective communities to which he could refer the patient in the post-analytic situation. However, the issue lies much deeper. A therapy so profoundly informative as the analytic may actually inhibit all transformative therapies. In some respects, the analytic therapy is patently anti-transformative, although it does support certain characteristics of the present individualistic culture. Thus, the monetary fee is considered a powerful weapon in therapy, precisely because it introduces an impersonal factor into what is otherwise a highly personal relation. Having paid, the patient has also discharged therewith his debt of gratitude to the therapist. By contrast, a disciple will always remain in debt to his mentor. Psychoanalysis may be a form of pedagogy, as Freud liked to consider it; but this pedagogy functions differently from its predecessors, and operates in a different phase of the Western psychohistorical process.

The analytic relationship is not always broken off. It is of some sociological interest that every analyst has been himself a patient, and may periodically become one again. The analyst-patient achieves something like a communal cosset by the very act of joining the professional community of analysts. This gives fresh significance to the standard notion that the analyst is a successfully analyzed patient. Moreover, we may now better understand the sociological import of a marked prolongation of analysis: whether due to increased knowledge or to other factors, such prolongations may also be a strategy for retaining

membership in that negative community of two in which the analytic relationship consists.

In summary, commitment therapies can be distinguished from analytic therapies. The latter arise in an historical period concomitant with the rise of democratic individualism. Commitment therapies, however, operate by returning the individual to the cosset of his natal community or by retraining him for membership in a new community, with a more effective pattern of symbolic integration; the therapeutic effort is transformative; the therapist is characteristically either a sacral or an exemplary figure. Analytic therapies, on the other hand, are uniquely modern and depend largely upon Freudian presuppositions. The therapeutic effort is not primarily transformative but informative. The assumption of the analytic theory is that there is no positive community standing behind the therapist. The therapist, therefore, can be neither sacral nor exemplary, but is rather an analyst. The resolution of the transference relation circumscribes the modal relationships to which the patient may aspire in his extratherapeutic relations, lowering his erotic illusions to a level where he is less vulnerable to fixation and disappointment. In sociological terms, commitment therapies are authoritarian, whereas analytic therapies are anti-authoritarian. Moreover, commitment therapies tend to take on a sacramental symbolism; analytic therapies have an anti-sacramental bias.

It is the function of the sacralist to help both an individual and an entire community carry out their pledges to some communal purpose. In this sense the sacralist manages the artifacts that symbolize the cultural super-ego. All therapies of commitment involve a sacralist and those to whom the sacraments invented in that culture are administered. The sacralist cures, therefore, by recalling the individual to some principle of legitimacy, by reinforcing, through sacramental action, the cultural super-ego, and by re-enacting its internalization. He speaks for some corporate identity within which the individual can feel secure in his

personal identity. The analyst, on the other hand, must deal with individuals beyond salvation, that is, beyond salvation through communal purposiveness. Therefore, the understanding of the individual's own authority is the final step in resolving a corporate identity that no longer serves to integrate the self.

Earlier therapists, being sacralists, guarded the cultural super-ego, communicating to the individual the particular signs and symbols in which the super-ego was embodied or personified. In this sense, earlier therapists assumed priestly powers. The modern therapist, however, is without priestly powers, precisely because he guards against the cultural super-ego and, unlike the sacralist, is free to criticize the moral demand system. Rather, he speaks for the individual buried alive, as it were, in the culture. To be thus freed from a tyrannical cultural super-ego is to be properly bedded in the present world. Analysis is not an initiation but a counter-initiation, to end the need for initiations. The modern therapeutic idea is to empty those meanings that link the individual to dying worlds by assents of faith for which his analytic reason tells him he is not truly responsible. In this way, by acts of interpretation, the sacred becomes symptom. Sacred images are, then, the visible form not of grace but of sickness. The sacralist yields to the analyst as the therapeutic functionary of modern culture.

Yet some moral revolutionaries sought a fresh sacramental language. D. H. Lawrence developed a language of sanctified sex, and so did Reich. Freud was, therefore, the truer revolutionary; in his doctrine, nothing is sacred, and certainly not sex.

Finally, in this chapter, a word should be said about the various forms of group therapy, including therapeutic communities. Inevitably, group therapies develop sacramental modes of overcoming individual isolation. Group psychotherapy follows the form of commitment therapy without its doctrinal content. It is as if Wesley's famous classes continued to meet, for intense supportive discussions, without the basic conceptual scheme

expressed in the theology, merely reaching out for temporary relief from the dialectic of despair and hope generated by the traditional culture.

In order to break this dialectic, new prophets have arisen, using the analytic attitude to accommodate hope in ways that the master of that attitude, Freud, had considered rather a mode of cultural religiosity, worshiping the releases instead of the controls, and therefore more a parody of the old consolations than a genuine advance beyond them. The following chapters will be devoted to the controversy between Freud and both the most conservative and most radical among his successor-critics. The final chapter will summarize the nature of those changes which have all but destroyed our inherited culture without having produced another to take its place.

# CHAPTER 4

## *In Defense of the Analytic Attitude*

*Nothing is indifferent in a matter of confession and abuse.*

—Flacius, *On True and False Indifference*

*The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement* is the best place at which to start reading, within the vast canon of Freud's work, his own defense of the analytic attitude against the doctrinaire therapeutics. This history is personal, the psychoanalytic movement is anatomized into Freud's own strengths and weaknesses, tested first against his own patience about the miseries of living and then against the impatience, before the same facts, of his chief disciples. Freud's motive for writing is simple: this is a work of determined self-interest, to exclude, on his own terms, those among his disciples who had already departed on terms he could no longer permit to be theirs. The writing is almost cruel in its clarity about persons and in its pregnant brevity; Freud leaves out no essentials, includes no irrelevancy. The *History* is a masterpiece of polemic.

Driven by what he considered a threat to his creation, Freud thus composed a partisan introduction to the development of his mind: first, in the lonely years until 1902; second, from 1902 until 1910, during the ascendancy of his mind over others less

great but exceedingly good, attracted as they were originally by their sense of Freud's intellectual greatness.

Must personal supremacy follow from intellectual greatness? At least where a movement described the trajectory of one man's mind, as did the psychoanalytic, such a conjunction—and the effort to break it—seems inevitable. By 1910, two of Freud's chief disciples, Adler and Jung, had planted what he believed to be sterile flowers, cut from his new tree of knowledge. Therefore, Freud's proprietary interest in the movement coincided exactly with his jealousy for truths originally his own. He had "possessed" these truths, as he put it once—inadvertently, it seems. He was not about to share the object of his vigilant passion with any who did not see it as he had created it. Part Three of the *History* is the purest polemic, a surgical dismemberment of Adler's political need and Jung's religious one.

In polemics, as in sport, the best defense is a good offense. Although the *History* is Freud's most polemical work, it is not ugly, as are most polemics. Freud was not a disputatious man. He defended himself by explaining the development of his own thought; he attacked by explaining, no less accurately, the development of the thoughts of his opponents. That thoughts are carried by men, vulnerable precisely in their possessiveness, makes all such comparisons polemical. Freud would not suffer the false civility of separating ideas from men. In the end, it is clear that Adler and Jung wrote as they did because they were as they were. Of course, Freud applies the same standard to himself. It was from the darkness of his own inner life that he set out upon his immortal distraction.

He poked around in the darkness for a lifetime, driving out ugly little terrors here and there but never pretending to find some adjuratory formula against them. He thought Adler and Jung had worked out formulae of commitment for which he was partly responsible. The *History* is dedicated to the absolution of himself from this responsibility.

Intellectual questions soon shade off into questions of organi-

zation. For this reason, Freud's defense of the analytic attitude was institutional as well as polemical. Here the two sides—ideas and men—are treated as one. And so should they be; there is no moral and no meaning in any culture if not in the conviction that men cannot live and work agreeably together, however good their avowed intentions, unless they share in the same basic stock of ideas. Consensus is the basis of every society, including the scientific. Freud knew this; he had no alternative except to try to organize into a movement those men who had come under the influence of his ideas.

The efforts to describe psychoanalysis as a strange cross between science and sectarianism miss the point: every science has its canon, an established body of knowledge from which students learn, upon the validity of which depend their own chances of extending and advancing knowledge beyond the given limits of the canon. Moreover, every science has its established body of authoritative makers of opinion, the cadre of men empowered to organize ideas into dogma. Students of physics do not advance in knowledge by arguing all over again about the elements of nature, beginning with Thales' fourfold division into earth, air, fire, and water. They begin where their masters in the subject stand. Every science, like every teaching church, must have its dogmatists; otherwise, all questions would be forever first questions—and forever remain unanswerable.

This is not to say that dogma does not alter; dogmatists do change their minds. But there must be some basic level of consensus upon which the members can test the nature and extent of their disagreement. Freud was not holding on forcibly to Adler (who, in effect, denied the unconscious) or Jung (who, in effect, denied the sexuality of libido); on the contrary, Freud suggested to them, and to their followers, that the disagreements between them were now so fundamental that they ought not any longer call themselves his, Freud's, disciples. In the second part of this chapter, we shall examine the question whether Freud's resort to polemic was justified by the depth of

his disagreement with his former disciples. In the third and final part, we shall briefly consider the movement Freud launched as a carrier for his own ideas, and question whether, in its present phase, that movement is capable of using the intellectual vitality with which it was endowed.

By January, 1914, when Freud sat down to write his *History*, a great part of the psychoanalytic canon had already been established, all by the hand of one man, Freud himself. It is as if Paul had composed the entire New Testament; or, more aptly, as if Moses had compiled the entire Pentateuch. After 1901, the disciples gathered in Freud's own home, at first rather informally. At the suggestion of Freud's former patient, Wilhelm Stekel, the group constituted itself as the "Psychological Wednesday Evenings,"[1] to read papers and educate each other in the psychoanalytic discipline. Thus the canon was to be learned and extended.

Freud did not aspire to exclusive authorship, or even exclusive leadership. His supremacy derived from sheer intellectual superiority and not from any ambition to rule this small group. His own work was not even half done, and collaborators were needed, not only for empirical and therapeutic but for theoretical work. Nevertheless, the theory was well launched, the canon already a huge achievement, which, Freud was convinced, needed secondary elaboration but not primary change. He recognized that his ideas would have to be contained in some kind of social organization, to prevent confusion as his influence spread, so that some intellectual authority could "admonish and instruct" as necessary. Adler and Jung were his first two candidates for the leadership of the movement, Adler locally in Vienna, Jung for the movement as a whole.

Freud would have preferred to remain behind the scenes, the leader of leaders, and thus stay free from purely organizational distractions, the more free thus to pursue those ideas for the sake

[1] *Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society*, ed. H. Nunberg and E. Federn, transl. M. Nunberg (New York, 1962), I (1906–08), p. xviii.

of which the organization existed. It was Freud's intellectual ascendancy that made him the leader of a movement intensely personal in character. To challenge him intellectually within the movement amounted to challenging him personally. Confronted by such challenges, Freud used his writing to establish a superior loneliness. *Studies in Hysteria,* written in joint authorship with Breuer in 1895, was to be his last collaborative effort. The head of the movement worked best alone. Intellectually he was always a loner, socially he wished to be joined. Such temperaments must try to found organizations dedicated to their ideas. In this sense, Freud was intolerant of disagreements. "We possess the truth," he once remarked; "I am sure of it." The phrase is passionate in a sense that Freud might be expected to have recognized. He had fallen in love with a coarse Galatea, whom others before him adored but rarely studied. And he worked upon her, refining his knowledge of the impossible creature until almost the day of his death. Freud's passion, and his discovery of its object, was a personal necessity. He had "only unwillingly taken up the profession of medicine"; in fact, Freud had a low opinion of the intelligence of doctors. They were merchants, trading in the mitigation of miseries they scarcely attempted to understand. This intellectual passion of his life, surfacing late as it did, when he was nearly forty, saved him from careerism and the superficiality of success. He had the courage to find, in his own suffering, "a strong motive for helping [others'] suffering." His profoundest success was the creation of an intellectual patchwork of genius rather than that of a unified doctrine.

Not only the quality of Freud's mind but the quantity of his output was overwhelming. His first colleagues must have felt some panic at the steady acceleration of Freud's originality, which, while carrying them along, stimulated and yet frustrated their analogous desires. *Interpretation of Dreams* appeared in 1900; *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* in 1901; *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious* in 1905; *Three Essays on Sexuality* in 1905; *Delusions and Dreams* in 1907; "Civilized

Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness" in 1908; the "Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy" in 1909; *Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis* in 1910; *Da Vinci* also in 1910; "Two Principles of Mental Functioning" in 1911; "The Dynamics of the Transference" in 1912; "On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love" and *Totem and Taboo* also in 1912; "The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis" in 1913. I have given here only some representative examples taken from among the important writings of these years.

Although Freud took pride (rather too much pride, it seems) in being uncontentious, he knew how to fight. To defend the analytic attitude, he takes the reader by the hand and gives him a lesson in the proper conduct of controversy. Freud made a distinction between what is worth arguing about and what is not. This fact or that takes on importance only from the analytic line along which the facts are strung out. Although Freud fought the rise of new theorists in his own movement, the first lesson to be learned from his defense of an incomplete legacy has little to do with the empirical content of the argument but rather with its theoretical form. Against his own cautionary advice, and against the prejudice of the time, Freud reasserted the primacy of theory in any debate on the meaning of the facts.

Theory is God's gift to both the timid and the daring. Moreover, it is often hard to say who is timid, who is daring. A theory can be used to kill facts or create them. A theoretician is the artificer of reality. But a theoretician cannot simply inherit his sense of the real from dead predecessors. Freud's first collaborator, Breuer, subscribed to the dead theory of nineteenth-century medicine: that all disease entities may be traced back ultimately to some material cause. Yet, somehow, that material or physical cause is never quite found, or (what amounts to the same thing) the data never get quite completely collected. Rather than face up to the inner logic of his own observations, Breuer resorted to another dead theory, that of "hypnoid

states," to explain hysteria. In his insistence on conceptualizing misery in terms of material properties, Breuer refused to face the facts. He needed to imagine something physical, "unassimilated foreign bodies," like invisible worms that fly through the night, landing on the psyche and agitating it. Without his defenses of dead materialistic theory, Breuer felt unsafe. Realizing that the safe theory led to an empirical dead-end, Freud decided to proceed beyond it. He would, he wrote ironically, treat the matter "less scientifically." Thus, daring to transform reality into a truer shape, Freud imagined the "repressions," which at first he had called, with almost equal precision, the "defenses." Facts apparently dead immediately sprang to life. Freud's theoretical daring had produced the predicates of change in the psychohistorical process; the one miracle human beings are obliged to perform, and which is really within their power, to change their basic self-interpretation, Freud performed.

Although Freud denied the divine, he did not deny his own divine capacity—to theorize. Before theorizing was distinguished from theologizing, to theorize was considered a way of seeing God. Now it is considered merely a necessity, something men are compelled to do if they are to become godlike. The alternative to creator-theories is well known, and evident especially in the social sciences nowadays: dead theories which merely arrange and rearrange the chaos of facts without bringing them to life, and so, even as the facts are collected, hide them from our understanding and render them inaccessible to our will.

There are two theories of theory. The first, and earlier, asserts that theory is the way in which "what ought to be" establishes its hegemony over "what is." Value and truth are inseparable; thus is content specified, a fact put in its place. Theory is the reflecting mirror of man's mind, catching glimpses of an order eternally right and good. In this first tradition of our culture, which continued unbroken until the time of Francis Bacon, there could be disagreement on the means of bringing mankind

to conform to the eternal and stable order of things as they really are, but not on the ends. Things being what we know them to be, the intellectual and emotional task of life is to make our actions conform to the right order, so that we too can be right. Theoretical knowledge is therefore of the good; the ideal is therefore most real, the model from which the *is*-ness of things, in their splendid variety, derives. Theory is the way of understanding the ideal. In this theory of theory, knowledge finally emerges, at its highest level, as faith; the best life is that of true obedience. God is the final object of all classical theorizing; to contemplate God in the unity above all the variety manifested in His natural and social orders (or moral commandments), was the highest good.

But there is a second theory of theory, one that arose both as a response to the death of the gods and also as a weapon for killing off those surviving, somehow, in our moral unconscious and cultural conscience. In this second and more recent tradition of theorizing, theory arms us with the weapons for transforming reality instead of forcing us to conform to it. The transformative cast of theorizing, unlike the conformative cast, is silent about ultimate ends. In the absence of news about a stable and governing order anywhere, theory becomes actively concerned with mitigating the daily miseries of living rather than with a therapy of commitment to some healing doctrine of the universe. In fact, the universe is neither accepted nor rejected; it is merely there for our use. In the second tradition, theory at its highest reach is not faith but, rather, power. A good theory becomes the creator of power. And from that creation of power derives man's freedom to choose among the options specified by the reach of potential powers laid down in the theory.

Psychoanalytic theory belongs to the second tradition. Marxism, too, belongs to the second tradition. Marx aimed at the increase of human power on the assumption that, in the access of freedom which follows upon power, man will know how to choose—that is, he will conduct his life in a better way, with less

narrowing of the range of alternative activities now theoretically presented to him.

It is at this point that we must return to Freud, and to his antagonists Adler and Jung. For, in their different ways, both Adler and Jung sought in psychoanalysis a total theory, to which a patient could commit himself wholly. But all such therapies of commitment belong to the religious category of cure: that of souls. More modestly, Freud sought to give men that power of insight which would increase their power to choose; but, he had no intention of telling them what they ought to choose. He wanted merely to give men more options than their raw experience of life permitted. Where experience impoverished, Freud would enrich, and do so by interpreting the meaning of their impoverishing experience, thus reversing its effect—or, at least, mitigating it. Masters of their personal experience, men would acquire the power to choose, in a limited way, the range of their obedience to the dictates of experience. To make men do less harm than they might otherwise do was the limit of Freud's ambition. He had no interest in creating a doctrine of the good life, nor one of the good society. This lack of interest in such doctrines, taken alone, is enough to distinguish him from the classical tradition of social theory.

Freud's object was personal capacity, not general cure. Moreover, one will not lead to the other. Cure is a religious category. The distinction Freud made between the increase of the freedom to choose, which he considered the proper object of theory and therapy, on the one hand, and cure, on the other, which belongs to another world of theory, had created a fundamental confusion among his followers, which Freud himself was helpless to control or resolve. Adler and Jung sought, each in his own way, a *cure*, while Freud, knowing there was no cure, in the classical sense of a generalizable conversion experience, sought an increase in human power without reference to any of the established ideals. It must follow, then, that both Adler and Jung

would come round either to denying the very existence of the unconscious (Adler) or to a version of the unconscious that really gave it the function of the ideal and eternal order, as in the older mode of theorizing (Jung). Without quite realizing what they were doing, both Adler and Jung rushed beyond Freud's doctrine of personal capacity into religious aspirations to reinterpret man as a whole and thus cure him in his entirety. Their failures draw the limit of Freud's success: the greater freedom to choose does not cure anybody—in the sense in which, for millennia, Western man has yearned to be cured.

No less moved by the misery of living than was Freud, Jung chose to return to a religious cure of souls, carrying back with him some psychoanalytic apparatus. Even though Jung admitted the difference in purpose, Freud never forgave Jung for this improper use of his theory. In the *History*, Freud slaps him hard on the back and sends him on his way, back to the invisible church of his fathers, from which, as it turned out in the years that followed, Jung could wander far but never entirely escape.[2]

Jung's aim was to reach a new compromise between the patient and his sufferings, which are individuated representations of a permanent and superior spiritual order. In the very symbols from which Freud had wanted to free mankind, Jung saw the principle of salvation. Sickness was indeed a form of misunderstanding. Jung could see, transparent through the neuroses, the order of man's health.

Such profound optimism can fairly be called religious. Jung transposed the forms and figures of earlier systems of symbolism into psychology. His diagnoses are pseudo-visions—but visions nonetheless. For visionaries never see more directly than through the symbolism by which they are troubled. To cure, in the Jungian theory, is to give the patient peace in adhering to the

[2] Freud never understood the questionable sense in which Jung remained a Christian (see Chap. 5). Jung sought an analytic symbolism that could halt deconversion as the central experience of the mature Western personality. The ensuing conversion experience need not necessarily be Christian.

eternal order, replicated within him symbolically. Neurotic action is then one among two possible lines of interpretation. The task of the therapist is to help the patient choose the ascendant rather than the descendant line. By re-adapting the patient to his dominant archetypes, Jung helps him neutralize the neurotic component in them.

There is a fine distinction between adapting the archetypes to one's own purposes and adapting one's purposes to the archetypes. Jungian therapy grows hortative in either mode; both are efforts at reaching agreement with an assumed eternal order, differently expressed in different cases. It is as if, because men are ill, gods exist. Freud risked the correlative implication: that healthy men need no gods. The age prefers its religiosities psychologized, one way or the other. Although Jung himself is less read than argued against, the Jungian position has filtered through, its elements broadcast chiefly by the literary gentry who have succeeded to the preaching function of the pastors. The "God above God" of our theological symbolists (e.g., Paul Tillich) reflects, in tepid holy water, the "man below man" of our psychoanalytic instinctualists, unintentionally set loose by Freud.

Freud's intellectual victory over Jung, though clear-cut, was not lasting. Perhaps the need for cure is too urgent, and all theories of cure too useful. As new religions are constantly being born, so psychotherapeutic faiths are constantly breaking out of their clinical restrictions. Freud's refusal to become a prophetic healer could not be permanently imposed upon all sections of his movement. But no one has succeeded in converting *psychoanalytic* doctrine into a cure of souls, although many have tried. What Adler and Jung did—and what Reich, Rank, Horney, Fromm, *et al.*, and the Existentialist analysts did after them—is patently *not* psychoanalysis. Freud insisted on keeping the differences intact. He did not deny that the cures others might

develop may be efficacious modes of therapy. Many agencies have been known to mitigate suffering, and the chief of these is faith, in the systemic cultural sense used in this volume.

For that matter, to the religious all religions have a therapeutic function. They reflect a symptomatic character only to the indifferent. Freud proposed that all those who wanted to cure souls, or preach a saving idea, do so under a banner other than his own. Since psychoanalysis is an anti-religion, treating religion always in its symptomatic character, its efforts could only be confused if religious psychologists continued to call themselves psychoanalysts.

Yet, even among some of the oldest and most eminent analysts, there has been felt a need for a therapy of commitment; these included some of the best minds in the movement. Perhaps the freedom to choose is not therapeutic enough. Finally, the content of the choice itself must be recommended, if not prescribed. Men want to be secured. Moreover, only in a secure symbolic can they bear to know themselves. This is the strong point at which Jungian therapy arrived.

Intellectually superior to Jung as he was, Freud grossly underestimated his disciple. He permitted his own sense of superior intelligence to obscure the equalizing effect of the issue between them. With his doctrine of archetypes, Jung offered a pantheon of psychologized god-terms, from which men could choose their spiritual medicine. In subjecting all images of a superior order to psychoanalytic doubt ("I am dependent, therefore I am immature"), Freud limited severely the range of the therapeutic effect of his superior insight.

Freud's was a sheer triumph of intellectuality, of detachment. And yet he could not quite confront the issue to which Jung pointed, however unsteadily: the content of the choices that mankind would be freed to make. The Jungian doctrine develops into a formal argument for the inevitability of faith. The neuroses themselves are badly translated symbols of the gods. Thus, Jung is the ultimate theodicist, converting the universal

sickness of the human spirit into intimations of individual health.

As a theodicist, Jung had to sublimate psychoanalysis itself, altering it to a general cure of souls, without committing it to one or another historical religion but, rather, making it available in the service of all. Tracing the way in which the motives of "erotic instinctual forces" are transformed into representations of the "highest ethical and religious interests of man," Jung attempted a reversal, so as to show how the erotic forces were themselves representations of the highest ethical and religious motives. Was this religion or analysis? Freud thought he knew the answer. The Jungian mode of psychoanalyzing was a "new message of salvation . . . a new *Weltanschauung* for everyone." Analysis offered an anti-message, for the few.

Even as a fresh thrust of religious psychology, Jungian theory is dangerous, first of all to the integrity of the religious themselves. Jung's doctrine is far more heretical than Freud's when examined from either the Christian or the Jewish point of view. In Freud's approach, the delicate foundations of mankind's ethical and religious interests are at least explored and the attractive dangers to religiosity from the instincts made clear. By understanding religiosity as instinctual per se, Jung may be doing religion the disservice of giving it a false sense of security. That fantasy is not the revelatory language of faith is a proposition to be explored in the following chapter. Here it may be enough to say that Jung's is too natural a religion—so natural, in fact, that it can scarcely serve the purpose of any particular historic faith.

Theologians might well reconsider, therefore, who is more dangerous: Freud or Jung. Better a forthright enemy than an untrustworthy friend. Jung's psychological religiosity is too strictly for therapeutics, those for whom a god is the need of needs. Freud declared that God did not exist—and identified Him as the universal figure of authority. I am not sure whether one should not prefer Freud's strong nonexistent God to Jung's weak existent one. Freud knew how tenuous was Jung's religious psychology, but was not capable of launching a systematic

criticism of it. Or, perhaps (wrongly, it seems) he did not consider Jung's work worth the critical shot.[3]

No longer grasping the issue between psychoanalysis and a cure of souls, many now are entering analysis innocently, as though it were a part of their quest for "meaning" and "identity," and do so often with the encouragement of restive members within the psychoanalytic movement itself. It is sad to witness their disappointment, even their bitterness: after years of analysis, these patients have not found what they were looking for; they have taken the wrong cure, so far as they do not understand that there is no cure at all. In consequence, there are new polemicists stalking Freud throughout the land, loudly saying that he cannot "cure"—when such a cure in the earlier cultural sense was never his object.

On the proposition that psychoanalysis does not cure in a sense that interests them, the more enlightened among the religious grow embarrassed; for, in their efforts at reconciliation between psychoanalysis and religion, they have attempted to incorporate Freud in a way that will render his doctrine harmless and their own intellectually more powerful.

There may be yet another reason for the way Freud has been partially incorporated now by the religious: in this way, with apparent safety, they can express now the unconscious ambivalence of their own religious rhetoric of "commitment." Lacking confidence in their inherited stock of insight, the religious prefer to avoid argument in a wordy torrent of good will. Correlatively, in a weakening grasp of their own subject, psychoanalysts are more and more inclined to treat Freud's irreligion as if it were a personal aberration no more relevant to psychoanalysis than Freud's puritanism or his passion for cigars. Thus do the psychoanalytic and the religious talk merrily past one another, making hash of two inherently antagonistic lega-

[3] This is one way of interpreting his use of the quotation from Goethe with which Part III of the *History* begins: "*Mach es kurz! Am jüngsten Tag ist's nur ein Furz!*"

cies. When psychoanalysis frees a patient from the tyranny of his inner compulsions, it gives him a power to choose that is not otherwise his. Thus, the aim of psychoanalysis is the aim of science—power; in this case a transformative technology of the inner life. Where science is, there technology will be. This ultimate technology aims at increasing the range of choice. Yet, without a parallel range of god-terms from which choices may be derived and ordered, choice itself may become a matter of indifference or man will become a glutton, choosing everything. There is no feeling more desperate than that of being free to choose, and yet without the specific compulsion of being chosen. After all, one does not really choose; one is chosen. This is one way of stating the difference between gods and men. Gods choose; men are chosen. What men lose when they become as free as gods is precisely that sense of being chosen, which encourages them, in their gratitude, to take their subsequent choices seriously. Put in another way, this means: Freedom does not exist without responsibility.

There may be a final solution to this absurdity of being freed to choose and then having no choice worth making. Psychoanalysis, once merged with technologies of the emotions (neo-Pavlovian, in the main), may help eliminate man's two most troublesome aspirations: toward freedom and faith. A marriage between Pavlovian or Behaviorist learning theory and Freud's might lead to that control of the unconscious which would eliminate the residues of religious compulsion, on the one hand, and the freedom to choose, on the other. The unconscious controlled, compulsion and choice would fuse. Science aspires to increase the freedom of choice, but science ends, as it must, in a technique of power. Already, some restive analysts talk of "controlling the variables" responsible for our patterns of personal relations.

Adler's therapy, too, was essentially one of commitment. The patient was salvaged by the completeness with which his simple

theory enclosed his complex motives. As Freud put it, Adler looked for a way at "one stroke to explain the behavior and character of human beings." As with Jung, Freud could bring Adler only so far along the road to an anti-doctrine. Originally, both had joined Freud so as to find a new supreme cure, and when he surprised them by offering the supremacy of intelligence instead, their days of allegiance to him were numbered, although neither they nor Freud could have been expected to realize it at the time. Both Adler and Jung wanted to take psychoanalysis out of the consulting room, where Freud insisted that it must be kept. Yet Freud, too, found himself regularly tempted to venture outside. He disliked the doctor game, and used the consulting room not least as a convenient base of operations upon the entire culture. One mutually wounding difference between Freud and the first schismatics is, rather, that Freud ardently desired to avoid having his insights locked into a system. It is within the cosset of a symbol system that people can ease their minds in the security of a complete explanation. Freud, however, specifically wanted to protect his patients from merging therapy with an adherence to his doctrine. There is the technique of the transference and the overcoming of resistances, but transference must be resolved if the analysis is to be brought to a conclusion useful to the patient.

Commitment, on the other hand, is a system of rationalization where therapeutic ideas serve both to exploit and to hide unconscious motives. Translating Freud's insights into a doctrinally inflexible psychology of power, Adler thus compromised with the fact that he was a doctor; psychoanalysis served the function, for him, of a neurotic symptom, complying with the demands of his ego to express his political preferences. Thus, originally, Freud offered Adler some advantage, an exciting alternative to his social interests. But Adler could not fend off for long the main interest of his life, the construction of a social ideology. It is possible that, as a socialist, Adler remade psychoanalysis into a doctrine of power as a way of rationalizing his

own acute sense of powerlessness, rather as neurotics accept their anxiety as a means of attaining a kind of security. He could not long tolerate analysis that stopped short of advocacy. And so, after a few years during which he impatiently played the analytic game, Adler experienced the personal satisfaction of finding the "sole motive force" of life.

With his dynamically balanced capacities for elaborating multiple analytic perspectives, Freud never chased the chimera of a sole motive force. Adler's passion for finding what he called a "guiding line," a master doctrine, was the precise opposite of what Freud had trained himself to achieve: to tolerate uncertainty and always entertain multiple analytic perspectives until, in the cruel competition of ideas, some few survived. Adler thus translated Freud's intricate intellectual enterprise into a psychological ethic of competition, preserving only half of it, and that part only which analyzes the "jealous narrowness of the ego" making use of the instinct to struggle for power; but, the other half, that in which the instincts oppose the ego, was outside the range of Adler's polemical interest and, therefore, beyond his understanding. The need of Adler's own ego, to politicize everything, was reflected in his ego psychology. Freud, on the other hand, was one of those rare characters who needed no therapy of commitment. It is in this special sense that he is the most unheroic of intellectuals, free from compelling temptations toward either politics or religion. He is, in fact, the embodiment of the modern intellectual as a type—for he was nothing more than an intellectual; he was not even a "mental healer," as Stefan Zweig mistakenly labeled him, depending on models of cure (Mary Baker Eddy, Tolstoy, *et al.*) repugnant to the analytic attitude.

Some modern psychologies are themselves the surrogates of political theory, as others are the surrogates of theology. The feeling of "organ inferiority," which Adler so easily discovered as the core of neurotic behavior, may be interpreted as his transliteration into psychological terms of the class war. The

weak, ugly, misshapen, crippled, miserable—these were Adler's own, privately designated proletariat, whom he set out to cure of their inferiority complex. Viewed thus, Adler's psychology reveals the quality of his socialism; it was, said Freud, characterized by (1) protest, and (2) self-assertion, the aggrandizement of personality. Here is a sudden swoop down into the very bowels of the socialist dynamic, with its inevitable cult of personality wherever it triumphs. Understood psychoanalytically, socialism is the child of capitalism, rebelling against a father whom it must closely resemble. Freud closes his comment on Adler with a fatal criticism of psychological socialism: "The view of life which is reflected in the Adlerian system is founded exclusively on the aggressive impulse; there is no room in it for love. It might surprise one that such a cheerless view of life should meet with any attention at all."

Freud raked the Adlerian system in search of a "single new observation." But Adler was interested in constructing a political psychology, not in adding to the superabundance of facts. For Adler, as later for Rank, truth is a matter of achieving therapeutically useful opinions. Thus, Adler was one of the "modern Messiahs," as Freud called them, who proclaim the "relativity of all knowledge"—except their own. At the same time, Freud defended his apparent conservatism against Jung's then self-proclaimed mission to the young, as their liberator from the fathers. As it has happened, Jung completed a full circle, from a psychology of tradition to a traditionalist psychology. This dialectic was already forecast in his early refusal to deal with what he called "distasteful" matters, for example, sex.

Freud takes a final, parting shot at both Adler and Jung: "The theological prehistory of [Jung] throws no less light on his attitude to psychoanalysis than does Adler's socialist prehistory on the development of his psychology." Both used their psychologies to stabilize their own ambivalent relations to their own faiths. Adler's individual psychology is a mean socialism; Jung's

archetypes are a museum of gods[4]—for educated tourists who enjoy visiting noble, quiet old edifices that once housed noisily worshiping communities. Socialists and Christians adopt either psychology at their peril. Indeed, too many among our emotional socialists suffer from a barely repressed love for competitive behavior, while our Christians are a little too satisfied in their admission to other less covert god-haters that gods must be crucified in order to be resurrected.

Freud erred, I think, in considering the Adlerian case more important than Jung's. It is true that Adlerian motifs can be found in contemporary ego psychology, and that Adler has had some influence on what is, after social work, intellectually the shoddiest field in the academic world—educational psychology. But ambivalent socialism has nothing like the cultural importance of ambivalent religiosity. Jung's psychological religiosity is the very opposite of the real thing; yet, being opposite, it may be more nearly the real thing than Freud's decided non-religion. Jung's is a religious doctrine in which God is rendered completely interior. The "Thou" term becomes a function of the "I." In this way, as Freud rightly concludes, with condemnatory implication, a "new religio-ethical system has been created." But Freud did not notice how strenuously this religio-ethical system opposed its predecessors—more strenuously even than his own analytic attitude.

Analysis can never be combined with "cure," in the sense established by the ascetic culture. Jung tried analysis but, given his purposes, he moved on to a psychological symbolism that admonished and instructed rather than analyzed and, in so doing, aimed at restoring something all but lost to modern life. Freud aimed at making man strong enough to come to a working agreement with his inner nature, through an analysis which neither admonished nor instructed. When successful, Freud left the inner man more free, but did so without that compelling

[4] In which neither God the Father nor His Son has any preferred place.

symbol system which is the model of Jungian therapy. One may admire Jung's ambition; even more, one may admire Freud's mind. Faith is better than knowledge if it works; but knowledge is better if faith be only an escape from knowledge.

It may be said that Jung's faith in faith cannot compete intellectually with the brilliant specificity of Freudian analysis. On the other hand, the aim of psychoanalysis may be too modest even to maintain its original strength. For, inevitably, at a certain point of societal power, knowledge seeks to transform itself into faith. To stop far short of that point may, in time, paralyze the very knowledge that is being preserved. Freud's successors know less and less because their knowledge, uninspired by that passion to find faith with which it must merge in order to fulfill its potential of power, is not taking them anywhere except where Freud has already been. The act of knowledge can become as mechanical and ritualized as the act of faith. Both are subject to the same dreadful specifically contemporary risk of becoming banal. In the last analysis, a leap of faith may be necessary, if the patient is to be free to choose—and to choose because his knowledge, being personal, compels him thus. The hardest lesson to learn is not how to choose but rather how to acquire that passionate knowledge which will permit us again to be chosen. In this sense, Jung represents the uncertain and confused renewal of an effort toward personal knowledge that is also, at the same time, faith. Jung is not quite so ludicrous, therefore, as Glover, in his exceptionally open bout of malice,[5] makes him out to be.

Much of Freud's polemical writing is so superior to that of his opponents that it takes on the character of a totem feast, in which the most powerful sons are carved up in swift clean

[5] E. Glover, *Freud or Jung?* (New York, 1956). Jung understood himself as the advocate of the "mythic man" against the uncomprehending "scientific man." But, "to the intellectual, all my mythologizing is futile speculation." See C. G. Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* (London, 1963), p. 279.

strokes, the father meanwhile justifying his action at every stroke. By sheer sharpness of execution, Freud succeeded in intimidating the weaker sons. Those post-Freudian analysts who remain orthodox never have had that healthy bout of rebellion which sharpens orthodoxy; it is as if Augustine had been born a bishop. Nowadays, the world is full of tame Christians; in consequence, the churches are empty of life, if not of people. The psychoanalytic movement trains tame Freudians and, in consequence, few sons remain who are worthy of the father.

Freud's intellectual superiority has bequeathed to his followers an unearned wealth of insight over which they cannot but quarrel; the psychoanalysts are, intellectually, a rentier class and, like all rentier classes, even when they prosper it is in a defensive mood. Not that the decline of the movement in intellectual power can be blamed entirely on the sons; perfectly mature sons, fully grown, would look the smaller when standing next to a father of such abnormal height. The comparison must be invidious and need not be made. It would be equally pointless to compare Moses with the Jews in restive attendance at their suburban synagogues. Like all ideas, and the institutions by which they are objectified, psychoanalysis is subject to the vicissitudes of its history. The faith of Israel is one thing in eleventh-century North Africa, another thing in twentieth-century America—though there are resemblances. The problems addressed by the psychoanalytic movement are one thing in Vienna at the turn of the century, another thing in Beverly Hills today—though there are resemblances.

It was the opinion of Karl Marx that history likes to make bad jokes during its second swing around. The psychoanalysts are vulnerable to bad jokes; they do important work, and it is possible that, in their busy professional routines, some of them have stopped thinking hard enough about what they are doing. Priesthoods have their rituals, psychoanalysts their clinical formulae (schizophrenia is now in, and hysteria out). But ritual is the proper function of priests; the formulae of the analysts more

nearly resemble the canned sermons of the ministers, made in Detroit, or somewhere, especially for this Sunday. Freud gave out no formula. Orthodoxy, in the pejorative sense, kills a living theory. It is significant that Freudian theory is most alive today outside the professional confines of psychoanalytic medicine, among some historians, critics, philosophers, and in the social sciences.

It is regrettable that psychoanalysis began as a branch of medicine. It is true, the first psychoanalytic organization, which gathered weekly at Freud's home, consisted of many doctors who were looking for a way out of the straitjacket of medical practice, but it included also schoolteachers, musicologists, students in search of their subject, and just downright intelligent people. Nor did Freud ever desire his subject to become a medical specialty; on this crucial point of "lay analysis," it was the American branch of the movement which defeated him, after a long and strenuous battle. In fact, the major defeats Freud suffered were always from inside his own movement, rather than from without. He could cope with enemies; his friends defeated him.

The declining intellectual vitality of the psychoanalytic movement is in part due to structural defects in the movement, in part to defaults of memory; the analysts choose to neglect lessons they once had learned from Freud. The two parts are not unconnected.

Probably the principal way in which the psychoanalytic movement defeated its revered founder—the more defeated, the more revered—was by the false legitimation of the medical degree. The M.D. is, at best, gratuitous; psychoanalysts are not medical doctors. But the absorption of psychoanalysis under the medical rubric has opened the door that Freud once had closed so decisively: to a resurgence of physiological and materialist models—dead theory. Freud settled this issue when he parted from Breuer on the theory of "hypnoid states" and other such physicalist categories. But materialist medicine has returned to

charm the Freudians in a new disguise, parading now as the ambition to quantify and measure. Poorly educated as they are and, like ministers, intimidated by anything labeled "science," psychoanalysts are too easily impressed with one or another kind of methodological nostrum. Nowadays, some psychoanalysts are even toying with the theory of neurosis being a failure of communications systems within the psyche, a disjunction between affective "input" and "output." Such a scientific regression may occur in any discipline that does not insist upon mastery of its own historical development. A social science that refuses to remember its founders will not realize when it is being silly or repetitious. Now, unchallenged by Freud's personal authority and flashes of insight, materialist dogma parades confidently as scientific progress. Old verities become new variables, jargon makes a mystery of the obvious.

The decline of the intellectual caliber of the psychoanalytic movement can be related to secondary structural defects derived from the primary defect of its being a quasi-medical and largely private practice. Medical professional education, with its large doses of rote learning, is precisely the wrong preparation for psychoanalysis. Moreover, once the analyst has hung out his shingle he is in business by and for himself. More than in any other branch of medicine, the privacy of practice hinders the psychoanalyst. He lacks the sort of critical contacts with other fields that would advance his own.

In the bustle of his practice, the psychoanalyst grows more and more relaxed about his theoretical competence. He has had his dose of theory in the institutes. Theory, to the practicing psychoanalyst, is too often an ornament, good for professional meetings, to be displayed on the wall, so to speak, along with his diplomas. Commerce and psychoanalysis do not mix, despite the opening Freud left for commercial standards by his insistence on the therapeutic value of fee-taking. Of course, it is not wrong, morally or technically, to traffic in the mitigation or removal of the neuroses for money. Freud made a powerful point when he

said that the cost of treatment is more important to the analysand than the income is to the analyst. But, income may mean different things, according to the wider frame of reference in which it is placed. Fee-taking is meant to help assure the resolution of transference, to guarantee the essential impersonality behind the ostensibly intensely personal character of the psychoanalytic relationship. It is an integral part of the Freudian theory.

Any criticism of fee-taking must take place at a more profound level. The question here is: whether, by guaranteeing the professionalism and impersonality of the analytic relationship, psychoanalysis permits the full range of therapeutic possibilities. The distance between the Freudian freedom of choice and curative therapies of commitment may be bridged by the character of the analyst himself. One is inclined to believe that a cure cannot be achieved without an exemplary presence. And, indeed, the psychoanalysts maintain the collegial romance of such a presence in their common reverence for the founding father himself. Cure, when super-added to knowledge, would be the informed acceptance of an authority figure. When it is not exemplary, an authority figure has an uncertain therapeutic effect.

The failure of the Freudians to maintain a high intellectual level as a profession is all the less excusable because they have been granted many of the conditions required for first-rate intellectual work. They have a canon, an authoritative body of writing administered by sanctioned and official cadres of teachers. This canon has favored a certain continuity of research, offering a significance and justification to each little piece of work that it might not possess except in reference to the whole. But even in their research, analysts have developed a false empiricism, in which their highest intellectual achievement is often nothing more than yet another report to their colleagues of a case history, complete with pious cross-references in the footnotes to show that they remember the great, who are dead,

and the mediocre, who are alive. Paper-reading has begun to bore even the psychoanalysts themselves. In some cities it is difficult to collect even these inferior specimens of intellectual vitality. The movement is softened, its mind lulled by featherbeds of dead data, collected in the ritual act of having been published. While worrying too much about whether they are scientists in any sense of the word acceptable to their most bigoted opponents, the psychoanalysts have become at worst technicians of therapy, and at best erudites, writing up data without any sense of responsibility for their more general import. The curse of erudition in the eighteenth and the early nineteenth century was that it collected trivia, and cluttered the humanist culture of the time with ornamental knowledge. Psychoanalytic work is becoming ornamental to the scientific culture of our own time. False empiricism can have its own pathology; from papers with manifest titles such as "On a Theme Suggested by One of My Patients" it is an easy move to the latent title "On a Patient Suggested by One of My Themes."

The meetings of the psychoanalytic societies produce boredom; it is mainly the psychoanalytic institutes that train these bores. More often than not, the contemporary candidate for training in one of the institutes now comes straight out of a medical school, with precisely the wrong kind of education, for which a reading of Freud's case histories and various other courses in the development and structure of psychoanalysis cannot compensate. The early psychoanalysts were educated men when they gathered around Freud; the contemporary psychoanalyst is not an educated man when he leaves the institute. And yet, by its own logic, the field must take the whole province of culture for its own. Sociology, for example, is only "applied psychoanalysis," according to Freud. This has been interpreted by psychoanalysts to mean that they need not master sociology. Psychoanalysts are now writing on religion, society, art, literature, and other fields with breath-taking incompetence. Geoffrey Gorer has made the point well enough recently:

> A number of contemporary social scientists . . . have submitted themselves to the discipline of learning about psychoanalysis by systematic study and, often, by undergoing a personal analysis. But with very few exceptions . . . psychoanalysts have not shown parallel humility; they have not made any systematic study of the literature of contemporary social sciences; nor, despite the vicissitudes of their lives which have often entailed emigration, have they submitted themselves to the systematic study of an unknown society, an experience which has many analogues with a personal analysis in the permanent change of focus which it produces.[6]

But by far the most damaging and symptomatic expression of psychoanalysts encapsulated within the limitations of their own professional training is that the analysts are, by that very education, encouraged to "cling to 'the data and hypotheses derived from clinical observation,' and make extrapolations therefrom on social, anthropological, or historical themes without systematic study of the society of the period or systematic reading of the relevant literature." For this ignorance, however, Freud is partly responsible, as has been shown elsewhere.[7]

Psychoanalytic education is still so narrowly based that the psychoanalytic candidate only rarely develops insights beyond those handed to him by his teachers—which is more a criticism of his teachers than of him. Recently, the entire pattern of psychoanalytic education in the United States has come under careful survey, and perhaps some changes for the better will occur. There are many changes that might help, including such minor items as the passing of written comprehensive examinations in cognate fields administered by external examiners. But, most of all, the institutes fail in their pedagogic function because they have no overall conception of what they are trying to do,

[6] G. Gorer, "The Psychoanalytic Study of Society," Vol. I, ed. W. Muensterberger and S. Axelrad, *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, XLIII, Parts 2–3 (March–June, 1962), pp. 188–91.

[7] See *Freud: The Mind of the Moralist* (New York, 1961), pp. 241–80.

nor a historical perspective on themselves. Psychoanalysis has developed a pseudo-interpretative attitude toward itself, which is the ultimate barrier to the acquisition of those critical competencies that could help a movement now almost wrecked by its own success. Meanwhile, by default, the institutes have become what most of their students ardently desire them to be: trade schools preparing them for accreditation and the good life in some suburbs, without night calls from troublesome patients.

Perhaps there are simply too many candidates. This is one field in which the supply creates its own demand. But there is not so much talent in the world, and many candidates now entering the profession are unsuited to the uniquely intellectual and emotional strain of being a psychoanalyst. The field faces the ultimate test of its own sense of responsibility as an intellectual discipline: Can it contract, in the face of all pressures to expand?

A curious mood of dissension pervades the psychoanalytic movement. At a time when they are drawn closer together, defensively, they quarrel among themselves, aggressively. The endemic and apparently arbitrary character of the dissensions has long troubled the more thoughtful analysts. Some explanation of this prevalent mood may be useful in dispelling it.

Psychoanalysis is a mature movement (over a half-century old in New York, for example) of one-time heretics, now established as the orthodox. No one is more touchy than a one-time heretic gone straight. More importantly, he has achieved his orthodoxy at a certain cost. At his best, the psychoanalyst is a person with some neurotic difficulties who has gone into psychoanalysis to help himself and, out of this trained self-consciousness, to help others. This is not said pejoratively. Psychoanalysis has effectively squelched the stupidly neurotic who resent and envy those who have engaged in some resolution of their misery. It is not that the psychoanalytically inclined is more neurotic than the next man, rather he is only more intelligent about his

problems. On the other hand, intelligent "normals" are now flooding the field, and they are, characteristically, without analytic talent.

The neurotic who becomes a psychoanalyst has passed through the urgencies of his own misery and is licensed as able to help others in their own. He learns to keep his own and his patient's problems quite separate. Just his unremitting involvement in the therapeutic relation lessens the capacities of the analyst for those long-range perspectives necessary to the higher aspects of intellectual labor in his field. There is an imbalance of involvement and detachment in psychoanalysis. This psychoanalytic clinician lives professionally too near his clinic, which is too private. His imagination has been too narrowly confined within the limits of his professional education. There was a time when analysts worried whether examining the unconscious life would destroy the creativity of the artist; this fear has proved unfounded. The creativity more certainly destroyed by psychoanalytic training has been that of the psychoanalysts themselves. They remain too closely tied to their mother subject—and too badly trained in other subjects to escape paying a price, in their own capacities, for the remarkable achievements of their professional predecessors. It must be pleasing to have a father so great as Freud, and yet also frustrating in that, for practically no other reason, they cannot be great, too. And thus, in dissension, they express their ambivalence to their own field. Psychoanalysts nowadays are malcontent in their settled professional situation—but only malcontent. Their professional anxieties are thus rendered stable in professional bickering.

Nevertheless, dissension within the psychoanalytic movement is an awkward tribute to its highest virtue and most vital principle: honesty. As an ultimate rule of organization, honesty is death to organization itself. Reticence, forbearance, tolerance —these civilities and hypocrisies are necessary to organized life. A powerful woman, with savagely clear intuitions, Lou Andreas-Salome, understood the ultimate cause of dissension in the move-

ment: its commandment of honesty. "This is the . . . reason why, within this [first psychoanalytic] circle, splits arise and disputes . . . and it is more difficult to settle these than any others." Being a rather cruel as well as intelligent woman, she honestly relished those fights: "It is beautiful to see men facing one another in honest battle." And, being human, she needed a father-figure in the chair, somehow remote and above the battle. Translations from one language into another can reveal motives lying deep below consciousness. In English, Andreas-Salome's reference to Freud as if he were a deity makes profound sense. Writing in her diary, she rehearsed a pretty speech never made, the peroration of which ran: "To thank all these evenings, even the dull ones, for the sake of the One who chaired them and gave them of his time."[8]

Writing to Oskar Pfister, Freud declared himself on the optimal traits of a psychoanalyst, without commenting on whether such traits can flourish in a professional setting: "Your analysis suffers from the hereditary weakness of virtue. It is the work of an over-decent man who feels himself obliged to be discreet. . . . Discretion is thus incompatible with a good presentation of psychoanalysis. One has to become a bad fellow, transcend the rules, sacrifice oneself, betray, and behave like the artist who buys paints with his wife's household money, or burns the furniture to warm the room for his model. Without some such criminality there is no real achievement."

There is a "criminality," a creative egoism, missing nowadays from this great and necessary profession. That egoism passed, for reasons that must be called culturally necessary, to Jung, there to be turned, with almost insane imaginative flair, against the analytic attitude itself.

[8] *Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society*, ed. H. Nunberg and E. Federn, transl. M. Nunberg (New York, 1962), I (1906–08), p. xxxi.

# CHAPTER 5

## *The Therapeutic as Theologian: Jung's Psychology as a Language of Faith*

*But in what myth does man live nowadays? In the Christian myth, the answer might be. "Do* you *live in it?" I asked myself. To be honest, the answer was no. For me, it is not what I live by. "Then we no longer have any myth?" "No, evidently we no longer have any myth." "But then what is your myth—the myth in which you do live?" At this point the dialogue with myself became uncomfortable, and I stopped thinking. I had reached a dead end.*

—Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*

In the spring of 1957, late in his eighty-first year, Jung reluctantly began to recall, for his disciple and amanuensis, Aniela Jaffe, the story of his inner life.[1] From beginning to end, it is the record of a struggle to find, for himself, the "personal myth" by which he could live, free of the Christian myth which had failed to give his father a workable sense of well-being.

Paul Jung, pastor, had become a psychiatric case, complete with stays in an asylum. C. G. Jung, psychiatrist, attributed his father's miserable life to the collapse of the Christian myth—

[1] C. G. Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* (London, 1963), pp. 9–16.

more precisely, to the failing power of that myth to control the inner conflicts of those subject to it.

Accepting as the leading premise of his psychology the failure of established religions in the West, Jung looked back on his entire life as the fortunate unfolding of a counter-myth, one that saved him from the fate of his father. In his development, from the dreams and visions of childhood on to the hypotheses of old age, Jung traced the convergence of divinely inspired messages and scientific intellection into a religious psychology—that form of faith he considered best adapted for use in the twentieth century.

The Christian myth was no longer therapeutic. Jung viewed his career, at its end, as a successful search for a functional equivalent in psychotherapy to what he assumed must have been the therapeutic effect of Christian imagery and institutions. His search led him to science and to a way of externalizing in psychology the ideas lying unexploited, but rather exploiting, inside man, the stable modes of man's spiritual history. Jung's search led him also to discover a hidden importance in alchemy as the precursor of a modern science which could—if only it would—discharge the vital cultural function: externalize the religious life, reuniting the spiritual with the material. Jung committed his own science to the discharge of this function, thus inviting the charge that his religious science was mere word alchemy. As Jung well knew, all modes of faith appear slightly fraudulent in the age of science, a coming to gods who are not there.

As Jung understood his life, the God necessary for our time came to him; he considered himself less a discoverer of the truth than discovered by it. So far as he imagined himself a vehicle upon which the therapeutic power re-entered our culture, Jung followed in the classical mode by which all prophets have understood themselves, that is, that they were less the choosers of a therapeutic symbolism than chosen by it. Jung insists on this distinction in all the anecdotes of dreams and visions that give the

early parts of his autobiography its fascination. Yet, he waited until he was beyond the reach of skeptical reviewers before he published the secret of his life: this burden of prophecy with which he had been charged from the time of his earliest remembered dream.

In that dream, which occurred sometime between his third and fourth year and which, according to his own testimony, preoccupied him all his life, the nameless "subterranean God," the aspect of divinity permanently opposed to "Lord Jesus," introduced himself to Jung. Yet, if the subterranean God was "not to be named," nevertheless he did have a describable form. What the frightened little boy had seen in his dream, as the old man recollected more than three-quarters of a century later, must have been a "ritual phallus." Indeed, throughout Jung's autobiography, it is assumed without question that what the old man came to understand the boy had actually experienced. Jung used his life ruthlessly to illustrate his theory, understanding himself as his best case (i.e., most successfully completed) of the required modern transfer of allegiance: from old faith to new psychology, not as an act of disrespect to any one faith but as the way in which all faiths could again become viable—and therefore also valid.

Subterranean gods, the suppressed aspects of divinity (which Lawrence and Reich also prophesied, as we shall see), reappeared to Jung throughout his youth, "whenever anyone spoke too emphatically about Lord Jesus." Indeed, after that model dream, which corrected forever in his imagination the one-sidedness of Christian doctrine, "Lord Jesus never became quite real" for Jung.

The unreality of Jesus was "a frightful revelation." After all, Jung was the son of a pious and official Christian. This revelation "had been accorded me without my seeking it," as if the unconscious of the father had been visited upon the son, there to begin the process of correcting the imbalance that was to destroy his father.

Psychological imbalances are corrected by fusion, as we shall see again in the chapters on Reich and Lawrence. Thus Lord Jesus himself became dark, identical with the phallus. It is in this rather special sense that Jung remained, as he declared, a Christian. But this is a new Christianity, one scarcely reconcilable with the old.

It is reasonable to expect of Jung that he would interpret his life in Jungian terms. His correction of Christianity lay, as he saw it, in the revelation to him of its suppressed underside: God in heaven had "His underground counterpart." In this sense, however, Jung's doctrine is far more than a correction of an imbalance in the depths of human motivation. Jung does not simply return a Christian to Christianity, a Jew to Judaism, a pagan to his paganism, as he claimed. More importantly, by rendering the suppressed underground emotions conscious and acceptable, Jung legitimates the demonic and destructive as having rights of their own on the strength of their therapeutic potential.

When the subterranean God erupted from out of the unconscious of the Germans, Jung was neither indignant nor morally offended. On the contrary, there were Jungian reasons to believe that this eruption was a therapeutic realignment of an unbalanced German collective unconscious. The incidental cost to many Jews of their lives was an unfortunate by-product of the eruption itself. Jung was not anti-Semitic, in any of the crude senses of that condition. Rather, being unfettered by the pale surface of the moral law and its personified symbol, Jesus, Jung could even utter some welcoming sighs of terror at the reappearance of the dark underside in political attire.

In Jung's interpretation, the trouble with Freud was that he had remained a Jew who had merely exchanged ritual obedience to the laws of the Hebrew God for intellectual obedience to the laws of sexuality. In transferring from his historic religion to science, Freud did not become a free man. "At bottom," the "psychological qualities" of Jahweh and sexuality "remained the

same." Not that Freud was mistaken; in his limited puritanical way, he had taken a most useful and true turning. "The lost God had now," in the twentieth century, to be "sought below, not above." Unfortunately, being Jewish and therefore rather fanatical in his devotion to some unifying truth, Freud sought for the lost God too single-mindedly. The "realm of darkness," out of which the new light was to come, contained much more than sexuality. It contained, in fact, a veritable old treasure-trove of symbols, discarded once as nonsense, which could be recovered for use against our insanely narrow rationalism. In Jung, psychology itself was to take on the mythic style, although rationally, for the sake of personal integration, and thus serve the saving purpose once served, less rationally, by religions.

What had to be recovered was not the action of the irrational but its symbolism. Not cannibalism itself but its motif, reenacted in a ritual ceremony or re-articulated in art, was to be the therapeutic device by which men might save themselves both from cannibalism and from too thorough a suppression of it. Not God but a more sinuous idea of God would save post-Christians from psychological consequences of their loss of faith. Jung's father had not known how to use his dreams to preserve his sense of well-being. The "creative impulse" (Jung's title for our saving grace) was to be sought now in psychiatry rather than theology. In the science of psychologizing there was a functional equivalent of the theogonic process by which all previous cultures had constructed their techniques of salvations.

It was in his twelfth year, after three nights of tormented effort to escape the vision apparently intended for his inner eye alone, that Jung finally saw, in a definitive fantasy, the ruin of his ancestral religion. He saw, in fact, the roof of the Basel cathedral, glittering in the sun. And then the thought of God, sitting on His throne, far above the church, occurred to the boy. And, then, after three days and nights during which the boy tried to prevent himself from experiencing what in the wisdom

of his old age he knew had been an "illumination," there came the apparently sacrilegious judgment of God upon His (and Jung's) own church. He (i.e., God) let drop from the seat of His throne, "an enormous turd," which, falling upon the church, destroyed it.

Jung understands and claims this vision as his first and formative "experience of grace." It was then, when he "experienced grace" in such an alarming way, that his "true responsibility began." Unasking, Jung had been given as a free gift the most intimate and revealing knowledge of the "immediate living God who stands, omnipotent and free, above His Bible and His Church." In return for this gift, Jung developed (although secretly) a prophetic sense of mission: to help those who, like his father, suffered from the failure of the Christian miracle of grace, to a new grace.

There can be no doubt about the way in which Jung looked back on his entire life: his was a prophetic mission, viably designed for modern consumption as psychology. God had made Himself painfully understood to Jung; it was Jung's appointed burden, the purpose for which, as a small child, he had been accorded that dreadful experience of grace. It was his task now to communicate, through his matured psychology, not the God of the Bible or church but the dark, subterranean God of each man's secret life, who is unknown even to the holder of the secret unless he be informed of His existence by deep psychologizing.

Thus Jung found his way out of the religious impasse which had destroyed his father: in an integrative personal symbolism, in a meta-religion, revealed originally to himself alone, which he then translated, without disclosing its divine source, into a psychotherapy which could be useful in the revitalization of any and all religious contents. It is a meta-religion aiming at something beyond the criteria of true and false, or even good and evil. The ideal character type produced by it is neither mystic nor ascetic, but therapeutic—a person assessing even his own myth in terms

of how much it contributes to his sense of personal well-being.

There is no arguing with revelation, as St. Joan's interlocutors discovered. Jung's was a personal language of faith, revelatory, and therefore beyond danger of being invalidated by argument or contradicted by experience. These revelatory experiences, and the terms he adapted for their expression, remained "true"—that is, therapeutic—for him. The gods spoke to Jung. One may believe him or not, the effect remains; because the old public myth no longer served a therapeutic effect, Jung created his own private myth, and felt much better for it.

The personal myths of Jungian psychology have little enough in common with the classical language of faith, and nothing whatever to do with the language of modern science. Because it offers no criteria of validity, other than the therapeutic experience of conviction, Jungian theory amounts at once to a private religion and an anti-science. For this reason, and despite its downright unreadability, Jung's theory has held out some comfort for contemporary literary humanists who, bored by the bread-making miracles of modern science, need to be reassured that man cannot live by bread alone. Jung developed a fresh rhetoric of spirituality, without the bother of churches or the imposition of consequential ethics. His therapy was a theogonic process: the gods remade to populate a charming cosmos, full of interesting people (the "Old Man," for example, and the "Anima," beautiful but dangerous) in which no ego need feel lonely.

God-making, nowadays, is no small miracle. Even as a private art, a theogonic process may outmatch, in the swiftness of its therapeutic effect, the slow and cumulative effort of science. Moreover, a compelling therapeutic is revealed to the very few, who are prophets, whereas science may be taught to the many, who are mere technicians. Jung believed it to be a sublime act of health, to produce, from within oneself, a panoply of contending and yet unchanging inner gods as a buffer against a world changing outwardly for the worse. Above all, Jung detested

modernity and the drift toward democracy and equality. His interior and subterranean gods are inveterate snobs and erudite skeptics, that is, symbols eulogizing the aristocratic past.

Jung's appeal to literary humanists and to the post-religious propertied classes is based upon an elaborately Romantic contempt for "mere intellect."[2] Barring intellect, we have only the logic of feeling; and, in Jung's terms, this has been discovered to be an automatic balancing of emotions, the famous Jungian "compensations." What remains? The inexorable particularity of personal situations, in Jung's phrase "the terrible ambiguity of an immediate experience." Some reconstruction must take place. Some spontaneous rhythm—unencumbered by intellect—must be discovered in history and personality. Note that a rhythm must be discovered, not imposed; and with that one step, we are right in the middle of Romantic dialectics.

The Romantics loved the dialectical method—or what they thought was dialectic. Plato became a patron saint of feeling. In Heine's famous words:

> Plato and Aristotle! These are not merely two systems; they are also types of two distinct human natures, which from immemorial time, under every sort of cloak, stand more or less inimically opposed. . . . Enthusiastic, mystical, Platonic natures reveal [religious] ideas and their corresponding symbols from the bottomless depths of their souls. Practical, ordering, Aristotelian natures build up from these ideas and symbols a solid system, a dogma and a cult.

But the Romantics did not understand Plato's intellectualism. As Plato used the dialectical method, one did not decide between two contradictory propositions but experienced a new insight, which transcends and, in a way, comprehends both terms. In this process, the interplay of concepts is as important as their resolu-

[2] This contempt sometimes erupted in crude indictments of the modern intellectual. "Man has been robbed of transcendence by the short-sightedness of the super-intellectuals," Jung declared. *Op. cit.*, p. 301. Moreover, "the so-called intellectuals" make the "most difficult as well as the most ungrateful patients, apart from habitual liars." *Op. cit.*, p. 142.

tion. The Romantics, however, saw only one delightful feature of the dialectical method: it was an open system, not a closed one; there was always a way out. They were unable to comprehend the import of continuity in the dialectical effort, and so that effort was wrenched from the pedagogic into the historical context, where Jung found it.

The Romantic philosophers loved dialectic with the Platonic teacher lifted clean out of the method. It became a neat historical trick, easily perpetrated: first one term, then its opposite, then—from behind one's back, out of the "collective unconscious"—the third concept, the savior, as a synthesis. No longer did the pedagogic interplay, the clash of reasons in a debate, justify either the method or the result; rather, the method was transferred to the stage of historical action, with that third term waiting all the time in the wings to come out and save the show. The clash of reasons became a story line, a mythic content, an attempt to keep the suffering audience from becoming too restless while waiting for the entrance of the savior, who, when he does appear, never quite succeeds in gaining their attention. In the Jungian dialectic, that ignored savior is the Unconscious itself, in one personification or another, come to correct the intellectual arrogance of consciousness.

Jung quotes the passage from Heine as the motto for his most influential book, *Psychological Types* (1921). Platonic and Aristotelian become *introvert* and *extrovert*. Each person, each society, each religion has simultaneously (1) a tendency to fall toward either characterological pole and (2) a tendency to compensate for the one-sidedness of its type. This dualism regulates the rhythm of history, both case history and race history.

The Jungian polarization, rendered interior to personality, supplied a new doctrinal abstract for the Romantic movement, a fresh statement of opposition between reason and spontaneity, thought and feeling, restriction and freedom, distortion and honesty. Jung, then, was hardly proposing anything new in his

break from Freud. On the contrary, he was returning to pre-Freudian motifs, without taking back with him the essential ideas of a dynamic unconscious, or of a truly unconscious conflict.

Freud, however, retained his grip on the discovery of the Unconscious, and was not tempted by the ease with which unconscious processes could be transformed into yet another place containing both heaven and hell. Freud did not impose the Romantic dichotomies upon his psychological types. They were unusable clinically anyway, since mental disorders display a multiplicity of contradictions and appositions. Freud reserved the Romantic dichotomy for places other than characterology—within his analytic procedure, for example. In reference to the regimen of mental relaxation demanded of the patient, Freud quoted Schiller, instead of Heine: "The essential condition of poetical creation includes a very similar attitude."[3]

Freud had a further and even more prominent use for the Romantic duality in his system: in his theory of the cosmic instincts, Eros and Thanatos. Perhaps one reason Jung has achieved one kind of cultural usability, while Freud achieved another, is that Freud never had the union of opposites revealed to him. He was neither psychotic nor prophetic—and Jung must be considered as having avoided the one condition by achieving the other. Eros and Thanatos, spontaneity and rigidity, remain in eternal although alterable conflict, neither victorious over the other. Two forces and their eternal war: this defines Freud's pessimism.

Jung is popular because he did more, first of all to preserve his own threatened sanity. He turned the nighttime horror of Freud's warring duality of love and death into the daytime optimism of a new and synthesizing principle. In that "terrible ambiguity of immediate experience"[4] Jung saw a randomness

[3] Cf. *Freud: The Mind of the Moralist*, p. 97.

[4] The complaint against reality of every modern secular intellectual in search of a system with which to reduce his uncertainty and indecision.

that supplied a new grace for those permanently out of touch with the Lord Jesus. The disorder of the interior life anticipated its salvation. "When Faust exclaims 'feeling is everything,' he is expressing merely the antithesis to the intellect, therefore only reaching, not satisfaction, but the other extreme; he does not achieve that totality of life and of his own psyche in which feeling and thought are joined in a third and higher principle."

What was this synthesizing principle? Not one of thinking at all—Jung calls both feeling and intellect modes of thinking—but a principle of action. Mental life is "perpetually creative." In this creative activity, intellect and spontaneity were combined. "Each new day reality is created by the psyche." This reality Jung called "fantasy." The higher third principle can be understood either as a practical goal or as the fantasy which creates the goal. Fantasy: this is the Jungian successor to Christian faith in its practical (that is, therapeutic) aspect. Once he grasped the therapeutic function of his own fantasies, Jung found himself charged with the missionary assignment of codifying fantasy and, in illustration, finding model parallels[5] to modern fantasy from comparative cultural history.

The Romantic dialectic was fundamentally sophistical; it is equally clear that Jung's synthesis is no synthesis at all. The Romantics, at least, were honest enough to set intellect and feeling in opposition to each other—however mistaken that opposition may be—and announce their preference for feeling, without inventing a synthesis for the two. Indeed, a synthesis is impossible: the Romantics so constructed intellect and feeling as to render them absolutely comprehensive and to mean precisely the opposite of each other. Any synthesis of the two can only mean that one has gone offstage for a moment to re-emerge with a new name.

Something very like this happened to Jung's idea of fantasy. Fantasy, we know, is "just as much feeling as thought." From

[5] Primarily in alchemy and in gnosticism; both, therefore, contained for Jung intimations of his own psychology.

fantasy "issues the solution to all unanswerable questions; it is the mother of all possibilities, in which the inner and the outer world, like all psychological antitheses, are joined in living union. Fantasy it was and ever is which fashions the bridge between the irreconcilable claims of object and subject, of extroversion and introversion." Is this true? Here is Jung's description of fantasy: "It is a special characteristic of fantasy that it is essentially involuntary and stands inherently opposed to conscious contents," having qualities of "strangeness and spontaneity" in common with the dream.

The truth is, Jung has brought back one member of the old duality, unreason, with a new name; it is no synthesis at all, but only the latest maneuver in the war against rationality that has been conducted with rising hysteria by literary intellectuals and humanists against the laws of a culture they have reason to distrust and disobey. The Jungian theory proposes to every disaffected humanist his "personal myth," as a sanctuary against the modern world. Against the vulgar democracy of intelligence, Jungian theory proposes an aristocracy of feeling. From this proposal derives Jung's persistent influence on modern critical and aesthetic style.

What exactly is this "creative impulse" Jung sets up as the highest activity of man? At first glance, one would think it is merely a new term for *art;* but actually Jung implies something much more general, public as well as private. What Jung means by fantasy is, in a word, *illusion.* Here is a fundamental difference between Freud and Jung. All the Romantics had agreed—Nietzsche's is perhaps the most famous formulation—that only an illusory history, or an illusory religion, or illusory politics, could lead human beings to a therapy of commitment.[6] Freud came to disabuse mankind; to lift from men the eagerly assumed

[6] As another ideologue of the therapeutic, Otto Rank, referring to an illusory therapy, concluded: "The individual will is either asserted in creation or lost in neurosis."

burdens of their "erotic illusions" is to render inoperative all the classical therapies. In exact opposition, it was Jung's mission to state the intellectual condition under which one might reinstate any and all therapies of commitment, at least as personal ventures in historical fantasy construction. Social life, eased and enriched by this esoteric religious science, would require ever more numerous erotic illusions. The more the material satisfactions will be taken for granted, the more important would grow the "spiritual" satisfactions. What the consolations of religion and philosophy were to the millennial cultures of scarcity, the consolation of psychology would be to the culture of plenitude. Both the high culture and the individual sense of well-being depended more than ever before for their very existence on erotic illusions. If old illusions no longer functioned satisfactorily, then they must be replaced by "something new." Jung dedicated his life to the production of something new in the way of saving illusions. Under the stimulus of this essential disagreement with Freud, Jung wrote his most lucid single essay, an account of Freud's historical importance—and limitations.[7]

We must not, Jung tells us, take Freud's analytic attitude as

[7] C. G. Jung, "Sigmund Freud in His Historical Setting," *Character and Personality*, Vol. I (1932–33), pp. 48–56. This summative assessment of Freud clarifies his own theoretical intention as well. "If Freud is viewed in this retrospective way, that is, as an exponent of the *ressentiment* of the incoming century against the nineteenth, with its illusions, its hypocrisy, its half-ignorance, its false, overwrought feelings, its shallow morality, its artificial, sapless religiosity, and its lamentable taste, he can be viewed in my opinion much more correctly than when the attempt is made to mark him out as the herald of new ways and new truths. . . . He is a great destroyer who breaks the chains of the past. . . . Freud's theory does not stand for a new way of life, a guiding line of development. . . . A general psychological theory which lays claim to being scientific must not found itself on the malformations of the nineteenth century, and a theory of neurosis must also be capable of explaining hysteria among the Maoris. As soon as the sexual theory leaves the field of the special psychology of neuroses and reaches out into other fields, as for example that of primitive psychology, its one-sidedness and inadequacy leap to the eye. . . . Freud has not penetrated into that deeper layer of what is common to all humanity. He ought not to have done it, nor could he do it without being untrue to his cultural historical task. And this task he has fulfilled—a task enough to fill a whole life's work, and fully deserving the fame it has won."

asserting historically fixed values. Rather, Freud embodied the destructive critical intelligence of a culture that needed "a great destroyer." It is in this negative sense, as the supreme critic of our culture, that Jung ascribes to Freud his greatness. But against the disenchantments of the critic, Jung balanced the compensatory cultural function of the prophet. His compliment to Freud as the consummate critical intellectual of the nineteenth century is left-handed. Fulfilling as he did the cultural-historical task of criticism, Freud stood for no new way of life. In Jung's view, the critic has served his purpose; he must be succeeded by prophets. In burying Freud with praise, Jung subtly voiced a wider dissatisfaction among intellectuals with their established cultural function as critics, chief designers of the deconversion experience. Not that Jung wished to return to the interdictory animus of the Jewish prophetic tradition. After Freud, it appears, the prophet stands not for repressive piety but for remissive blasphemy.

By such clearing away of stale pieties, Freud had prepared the way for the reinstatement of pieties that were more durable, more ancient. Jung despised the fundamental "unspirituality" implied by Freud's suspicious treatment of the dynamics of the unconscious. Just there, in the unconscious, are those superior illusions that would compensate mankind for the barren interdicts of Christianity and the almost equally barren interdicts of psychoanalysis. For Jung, the illusions enforced by the modern rationalist culture were no more operative than the rationalism grafted onto the old religious culture; they were threadbare, like a manual of administrative procedures. Instead, Jung thought the deeper sources of illusion were primordial and creative, unconscious though not rationalizing, and mainly anti-moral, remissive rather than controlling.

These remissive reassertions of the creative impulse were to be the new religious foundation of modern culture. Jung's higher truths become a mode of personal faithfulness to primordial fantasies which, far from internalizing parental authority, eman-

cipate men from them, thus releasing the distinctively human mode. Religious history is a chronicle of the creative impulse. Psychotherapy is, at best, the discovery and encouragement of this impulse. Derived as they are from the distinctively human mode, artistry and religiosity are identical in their origin and function, that is, stabilizing varieties of illusion, the chief form of which is *myth*.

Historically, the modern idea of myth experienced a gradual change from a pejorative to a meliorative sense. Myths are no longer considered sources of error, although the term still preserves this sense of contrivance in contemporary politics, for example. To eighteenth-century rationalists, a myth was a lie, a rationalization and defense of power, a deception such as practiced by Voltaire's priests,[8] or, in a later translation of the idea, it was an ideological stimulant to violent action, as in the political theory of Georges Sorel.

Nowadays, the meliorative sense of myth is everywhere. It has become a major term of literary criticism and, in Jungian psychology, the foundation of the creative process. Joyce went forth in *Ulysses* to forge the inchoate consciousness of the modern literati, and Allen Tate discovered the mythic implications of the fly on Nastasia Filipovna's nose. Lionel Trilling discovers the River God in Twain, Leslie Fiedler the myth of homosexuality, William Golding the original sin of striving for power. Magazine titles are full of myths, and young novelists plot exemplifications of myth. Shakespeare has received the full treatment, and Yeats too. It is always opportune to discover the mythic in a contemporary novelist. Myth detection is nowadays a major critical task, as once it was the professional occupation of religious erudites.

If one could believe in a *deus ex machina*, then certainly the

[8] Of course, the original Greek meaning of myth was in another mode, very near that sought by Jung. For Plato, a myth was not contrived; it dawned upon man as from another world.

vogue of myth has come, conveniently, at a perilous time in literature. Literary art had turned to the representation of particulars, supposedly neutral. The great naturalist experimenters in nineteenth-century French fiction all avowed a panoramic and faithful reproduction of the particularity of human experience. But, judgment was always insidiously present, and whenever it was not, the human comedy was hardly comic and incredibly boring, as in Zola. A new integration of particulars was required to displace the old evaluative integration, now merely covert. Where was it to be found? The great psychological and anthropological studies of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century, with their stress on genetic authenticity, seemed to destroy the validity of any single integration. The experience of children and primitives demonstrated the evolution of the intellectual and the moral from the sheerly perceptual. This was thought to be an added proof that reality was not more than unordered particulars, and ideas an artificial and dangerous imposition.

Following the scientific liberation from reason, influential writers on writing advised the snipping away of the last tendrils of coherence in art. Writing such as that of Gertrude Stein is naturalism driven to its limit. By the twenties, the chaotic proliferation of objective reality was artistically exhausted. The very medium of naturalistic communication disintegrated into the formless, the particular, and the repetitive. Stein's use of language is determined by a view of authentic particulars that are least intellectual. The opposition of thinking and perceiving dominates her style, and, after her, Hemingway's. Thinking was considered unnatural—a mark of imperfection, expediential. This is confirmed by psychology and anthropology, which, in the late nineteenth century, identified the genetically prior with the authentic. The genetically prior is primitive: if it is not childish (Freud), then it is archetypal (Jung). The genetically prior does not know logic, only feeling. While Freud fought for a stronger critical empiricism about conduct, Jung fought for

remissive feeling, on the assumption that this feeling was organized in a static, rather than dynamic, unconscious.

In the Jungian usage, myth becomes translated into yet another term, the "archetype," which is the most formal term of personification, the motivational form of an action and its symbolization. An archetype is represented by a cluster of "typical images or associations," but it is not reducible to those contents. In themselves, archetypes are not representable; they are "transcendent" and "autonomous." They are, in short, the predicates of that theogonic process which empowers all thought and feeling. Archetype is Jung's generic name for the first cause. Jung has turned the Freudian conception of instinct upside-down and located it not in the biophysical but in the cultural level of life; thus the predicates of his theory permit him to see the essential elements of the unconscious penetrating downward from the realm of what used to be called "spirit," rather than upward from what used to be called "flesh."[9]

[9] Jung clarified his theory of archetypes in the following passage, where he judges it necessary to correct the "mistaken notion that an archetype is determined in regard to its content." On the contrary, he concludes, "archetypes are not determined as regards their content, but only as regards their form and then only to a very limited degree." Jung then resorts to a theory of pseudomorphism, in order to develop a theory of archetypal forms, by comparing them to "the axial system of a crystal, which, as it were, preforms the crystalline structure in the mother liquid, although it has no material existence of its own. This first appears according to the specific way in which the ions and molecules aggregate." By this analogy, Jung supports his postulate that the "archetype in itself is empty and purely formal, nothing but a *facultas praeformandi,* a possibility of representation which is given a priori. The representations themselves are not inherited, only the forms, and in that respect they correspond in every way to the instincts, which are also determined in form only." Directly challenging the Freudian theory, Jung goes on to assert that "the existence of the instincts can no more be proved than the existence of the archetypes, so long as they do not manifest themselves concretely." Nevertheless, by arguing again from analogy with crystal physics, Jung concludes that there is a systemic constancy about archetypes. "In principle," therefore, the archetypes "can be named," for they are constituted in an "invariable nucleus of meaning. . . ." It follows, for Jung, in the example he then gives, that the "specific appearance of the mother-image at any given time cannot be deduced from the mother archetype alone, but depends on innumerable other factors." "The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious," *Collected Works* (New York, 1959), Vol. 9, Part 1, pp. 79–80. But Jung

Freud's mythic idea of cause is less difficult to follow, dependent as it is upon a structured occurrence, with regard to which the particulars of subsequent experience are analogies, if not repetitions. For Freud, then, there was a formative time, the first time, when all experience was universal experience, all acts universal acts. Everything after this primal time is derivative, all experience merely a rediscovery of primal experience, all acts merely re-enactments, vagrant particulars of a more orderly universal. Freud's theory is a curious secular version of the Platonic theory of universals—that they dwell in a world of their own, that we dimly remember them and never learn but only remember, that all particulars can be understood only insofar as we relate them as participants to the universal. The soul pre-exists in a world of universals dominating the psychohistorical process. Thus Freud, at his mythic extreme.

Jung's mythic theory makes Freud's read like a cautious empirical generalization. Although the archaic past was an important concept to Jung, he gave it a different and even less justifiable meaning. Freud's archaism was constructed upon an assumption of ordered sequences of traumatic events, and special contents. Jung's archaism contains neither an ordered sequence nor any special content; rather, by archaism he refers only to an attitude of mind he called, among other things, "fusion." "The relation of identity with the object" or "participation mystique" is archaic. Concretism of thought and feeling is archaic. Compulsions, inability of self-control, ecstasies (being released, transported, carried away) are also archaic. That condition in which psychological functions are fused or merged into one another is

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gives us no theory for sorting those "innumerable other factors," or for relating them to the nuclear archetypal forms; moreover, there are times, in his writing, when the "invariable nucleus of meaning" quite overwhelms any other factor. Much as he tried to guard against reducing his theory of culture to modes of archetypal expression, Jung is rarely lucid except when he abandons caution and engages precisely in such reductionist arguments. On the problems of analogical argument in depth psychology, see author's article "History, Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences," *Ethics* (Jan. 1953), Vol. 63, pp. 107–21.

archaic—the fusion, for instance, of thinking with feeling, feeling with sensation, sensation with intuition, intuition with knowledge (which is different from thinking, being discursive and limited). Furthermore, the coalescence of parts of a function, ambitendency and ambivalency, the state of fusion with a counterpart, a positive with negative feeling—all these are archaic.

What is not archaic? Only rationality, or abstraction. Jung suspected the new and adored the old.[10] These passions dominated his psychology. The representation of the archaic in modern situations, mainly internal to the person, was the mode in which tradition survived. In Jung, psychology was transformed into an inventory of traditions, from which culture could borrow variety and relieve the boredom of an "unspiritual," although comfortable, life.

The bookkeepers of tradition, who fought a long battle among the educated classes to preserve an interest in religion as a civilized alternative to faith, shall be called, here, the "erudites" —for they turned erudition into a support of safe religiosity. Jung is the latest in a line of great erudites. His learning is put to use in illustrating a position or arguing a case, fixed in his mind even before the evidence is examined. Jungian psychology is, in fact, a vast collection of illustrations, not data; modes of support rather than actual testing. The position is given by revelation. Such uses of erudition are disappearing because its primary purpose was to augment with illustrative argument the language of faith, then taken for historical science. With the disuse of the languages of faith, erudition itself became dysfunctional. Jung may be the last as well as the latest of all the erudites; in him Protestant erudition has completed a full circle, to attack rationalism itself.

The Protestant erudites preceeding Jung had it both ways. On the one hand, if they were anti-Christian, like Gibbon, they deplored the conquests of pagan antiquity by Christianity. On

[10] In the social order, as in the history of culture; but to opposite effects.

the other hand, if they were Christian, like Middleton, they deplored the absorption of pagan culture into Christian doctrine and institutions.[11] As an erudite, Jung fits into neither of these two categories. He seeks rather a Christianity that, transformed into psychology, can accomplish through the absorption of "pagan" imagery its own transformation. Precisely the myths and images that the Christian erudites naïvely rejected as heretical, or as pagan infusions, Jung accepts as fresh therapeutic grafts onto the stock of Christian myths. What a myth must somehow avoid is becoming banal, or "one-sided," just as a therapeutic must avoid boredom.

There was a venerable style of erudition that is remarkably like Jung's: that Gnostic and neo-Platonic style which sought constantly to show concordances between pagan and Christian myth, as if paganism were somehow an intimation of Christianity. Among the eighteenth-century erudites who most characteristically advanced this position was Daniel Waterland.[12] However, even though he avows to be a Christian, Jung does not hold a recognizable Christian position. For the pagan myths are in no sense intimations of Christianity, nor is Christianity the culmination of the entire history of myth and imagery preceding it (as claimed by representatives of the historical Protestantism of the nineteenth century, in Germany, led by Ritschl and Harnack). Jung does not hold to Protestant evolutionary historicist positions. Instead, he sees the concordance between Christian and non-Christian myth and imagery as strictly that: a matter of concordance, indicating the equality and uniformity of the creative (that is, religious) impulse throughout history.

From the concordances of the erudites to the codifications of images within Jungian categories is a simple, short, and logical step. Indeed, much of the Jungian canon is traditional eruditional

[11] Conyers Middleton, *Letter from Rome: Showing an Exact Conformity Between Popery and Paganism* (London, 1729).

[12] D. Waterland, *The Wisdom of the Ancients Borrowed from Divine Revelation* (London, 1731).

writing, being largely a record of concordances—with psychological glosses added. Once the tradition of Protestant erudition has been carefully studied, Jung seems no longer such an eccentric figure.

After the failure of the Reformation, and the further fragmentation of Christianity, the search was on for those more purely symbolic authorities to which an educated Christian could transfer his loyalty from the Church. Biblicism gave way to erudition, erudition to historical liberalism, and the latter to a variety of psychological conservatisms, of which Jung's is potentially the most attractive for those who are not entirely unchurched.

That famous literary style, unreadability itself, is a hallmark of the Protestant erudite tradition. Jung justified his style by declaring that it was not quite of his doing, rather a burden imposed upon him as the unwilling recipient of a revelational language of faith. Repetition, with the addition of yet another concordant image, was the essence of the eruditional exercise. In this way culture—and its religious foundation—was recorded and strengthened. Among the educated, Protestantism did not remain fundamentalist and, therefore, a culture religion. Rather, Protestantism became erudite and, therefore, a religion of culture. From a religion of culture, it was destined to become a religious psychology. After Matthew Arnold, and David Friedrich Strauss, at the end of churchly Protestantism, there came C. G. Jung, completing our permutatory line of rationalist Protestants; it broke up into small, charismatically led, mental health cults engaged in the testing of spiritual tonics for failing nerves.

The earlier nineteenth-century religion of culture had been often animated, as for instance in Strauss, by a suspicion of myth as a prop for the continued institutional power of the churches. But Jung did not live in a church civilization. Even his poor father went, symbolically enough, from a church pastorate to an asylum. For therapeutic purposes, to correct a spiritual imbalance, Jung presented a God who strangely resembled the Chris-

tian devil; his creative individual is the Christian antinomian. The new psychology is old heresy, as Jung himself understood. Perhaps it is a measure of the desperation of some churchmen, both Protestant and Catholic, that they are willing to adopt the Jungian doctrine.

Of course, some churchmen are now themselves theologically indifferent enough to graft this religious psychology onto their historic faith. That the entire intellectual effort of Jung represents a breaking away from the irreducible claim of all Christian theologies to represent the particular, unique, or superior value of truth in the very fact of the "Lord Jesus," can now be conveniently overlooked. There must be some satisfaction in the fact that Jung's psychology has a religious resonance, even though that resonance is of a subterranean God rather than of the Lord Jesus.

Jung's particular theological representation renders the entire polemical commitment of his erudite predecessors irrelevant. It was their argument, as Protestants, that the Roman Catholic organization is built on lies. The Catholic myth was accused of being at best a therapeutic lie sustaining near-Christians in their corrupt faith. By admitting pagan motifs, it was charged, "Romanism" watered down the the Christian conviction in a way that made a rejection of the "world" unnecessary. Yet, it was considered that a Christian ought to reject it. Jung's position, of course, reverses the classical Protestant one. No myth is a lie to him, whether personal or corporate. Every myth and image expresses some creative and compensating impulse of the unconscious.

Jung reduced the variety of mythic imagery to a basic set. Thus, he lifted all mythic materials out of their time and place and gave them archetypal contents, which, by virtue of their reappearance in the most disparate cultures and times, are "eternal."

Jung's formalism protects him from mere erudition. It is true, however, that this automatic compensatory action of the arche-

types renders Jung's categories of the eternal irremediably loose. A horse could be a specific symbol; it might also be an archetypal content. It is unclear whether Jung has succeeded in making the reduction which he, like his predecessors, sought, so as to get at the original code of the religious impulse. The archetypal contents are not functions of repression; they have nothing whatever to do with the dynamic unconscious. Rather, they are suspiciously literary, figures out of a library, massively annotated versions of Jung's own disturbing inner experience. Without his private myth of the "anima" to identify and rationalize the voice which spoke to him out of nowhere, Jung's insight would have been reduced, by his own theory of it, to madness.

Yet the voice spoke for some eternal being. Jung rooted the mythic in the unconscious not by relating it to repressed events such as, in Freudian terms, the killing of the primal father, which is a simple euhemerist motif, but rather to motifs in a collective and static "unconscious" that are universally distributed and merely varied in one particular image or another in every culture. The archetypes are both supra-historical and transcultural; they are specifications of an eternal and stable order. At last Jung had found a way from ontology to psychology.[13]

For the reasons given above, Jung is no defender of historical Christianity. Christian imagery does not describe the final and superordinate position, as in nineteenth-century Protestant liberalism. On the contrary, for Jung, Christian imagery is but one mode of expressing the general feeling for the divine. By attending with equal, if not superior, respect to Oriental religions, Jung implicitly denies the assumption, popular not least among liberal and sophisticated Christians of the generation before his own (e.g., Troeltsch), that Christianity is the highest developmental level yet reached in the history of religion.

In Jung's sense, Christianity is unique only insofar as every religion is unique, each being "individuated" in its particular

[13] See Chap. 1, p. 41.

combination of religious images. From this special sense of uniqueness, Jung launches his argument for the essentially private character of all true religion[14] as it erupts, paradoxically, from the collective unconscious. Although these religious images differentiate themselves from the collective unconscious, they are merely particular varieties of it. The collective unconscious, therefore, is the predicate of individuation. Jung's psychology of the unconscious is not, as it might appear, a version of the pietist doctrine of the inwardness of all religious feeling, irreducibly personal—and almost uncommunicable. On the contrary, the unconscious is Jung's psychologically functional equivalent of communities and, in fact, derives its content from the culture. It is in the sense of a derivation *from*, and *individuation of* the cultural community, that the unconscious is "collective." The notion is a daring advance on the far older one of an invisible church. It has yet to be taken seriously, the less so as the doctrine of the Church has fallen into disuse. The first question is whether any test can be devised for it—that is, whether this notion can be used. But, at least, the hypothesis of the collective unconscious ought to be understood, *qua* hypothesis. It does Freudians and other anti-Jungians no intellectual credit if they seem incapable of grasping this Jungian hypothesis, which, though it may be false, is not ridiculous.[15]

In a way Jung never adequately described, especially compelling signs of feeling develop within a certain group, comprising a symbolic of reality and the response to it. Over the slow course of history, such creedal complexes, shaping individual character, become "unconscious" (i.e., unaware and habitual) and "collective" (i.e., common to the group sharing the creed). The unconscious is always social, and therefore always "collective." To each group, according to Jung, there corresponds a special

[14] True religion, for Jung, is always a private version of a deeply, and even unconsciously, held communal faith.

[15] Jung has been treated to elaborate ridicule by such critics; for example, by that violent defender of the psychoanalytic science, Edward Glover. See *Freud or Jung?* (New York, 1956).

mythology and a particular set of images. Jung was quite uncertain how elaborately these groups could be divided and subdivided. It is clear, however, that they would have to be divided and subdivided in accordance with the particular creedal mentality which they express. In this sense, Jung argues that the Christian myth is valid only in a Christian culture and when that culture ceases to be therapeutically potent[16] it is a sign that Christianity is no longer valid. A particular imaginative form may grow banal, even exhaust its creative potential. Jung is persuaded that the Christian God, as Father and as Lord Jesus, is moribund. Only from the opposing and neglected underside of Christian imagery can the sense of well-being be revitalized. This follows the law, as Jung understands it, that every movement of revitalization is, in principle and in content, compensatory. Jung's doctrine is a balancing machine driven by nostalgia. What every new orthodoxy needs is, so to say, a fresh infusion of old heresy.

That the old therapeutic symbols are now banal suggests to Jung the excessively rational and dogmatic use to which they have been put. What is, then, to be expected is a new breakthrough from the unconscious, compensating for the overintellectualization of earlier unconscious materials. Jung waited expectantly for the appearance of new therapeutic symbols, assessing meanwhile the cultural conditions under which the symbols would have to operate.

The new symbolism would probably arise from among the uncultured. For a brief while Jung thought he detected stirrings of the subterranean God against the banality of liberal culture in Fascism and in the Nazi movement (but never in Communism, which was entirely too rationalist for his taste). On the other hand, it is quite clear that religious psychology is for him the mythology of the cultured and it is quite likely therefore that, under modern conditions, a revival of spiritual energy may

[16] As in the case of his own father.

occur first among the cultured. The way to revitalization among the cultured is through a charismatic psychotherapy; among the uncultured through charismatic politics. On both levels, our sense of well-being is really in the hands of the "creative person."

Jung has no disposition to link creativity to the intellectual classes. He is both an irrationalist and an avowed anti-intellectual, for the "so-called intellectuals" are to him superficial, rationalists and skeptics. Only where the suppressive energies of the intellect have weakened, there the theogonic unconscious has a chance to re-invigorate the ordinary unspiritual life with a saving imagery. Without this re-invigoration, Western culture must remain neurotic. The general solution for neuroses in a culture that has exhausted its particular symbolic capital is an infusion of new capital from the unconscious or, perhaps, even the appropriation of capital from the collective unconscious of another culture. This explains Jung's interest in Oriental religions as resources of mythic raw material, to be transmuted, by religious psychology, into therapeutic capital for the production of Occidental satisfactions. That he could not extract Oriental autoplastic religious motifs from their historical and sociological contexts, for grafting onto quite another culture configuration, did not occur to Jung as a serious obstacle. He is innocent of sociological interest. Jung possessed, essentially, the mind of a curator. Culture was for him a vast museum, and he saw no great impediment to the transfer of symbolic artifacts from one museum to another. But cultures are living phenomena; although diffusions of motifs occur, we understand the matter quite imperfectly. Transfer, however, is not diffusion. In his ambition to help effect transfers, Jung indicates that he is indeed a curator rather than a prophet; his passion for collecting antique symbolisms represents the dead culture he seeks to revive precisely by introducing his precious antiques. Nevertheless, there is shrewd wisdom in Jung's hope that what is introduced externally from alien cultures will be internalized by the alloplastic energies of Western man, who will thus provide himself, under the new

circumstances, with a new soul. In this sense, Jung's aspirations to be a prophet and a scientist converge.

To end the spiritual impoverishment of Western culture, Jung recommends the following: that the rationalist suppression of myth and of other manifestations of the unconscious need mitigation, but not by a new theology or by new dogmas; rather, by a therapeutic release of the myth components from the collective unconscious. The neurosis of modernity is defined by Jung as the suppression of precisely those irrational components. Therefore, Jung is recommending an essentially private religiosity without institutional reference or communal membership for the individual in need of an integrated symbolism. In this sense, Jung is anti-institutional; he suspects that institutions rapidly rationalize a symbol system, rendering it rigid for the individual, thus to become a negative factor in the process of "individuation."

This, then, is a religion for heretics in an age where orthodoxy no longer serves the sense of well-being. Jung's is a literary religion that demands more imagination than faith, more magic than science, more creativity than morality. Jung never analyzes the social structures within which all creative symbolisms occur. Indeed, he seems unaware of social structure. His psychology of the creative unconscious is remarkably old-fashioned, a secular version of the theology of the Creative Person which forms the central pillar of the huge and variegated growth we know today as Protestant theology.

The theological notion of the Creative Person becomes for Jung a model, adapted and doubly renamed the "Collective Unconscious" and "Individuation," from which his entire religious psychology finally derives. "Lord Jesus" thus becomes but one expression of the universal process of the creativity of the unconscious. Jung, in his own inner life, is yet another expression of that process.

If Jesus would not be creative (i.e., releasing), then Jesus must

cease to exist as a psychological truth. The historical raising of Jesus to Messiahship, as the Christ, becomes one particular historical variety of that strong leadership Jung calls "Christification." One should speak now not so much of Christ as of the "Christ archetype." A strong leader is a Christ archetype—although he might also be a "Siegfried" archetype, if the Christ archetype has suffered banalization. In the culture of commitment represented by Jung, boredom is the heaviest of all crosses and banalization the secular analogue of crucifixion.

In *Symbols of Transformation,* which appeared in the same year (1912) as Freud's *Totem and Taboo,* Jung made his own definitive effort at a psychohistorical theory, based on his concept of archetypal forms:

> There are no conclusive arguments against the hypothesis that these archetypal figures are endowed with personality at the outset and are not just secondary personalizations. In so far as the archetypes do not represent mere functional relationships, they manifest themselves as . . . personal agencies. In this form they are felt as actual experiences and not figments of the imagination as rationalism would have us believe. Consequently, man derives his human personality only secondarily from what the myths call his descent from gods and heroes; or, to put it in psychological terms, his consciousness of himself as a personality derives primarily from the influence of quasi-personal archetypes.[17]

Thus, Jung sees even in euhemerist mythologies another personification of the archetypal forms which are natural to, and universal among, all mankind. To the degree to which Western culture has depersonalized archetypal forms, or rendered them historical rather than revelatory, that culture has cut itself off

[17] Cf. C. G. Jung, *Collected Works,* Vol. 5 (New York, 1956), pp. 255–56. For example, the quaternary of father-mother, god-father, and god-mother, the latter two corresponding to the divine pair.

from a major source of the religious renewal which is the basis of mental health. In consequence, because of his rationalist error of independence from personified archetypal forms, Western man has suffered a diminished capacity to integrate the conflicting motifs in his own personality.

Rationalism, the ideology of modern technology, which Jung equally abhorred, may be called an "unnatural religion." It is against what Jung considered the differentia defining human nature, for it is in the nature of the imaginative powers of man to personify the eternal motifs of his existence. To be led, by science, so far away from the characteristic symbolic modes assumed by the archetypal powers is, according to Jung's theory, to encourage the onset of neuroses. A culture founded on science is neurotic, by Jungian definition. Here is literary humanism in its most vengeful form, cursing modernity with a doctrine asserting the automaticity of spiritual suffering as the price of an automated culture. In this sense, Jung continues a tradition of prophetic accusations against the present scientific age.

European intellectual history still revolves around this crisis of attitude toward modernity. Pascal's was the first great affirmative response to the crisis, asserting his personal commitment to the old faith in face of the new cosmology. But the Pascalian affirmation of faith did not hold; it gave way to modern analysis, which, in turn, elicited Jung's analytic affirmation of all affirmations as therapeutically useful. Jung tried, awkwardly, to create a theology calculated to evade the pressures of modernity, by setting symbolic limits to it, rendering loneliness theoretically impossible. With psychological dispassion performing the function of religious passion, every man would live grandly with his Unconscious, himself an entire church, complete with grace given and received by the same Creative Person. Being thus a church of one, man is no thinking reed, but, in an image more Jungian, a feeling tree—or, more precisely, a singularly shaped

branch of that tree (the "collective unconscious"). The lonely one must not cut himself off from that tree on peril of madness.

Against the disenchantment of the world Jung proposes therapeutic commitment. This reverses Freud's analytic attitude, which proposes neither private nor institutional commitments; however therapeutic they may have been once upon a time, all commitments are now neurotic because the cultural condition of man has changed in a fundamental and unique way. The alternative to neurosis is disenchantment, but not some deliberately cultivated and controlled enchantment. Modern man has himself disenchanted the world; only his inner life harbors residues of enchantment. But no further convulsions of commitment need agitate the culture. The great mechanism has been set; it will run on without further heroics. Both saints and sinners are now obsolete. We need only live in our own time and keep the dangerous past in its place. Freud, therefore, looked back with no false regrets. Jung regrets. He does not believe men can make their lives endurable without constant revivals of commitment. His psychology attempts, therefore, to reinstate exercises of commitment, without endorsing the specific contents of any particular symbol system. Truth is a highly personal matter; better, then, name it more accurately: "psychic truth." Understood culturally, psychic truth is commitment.

In its genteel and erudite suspension of unbelief, Jung's doctrine is linked to another, less genteel response to the same problem: personal unruliness. In a bureaucratic, technologically and morally cold world, delinquency may become a form of ethical protest, and crime as treated by literary theory is likened to a moral act. Man, this thinking reed, ought properly to depend on his fantasies—for the fantasies themselves, rather than their elimination, will save him. Jungian thought projects yet another mode of protest against the modern treatment of things as things—against the primacy of external magnitudes. All things, rather, have an *internal* magnitude. Because things carry

symbolic value, they also carry an integrative potential. Science has lost its sense of the internal magnitudes and sees only the outside of things. In the Jungian myth, modern man is accused of being a Dr. Frankenstein, who, having created a monster that is really a mirror image of his self, becomes frightened at the absence of soul (or meaning) in that monster. It is a standard self-accusation.

By resorting to a religious psychology of the Creative Person and collective unconscious, Jung tried to fight off what Nietzsche called "nihilism," the "weirdest of all guests." The questionable manner of his fighting has been the object of our attention in this chapter. But, at least, he must be credited with putting up a brave and ingenious fight.

The fight, unfortunately, was ill-conceived. Jung's objection to nihilism is less that it is immoral or amoral than that it is areligious or amythic. Nihilism goes beyond acceptance of the coldness of the universe to assert the passion of man as the one and only way of warming up the universe. The culture of commitment is, in fact, yet another version of this nihilist passion. Jung did not escape the nihilist trap. Rather, he fell into it, however much his bio-ethic is prettied over, as Freud's is not, with a language of faith.

Jung did not comprehend his own nihilism, for it opposed what he considered to be the nihilist position: the rationalist murder of the communal imagination. For this reason, Jung is so much at pains to plunder history, so as to find earlier contents of the archetypes and to train his readers in an historical awareness of creative efforts from the collective unconscious. Jung's mania for antiquarian shopping in disused modes of thought thus has a powerful tendentious quality. It is directed to trimming down all specific beliefs, ending all creedal strife, so as to supply a language of faith that can serve the individual without compelling him to serve a creed. Psychological religion becomes a form of edifying self-examination, calculated to distract the individual from what would otherwise be the meaninglessness of living.

This is a strictly personal faith. It cannot have social consequence except as the therapeutic, satisfied inside his private myth, stirs no social trouble. This modern form of quietism is a powerful answer to the question of how to live in the modern world. It is also an answer that denies, in principle, any significant social responsibility. Jung seeks less to transform the modern world than to avoid it—or, better, to create an enclave of invulnerable privacy that is yet not insanity. This is religion of a sort—for spiritual dilettantes, who collect symbols and meanings as others collect paintings.

Inside his private myth, the individual can safely claim his discharge of catholic obligations. In the ritual of dream and fantasy he gains membership in the invisible church of common meanings. A socially and politically inconsequential symbolic universe is thus constituted.

By this general integration into a symbolic universe, the individual achieves the predicate of his personal integration. All salvations derive from such personal integrations. Alienation, from the stable personifications that form the Unconscious, means perdition—or mental illness. The entire set of equivalences is used by Jung quite deliberately. He has supplied a parody of Christianity, stopping short at his own "Christification." Jung prudently arranged to become the posthumous prophet of his private religion—thus avoiding the martyrdom suffered by Christ and Nietzsche, both imprudently public spokesmen for their private religions. To avoid martyrdom, Jung delayed announcing his full membership in the confraternity of prophets until after his death, by arranging a posthumous publication of his autobiography, which is at once his religious testament and his science, stated in terms of a personal confession. It is, indeed, a great confession, precisely for these bizarre connections, so ingeniously made. That Jung had a touch of madness scarcely matters, it seems. More importantly, he had a touch of genius. But his doctrine is not the stuff of which religious systems are made: his lifework was a failure. But, were

he less mad and more genius, he need not have failed. Were there a lesson to be learned from his failure, it is that symbols of psychological analysis, if they are intellectually compelling, become what they must be wherever analysis develops fully into therapy: a language of faith.

# CHAPTER 6

## *The Therapeutic as Martyr: Reich's Religion of Energy*

*A man who is going to live a full life must allow his desires to become as mighty as they may be and never repress them. When his passions have come to full maturity, he must be able to serve them through his courage and intelligence, and gratify every fleeting desire as it comes into his heart.*

—Callicles to Socrates
(*Gorgias*, 492)

Furthest to the left of Freud, balancing Jung on the right, was Wilhelm Reich. Jung went religious; Reich went political. It was Reich who ventured furthest beyond the analytic attitude, so far out that he has been justly ignored as an eccentric. Once judged brilliantly sane because he stayed closer to the middle way,[1] Reich was judged absurd when he completed his development as a moral revolutionary. In the following, we shall examine the continuum between the brilliance and the absurdities in Reich's work as a case instance of psychotherapy leading into the religious question, despite many clever, even bizarre, rituals of avoidance.

[1] I.e., remained within the Freudian camp.

Ridicule seemed to Wilhelm Reich the high price he had to pay for the range and depth of his advance beyond the analytic attitude. He felt even the Freudian world was not ready for him. As for the larger world, Reich's intimations of persecution, which led him to identify himself with Jesus and Bruno, proved quite correct. As a protagonist of health against sickness, Reich fancied himself foredoomed to persecution by the sick. He had shown the way out of what he called "the Trap," the prison of defensive character in which civilized man found himself. Afraid to venture out of their traps, sick men could only turn on the one healthy man of understanding who showed The Way Out (to imitate Reich's oratorical style) and strike down this liberator. Even the political revolutionaries of the Soviet Union had chosen, finally, to back down before the psychology of revolution. The revolution was betrayed more profoundly than even Trotsky supposed. A Stalin had to win, for reasons we shall discuss later. And so Reich considered himself alone, too revolutionary even for the official revolutionaries, who, being themselves sick, were building yet another version of the sick society. Thus, with a logic that we shall also have to examine later, Reich became anti-political. To a moral revolutionary, the only hope was a destruction of politics as such, regardless whether it was of the right or the left. Reich started on the left, but kept going, until he found himself advocating a most radical rejection of politics—a rejection so radical that it must be called religious.

Respectable anti-Freudians rejected him no less firmly than the respectable Freudians. He had ventured outside both camps, and even beyond the frames of reference that permit an argument between them. Once so far out, harboring what he considered ideas fit only to meet the future, Reich took an almost maniacal pride in his isolation, despite the fact that followers soon gathered around him. He found himself the center of a therapeutic sect, small but the more devoted to their master for the persecuting ignorance of all who ridiculed him. Once rejected by the psychoanalytic movement, Reich chose to stay

outside loudly rather than to return quietly by some side door. When the little Norwegian psychoanalytic society, already infiltrated by Reich's disciples anxious to help their leader, offered him membership, he declined. Excluded from the international movement in 1933, Reich accepted the terms of exclusion as essentially correct: he had ceased to be an analyst; he had passed beyond the analytic attitude to a polemical one. He had become, in fact, a Freudo-Marxist.

Reich called himself explicitly by that title. We can take him at his word. He aimed at using psychoanalysis for revolutionary purposes. In contrast, like a possessive father, Freud ardently sought to prevent the marriage of his beautiful brainchild with any political doctrine. As an analyst, Freud was neither on the left nor on the right, nor was he in the middle. Political questions could be treated psychoanalytically, but psychoanalysis could not be treated politically. This was Reich's original heresy; for this he was read out of the movement. Depth psychology, he insisted, needed the complement of radical politics.

There is something intractably political about Reich's style of thought, just as there is something recalcitrantly theological about Jung's. Reich drives at questions of tactics just as Jung drives at questions of worship. In comparison, Freud aims at a better balancing of profit and loss among the emotions. His is the iron law of analysis: culture develops at the expense of the instincts; and neither revolution nor religion can save man the eternal wear of conflict.

Precisely this iron law of analysis was the beginning of Reich's revolutionary doctrine. If Freud was the classical economist of the sexual life, then Reich aspired to be his Karl Marx, or at least a utopian forerunner of some later more acceptable revolutionary, who would place the fantasia of a healthy man in a free society on a practical basis, one in which therapy itself, like the state in the Marxist myth, would wither away for lack of patients. At last, power and repressions would yield; love would

be free—but not free to rule; on the contrary, the necessity of ruling, even benignly, would have disappeared. Here was a revision of which Freudians rarely dreamed, and which Marxists could never preach as science, for Marxist science did not begin with moral conditions but with economic ones.

For the salvation of mankind, and against his conscience as a scientist, Reich began to preach—although he was later relieved to discover that preaching and science, rightly understood, amounted to the same thing. This preaching, even in the name of science, was enough to get Reich read out of the psychoanalytic profession. He left psychoanalysis not reluctantly. On the other hand, he did cease to be a Bolshevik Communist reluctantly. By failing to convert Lenin's political revolution into the first moral revolution fought on scientific principles, the Marxists defeated themselves. It was Reich, more than any other, who insisted with simple declarative honesty that this was a sick as well as an unjust society; therefore, a revolution would have to occur—and would do so in psychological depth as well as in political latitude.

Reich tried to play not merely Marx but also Lenin to Freud's Ricardo. At this point, the government of the United States took notice. Wilhelm Reich, M.D., self-proclaimed discoverer of Orgone Energy, the very stuff of life,[2] was prosecuted as a quack, accused of peddling across state borders empty boxes (Orgone Energy Accumulators), in which buyers (patients) sat as if they might thus be cured (of cancer, of rancor, and of various other ills, Reich said); they will not be cured of anything, the government decided. He died in 1957, in a Federal penitentiary.

Reich would not defend himself. "Nobody can examine me who does not know more than I."[3] Nobody could know more.

[2] Nothing mysterious about this stuff. At favorable times it could be seen in the air. It gave off a "bluish-green" color, flickering and vibrant, as if it were vitality itself. It could be seen by those with seeing eyes; its warmth could be measured, its colors separated.

[3] *Listen, Little Man!* (New York, 1948), p. 59.

Can the sick argue with the healthy, when it is their sickness that they are defending? How could he argue his case before scientifically incompetent and emotionally disturbed judges? The confraternities of respectable science would not defend him. How could they, when all their sciences were in the service of domination and death rather than equality and life? Even Freud's attitude, the analytic one, although it was correct beyond any other yet established, belonged to the "Mechanist" point of view, which underlies the traditional natural sciences and renders them destructive. Nor was Reich interested in the Jungian revision; patently, the "adapted attitude" belonged to the "Mysticist" point of view, which underlies all religious orthodoxies and renders them the chief ideological device of authoritarian culture. True science, faithful to "Life," and incapable by its nature of serving any purpose other than the "affirmation of Life," began with the "monumental discovery of Cosmic Life Energy" by Wilhelm Reich.

Perhaps Reich would have been safe had he remained a mere theorist of the New Jerusalem. But he lacked Freud's saving irony. Moreover, he lacked that sense of humor which can protect even messiahs from becoming arrogant with the grandeur of their own vision. Most of all, he was loyal to the Freudian principle that theory, if it is to save, must also be therapy. For therapeutic purposes, Reich invented therefore a device to gather "Cosmic Energy," sold it across state borders and wrote books on the theory behind the therapy. Boxes and books were both officially condemned, as constituting a fraud upon the buying public. It was the sales standards of American business and not the innocence of the American mind that the courts of the United States thus fiercely protected.

Whatever the competence of the courts to judge what Reich called his "strictly scientific" work, trained opinion has yet seriously to confront that work. It is not easy to form an instructive opinion. Reich is even harder to read than Jung. Certainly, he was so moved by his vision that he wrote like a

madman. But the brilliance of his vision is such that he can no longer be dismissed as a pathetically ridiculous figure. Men of moral science and men of letters will at least have to admit the seriousness of Reich's challenge—and the fine subversive quality of it. He was not intentionally revolutionary. It was not his fault that the highest achievement of science has been to see man as an animal, not unlike every other animal. Therefore, as a scientist, he chose to study man in what he considered the most natural act—the sexual. Reich's biocentricity opposes all our orthodoxies, religious and post-religious. He accepted the universe and gave it a name: Orgone Energy. In his acceptance, Reich mocks man's growing capacity, once expressed religiously and latterly the aim of science, to reject the universe—in the unnatural and intellectual act of transforming it. Reich tried vainly to defend nature as nature might have been. The therapeutic revolutionary ended as a religious conservative, enunciating his version of natural laws like an incantation, as if thus to hold back a technology that seemed to him like rape on a cosmic scale.

If genius is comprehensive enough, all the thoughtful will find room for themselves within it. The orthodox, if they are intelligent, are orthodox in their own way. For example, the orthodox of psychoanalysis cherish their own particular piece of Freud's mind, translating it thus to serve the uniqueness of therapeutic practice. Without such covert adaptations, culture would ossify and would then breed dissenters so as to grow again. But dissent carries its own dangers. Sometimes it is rendered less supple than orthodoxy by a curious monomania of objection. Swept away by the enthusiasm of their dissent, dissenters breed their own and even stricter orthodoxy by concentrating on a single objection. The old histories of dissent are heavy with examples. Of course, a history of new dissents cannot yet be written, for we do not clearly grasp the lines that lead from the negative of objection, in the name of science, to the positive of projection, in the name of an unnamed religion. Lawrence and Reich made

identical objections; this is a clue to their strange and similar dogmas. In a culture that had exhausted its religious energies, neither could invent ways in which to express his religiosity without appearing eccentric and therefore irrelevant to less gifted or more normal men.

Reich repeats the charge made earlier by Lawrence: that Freud did not go deeply enough. Below the Unconscious of repressions, with its "cruel, sadistic, lascivious, predatory and envious impulses," Reich, too, had discovered the pure Unconscious of "primary biological impulses." Instinct is pure, good, and beautiful—until it becomes adulterated by the repressions through which it must pass on the way to action. Just on the level of action, there is the "sham social surface" of the super-ego, where the human being appears "restrained, polite, compassionate and conscientious." But this shamming by the super-ego is the rubber glove with which repressions maintain their sterile grip on character. In Reich's terms, the tragedy of being moral occurs because the polite social surfaces of character are separated from the "deep, natural core" by repressions masquerading as the very instincts they repress. One lesson may be drawn: abolish the repressions. This was the therapy and tactic of Reich's Freudo-Marxism. If—and only if—the therapeutic aim of a dissolution of the super-ego could be added to the political aim of the dissolution of the state, then—and only then—would a revolution truly occur. The instincts and the proletariat must triumph together, or not at all.

The hyphen in Reich's Freudo-Marxism makes for a doctrine ingenious enough to rouse exegetical curiosity. Although the international psychoanalytic movement did not agree, Reich considered Marx as necessary to Freud as Freud was necessary to Marx. Only "under favorable social conditions" could the "deepest layer" be raised, and man become what he is, instinctually: "an honest, industrious, cooperative animal capable of love." To his honor be it said, Freud had pulled off the "cultivated mask." But a real, and revolutionary, therapist had to

recognize the "natural sociality" of the instincts. By venturing no further than the "perverse antisocial layer" of character, Freud had supplied new reasons for slipping on again the mask that, having been worn so long, is more familiar to humanity than its own natural face. Reich's Marxism, however, permitted him another tack. Never, since the age of matriarchy, have the instincts had a fair chance of expressing themselves directly. Historic man is burdened with a repressive psychic structure no less unsteadying for the social wealth of individuals than is a capitalist social structure for the common wealth of nations. The structures mirror one another, running conflict through the world inside and out. Both together serve to make it necessary that every "libidinous impulse," social by nature, should have to pass through, on its way to action, the "perverse secondary impulses." As if by contagion, the "originally social character of . . . natural impulse" is transformed into "perverse impulse." History is the record of a conspiracy to inhibit "any natural life-manifestation." Here Reich reproduces familiar speculation, now dressed in the odd vestment of Freudo-Marxism. But before Reich there were the Saint-Simonians, and before them all manner of antinomians.[4] Add Freud to Marx

[4] The antinomian tradition is at once revolutionary and anti-repressive, in fact, revolutionary chiefly in its rejection of the repressions. That the moral law is not binding sums up the doctrine of religious antinomians. Secular antinomians went the religious one better: there was no moral law. On the contrary, what was ordinarily considered moral contradicted both the nature and the grace of humanity, being imposed on man before he had the wit to understand that he was thus imprisoned inside a wall of sentiment that separated him from the elemental rewards of living. Secular antinomianism, therefore, turned into political radicalism—more precisely, into *anti-political* radicalism. For politics is the art of preserving authority. Reich derives from this secular tradition, traceable through the millenarians on the left wing of the Reformation to the Saint-Simonians, and their Young German literary disciples of the nineteenth century. It is an old German literary tradition to thunder against moral fanaticism and to insist that whatever is is right. Heine, no less than Prosper Enfantin, insisted that if moral habits seemed to rub against moral laws, then new laws were needed to sanction the established habits. This position, with its curious logic, is essential to contemporary liberal views on sexuality—and homosexuality. On this position stand most of the present British intellectuals, and with them the late Dr. Kinsey and other scientists of the bio-moral problem. The old thunder of the German literary left of the

and there is sociology where socialism was. It has been discovered that in order to bring down tyranny it is first necessary to loosen conscience; for the first tyranny is of conscience. The two tyrannies—public and private—are in a relation no less circular than the two liberties of the Marxist ideal. Until social conditions are right, the inner man cannot feel free. Short of a condition of freedom, the social process transforms the original biological needs into character; the latter creates the social structure in the form of ideologies. Here is a scientific law: character structure creates social structure.

On the other hand, it seems equally lawful to say that social structure creates character structure. Reich opted for the second formulation. His socialism had gone completely psychological: revolution could only take the form of therapy. Repression is to ideology as psychology is to politics. Abolish the repressions and end ideologies. Only a thoroughly therapeutic psychology can displace the vicious sameness of politics. Revolution on the ideological level cannot survive unless it proceeds even more ruthlessly on the psychological. Not merely institutions but sentiments must be liquidated. An inner change of attitude could destroy the most powerful institution. Reich imagined that in Freudo-Marxism he had found, at last, the "fundamental criticism of all theories of morals" that would make possible a revolution without regression. To the extent that Marxism alters the social structure, and Freudianism the character structure, not merely political regulation but "*moral* regulation of social life will become unnecessary."[5] Not merely the state but conscience as well would wither away.

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nineteenth century has become the new science of the Anglo-American bio-social scientists of the twentieth century. Behind the principles of both the literary and the scientific reformers is an ethic as old as the classical mystery cults: the worship of Life. The innocence of the secular antinomians has been complicated by the sophistication of the scientists, but the polemical point has not changed: the good life is entirely a matter of living up to the promise of the senses, so far as the special limits of a given culture will allow.

[5] *Character-Analysis* (2d. ed.; New York, 1945), p. 172.

To be a Freudo-Marxist is something entirely different from being either a Freudian or a Marxist. Indeed, Reich plays off Marx against Freud to suit his own purposes. Marx is used to explode the Oedipus complex, which "is not so much the cause as the result of the social inhibition of infantile sexuality."[6] The famous Oedipus complex is a mere symptom of the authoritarian social order and is removable by the surgery of revolution, like every other sentimental attachment by which men delude themselves into submission. Freud had no politics; Marx had no psychology. Wedding the two in his own mind, Reich produced himself. Ideology not merely reflects the economic process but internalizes[7] it in the character of the individual. "By forming ideologies," he reasoned, "people change themselves"; thus the regimes are saved the trouble.[8]

From this advanced position, Reich could offer what he considered the first foolproof strategy of revolutionary behavior. To attack the economy and the regime alone leads to disastrous "defense reactions"—as in the case of Fascism. Revolution, if it is not psychologically deep as well as politically broad, breeds counter-revolution, and does so precisely among the "masses," with whom the revolutionaries believe they have sided. Unless the repressions are abolished, the irrational, built through ideology into character structure from the top down, remains intact and will turn inevitably into the starting point of reaction. The pattern is classic. Revolutions freeze, lock themselves in. Heroism gives way to efficiency. Passion gives way to calculation. Thermidor follows Germinal. Stalin follows Lenin. But the political doctor had at last found a way of breaking the pattern: prescribe an end to ideology by destroying the process of repression through which ideology becomes internalized. Traditions are merely old ideologies, and they are to be respected least of all. Reich's passion for tactics led him on,

[6] *The Mass Psychology of Fascism* (New York, 1946), p. 48.

[7] Ambitious for his own jargon, Reich would have said "anchors" rather than "internalizes," the latter being psychoanalytic coinage.

[8] *Op. cit.*, p. 67.

through pages of strategic thinking on how revolutions ought to be conducted.

Although Reich was not the last, he was the first Freudo-Marxist to play the important game of relating the ideological to the psychological process. He was far more forthright than later players of the same game—say, Erich Fromm, in *Escape from Freedom*. Entire categories of political position could now be reduced psychologically. Thus, liberalism was understood to function in society as the super-ego functioned in the psyche, a sham of civility pulled over the reality of conflict, and thus powerless against doctrines of conflict should these break through to the surface of social life. The "genuine" revolutionary doctrine, on the other hand, functioned in society as the pure biological impulses do in the psyche. Reactionary impulses came straight from the middle level of the psyche, as reactionary regimes came from the middle classes of society. Fascism was the most powerful expression on the political level of the repressed unconscious. These Reichian correlations are neat; too neat. They dispose of politics as Freud disposed of symptoms. The Reichian analysis of politics was in fact anti-political, interpreting all power as pathological. It is the utopian element in Marx that Reich adapted to his psychologizing; separated from its utopian finale, Marxist doctrine remains political, and suspect, therefore, to a radical of the anti-political tradition to which Reich belonged.[9]

Freud was suspect in another way. Unwittingly, through his doctrine of the repressed unconscious, Freud served the aims of liberalism. Instead of scourging the beast in man, liberals, after Freud, could treat it therapeutically, as the repressed unconscious. But, for both Freud and the liberals, the aim was the same: not liberation but better management of the instincts. In contrast, by liberating the instincts, Reich hoped at the same time to create the conditions for a final and irrevocable liberation of man in society. Born free, men would remain free.

[9] Cf. the latter part of this chapter, pp. 176–178.

Rousseau's conundrum could be solved by breaking the historic chains of repression. For the chains, which Rousseau saw but did not understand, were self-made. Men could break them if only the effort were ruthless enough. The social order had been built on the historic habituation of human beings to their captivity. Man was like a prisoner, so long confined that he no longer wanted his freedom. But, once willed, freedom would suddenly break out. First, the individual must learn to break out of himself. Here was a therapy that would change the world—but only by changing the self. In Reich, these strands of socialism turn around a curious messianic belief in therapy, forming a doctrine of salvation.

What results from repression Reich calls "armoring." It is his general term for all the defensive anxieties of the individual against the best that is in himself: his erotic impulses. Reich knew that repression was not merely social or acquired. It began automatically, first in "terror with the deep experience of the self." To experience the power of desires was enough to create a profound fear of satisfying them. In this religious doctrine, fear of self, not disobedience of God, is the original sin. The historic disturbance of the social order may have begun with the dissolution of primitive communism by the division of labor, as Marx believed. But the more fundamental history of the disturbance of mind began, we may infer, with the alienation of the individual from his desires. What is called "the human condition" by those who accept it has come of enforcing calm upon the excitements of contrasted instinctual living, instead of letting the instincts literally *play themselves out* in satisfactions. Apprehensive before the intensity of his own impulses, primitive man destroyed his own "natural decency." In the natural beginning were the impulses; in the historic beginning were the repressions. Political history began when some of the repressed[10] discovered how to use repressions for their own material gain. Thus,

[10] That is, the ruling classes. In Nietzsche, the same speculation about an enforced calm upon the natural excitements of living is linked to the ruled classes, their revenge of weakness being, as in the case of the Jews (and Christians), an ascetic faith. See, e.g., *The Genealogy of Morals.*

through Freud, Reich revised the Marxist eschatology: the abolition of repressions would bring an end to political history—that is, the history of mankind's division against itself. All emotions would become personal. Abstractions would disappear. Not that men would become angels. Enmities might occur, but not class wars or group hatreds. At last, every man would be on his own, undisturbed by ideas, remote as they are from the play of his energies.

There is a sinister anti-intellectualism about Reich's theory of the origin of repression. Repression began the moment man made the mistake of thinking about himself, ceasing thus to trust his "instinctual judgment." Reich believed that our sickness began at the moment man began to think—too much and specially about himself. This reverses the naïve intellectualism of the liberal tradition, in which ignorance is blamed for the human condition but may be cured by self-knowledge only. But, to Reich, the human being suffered his first and most fundamental neurosis through an "overstrained perception of self-perception." Mind turned against body. Body could not help but turn against mind. Love abstracted itself from sex. Sex could not help being restive in the trap of love.

Reich's explanations of the origin of repression are heavy with a dialectic less Marxist than Hegelian. No German ever escapes Hegel; a German Marxist is suspect of saying Marx when he means Hegel. Here, the Hegelian organ tones are unmistakable. Profound subtleties move heavily against each other and unite in simple animosity. Thus, according to Reich, man began to think when he felt threatened by his own instinctual energies, perceiving them as alien. To protect himself against his own inner fright, the poor primitive hedged himself round with ideas. He began to philosophize, and so made himself ill. "The turning of reasoning toward itself induced the first emotional blocking in man."[11] In short, at the moment he began to philosophize, man became the sick animal, thinking his disease. The first great anti-

[11] *Cosmic Superimposition* (New York, 1951), p. 117.

philosopher, Hegel, had foreseen the end of philosophy and its transformation into history. The anti-historian, Marx, had foreseen the end of history and its transformation into political economy. The Freudo-Marxist, Reich, had foreseen the end of all defensive, abstract thinking, including psychology, as the analysis of defensive thinking. But, what comes after psychology must wait until Reich has passed through his Freudo-Marxist phase.

As early as Philippe Pinel (1745–1826), psychiatrists have found too much thinking a dangerous thing. After disappointed lovers and religious enthusiasts, it is students who are most likely to go mad, Pinel tells us. By an easy transfer of terms, Reich finds all thinking indicative of latent schizophrenia. "To stand aside, entirely logical and drily 'intellectual,' and observe your own inner functioning amounts to a splitting of the unitary system which only a very few seem to bear without deep upset."[12] Perhaps a few professionals, like Descartes, could tolerate this splitting of their selves, but for most the Cartesian slogan would have to be amended: "I think, therefore I am neurotic." Reich would not even admit that the brain had "anything to do with reasoned thinking."[13] The question seemed to him scientifically still open. But he was certain that for any moral revolution to succeed, all aspiration after philosophical wisdom would have to be trained out of humanity, as it is trained out of a patient. "Know thyself" is a motto that, if taken in the Socratic sense, merely bundles a neurotic deeper in his or some therapist's controlling symbolic. To get beyond that controlling symbolic, and make a good society really possible, "the most strenuous effort ever made in the history of man" must be "to adjust the majority to the flow of natural processes." Thus adjusted, "man could return home to nature; and what appears today as exceptional in a very few (i.e., the unblocked) could become the rule for all." The happy few are not the thoughtful, but the satisfied.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 119.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 116.

It is a democracy of the satisfied that Reich, as a moral revolutionary, is after. Who will say that Reich does not express a revolutionary sentiment fairly widespread in our culture?

Reich emerges as a figure whom we must learn to recognize when he appears in a less exaggerated form: the man of the left as an anti-intellectual, by no means an exceptional combination, and one that helps to explain why some types of intellectuals, and artists, found Reich's doctrines particularly attractive.

The arch-radical Marx himself distrusted the so-called "left intellectuals"—nowadays it is a gratuitous epithet, for there are practically none on the right. And, on the suspicion conservative fathers harbor about their radical sons, Freud conferred the dignity of his theory that, in the very act of rebellion, the sons brought themselves nearer the images of their fathers. Reich's jargon adds little to Freud's theory of the futility of revolution: men of the left are themselves "armored" types, engaged in an "infantile rebellion against the father," and are destined, therefore, to assume the authoritarian character and functions of their predecessors.[14]

The notion of anti-intellectual radicals may appear a contradiction in terms; but not so to Reich. In fact, such radicals were the only ones he trusted, in particular if they came from the working class. For in that character type, the "armoring" would not be complete and, therefore, they would have more trustworthy character structures for carrying out revolutions. Intellectuals will think up excuses, blame the revolution for failing them when in fact they failed the revolution. "Leftists" are no less "armored" than "rightists." Doctrinal differences are symptomatic; each type grows rigid with anxiety, but in different postures of expression. Doctrine always simulates anxiety. The deeper or more high-flown the doctrine, the more intense the anxiety of which it is the intellectual equivocation.

[14] To document the Freudian suspicion, consider the generation of Angry Young Men, all angry at the Establishment and all panting to join it, after a decent interval of articulate alienation that their father-images now expect of them.

For the anxieties behind all politics, Reich blamed all the familiar scapegoats: first, of course, the patriarchal, or authoritarian, family; second, "mystical" religion; third, the division of labor, or "requirements of civilization," which necessitated that there be big and little men, to do the honors and the drudgery of the world. In his own terms, Reich parrots the Marxist legend of an evolution from a primeval stage of undivided labor into various forms of the class society, with its attendant injustice and crippling oppression, supported by ideologies justifying the oppression before the oppressed.

The chief institutional instrument of repressive authority is the family. As political revolution must overthrow the power of the state, moral revolution must overthrow the power of the family—all families. Reich makes a standard point: the family, being the training ground of morality, is authoritarian by definition. It is the "factory of reactionary ideology and structure."[15] To destroy the ideology and social structure without destroying the factory in which they were manufactured seems an obvious folly. A revolution must sweep out the family and its ruler, the father, no less cleanly than the old political gangs and their leaders. However radical the revolution, so long as the family persists, authority will creep back. Rebellions of sons against fathers permit the return of the father in the character of the son.

The destruction, then, of the ancient mystique of fatherhood defines the revolutionary task. For this eminently theoretical reason, Reich became a fierce feminist, pathetically divided against himself by the wish to cut a father-figure before the posterity from whom he expected the most adulatory vindication.

Freud reasoned that the authoritarian nature of government is preformed within the family. It is a point political theorists had grasped long before Freud, who elaborated in brilliant detail the dynamics of preformation which leads from the image of the

[15] *The Mass Psychology of Fascism* (New York, 1946), p. 51.

father to political authority. Freud's own misogyny protected him from adding fantasies of revolution to his analysis of the fatherly character of power. Rather, he saw in the preformation of political authority the futility of all revolutionary effort. Reich, however, took that same process of preformation as a strategic opportunity to focus the aims of the revolutionary temper. The historic source of authority is to be sought in the patriarchal system. On the figure of the father, therefore, the revolutionary must concentrate his objections to the entire social order.

Hunting the father-figure is great sport among moral revolutionaries. Often it leads, as among the Saint-Simonians, to the deification of a mother-figure. Reich was a ferocious hunter. But, like that of the Saint-Simonians, his feminism was not genuine, being mainly a reflex of his animus against the established image of authority. Mother-images are no less authoritarian than father-images. Both must be purged by a "revolutionary family politics."[16] Indeed, authority depends as much on the "idealization of motherhood" as on the internalization of fatherhood.[17] Yet the parricidal twist in his theory led Reich to imagine an ideal and originally free society as matriarchal. Because "political reaction favors the patriarchal theory," Reich supposed that matriarchy must be the "natural" and free form of social organization.[18]

When he happened upon Malinowski's *The Sexual Life of Savages*,[19] Reich considered he had found "ethnological proof" for the correctness of his fancy. Here was a scientific work,

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 49.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 52.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 73.
[19] See Bronislaw Malinowski, *The Sexual Life of Savages in North-Western Melanesia:* An Ethnographic Account of Courtship, Marriage, and Family Life Among the Natives of the Trobriand Islands, British New Guinea. Special foreword to the third edition (London, 1932), pp. xxxiv–xxxv. Malinowski declares flatly, "Sex is not everything"; nor is economics, nor the two together. No polemic could have issued, because Malinowski had no knowledge of Reich's concepts, so far as I can ascertain.

reporting in detail the condition of a natural, primitive society. Reich welcomed the work as a fairly large-scale empirical confirmation of his scientific intuition. Because the father plays no authoritarian role, there is no "compulsive morality"; young love is free, peace reigns.

In fact, as anthropologists since Atkinson have known, the nearest discoverable paradigm of a state of nature is a fighting situation, with the father as the fighter-in-chief, defending his familial primacy from the attacks of exiled sons. Nor were Malinowski's Trobrianders quite so self-satisfied and happy. But Reich attributed their misery to a "moral-ascetic demand" which had slipped in, "like a wedge," between their innocence and its satisfaction.

The ubiquity of conflict cannot be dismissed merely by calling it patriarchal. Reich uses the idea of matriarchy as a foil, an unhistorical ideal with which to score rhetorical points against the reality of all historical societies. Matriarchy is to social organization what instinct is to the self, the condition of peace. Conflict began with the transition from matriarchy to patriarchy. The patriarchal family became the main device for suppressing freedom; in this way, Reich reinterpreted pejoratively the early anthropological theory of the family as a universal device for regulating jealousy and conflict.

As liberals, the anthropologists of the nineteenth century had gone in search of the primitive precisely because of their suspicion of contemporary social "regulation," and from nostalgia for the fabled freedom of primitive society. Atkinson found exactly the reverse of his liberal expectation.[20] Freedom is not a condition of primitive or animal life. So far as the anthropologists could reconstruct it, prehistoric society appeared even more authoritarian than its successors. Regulation characterized the more rigid, the more primitive social order. But, Reich learned only what he wanted to know from anthropology. If primitive

[20] See J. J. Atkinson, *Primal Law* (London, 1903); specially Chap. II, "Sexual Relations of Animals," pp. 219–225.

societies were rigid with regulation, then they were not primitive enough. Taboos, like all law, are a function of patriarchal authoritarianism. Reich holds to an old libertarian sentiment: that authoritarian culture begins even before the division of labor, with the rise of patriarchal social forms. A triumphant father[21] supposedly ended the primitive utopia of freedom.

Excepting Malinowski, Reich does not show much respect for anthropologists. Nor does he concern himself with a psychoanalysis of social origins, as Freud did. He is uninterested in the meaning of the primary taboo of incest, which developed to protect the family from disintegration, through conflict and jealousy. Taboo is primitive law. Reich would have had to demonstrate that primitive law was dysfunctional. Indeed, he never bothered to argue against the probability that sex suppression functioned to hold societies together against the pressures of nature. It was dogma with him that nature and culture could not be in tension. Therefore, sex suppression could not be culturally functional.

Because he was a radical anti-dualist, Reich rarely noticed the cruel imbecilities of nature; its stupid side never showed itself to him. Owing to Reich's nature worship, his writing has an old-fashioned edifying cast. He never confronts the horrible possibility, which obsesses all modern art, that the reality behind the appearance is even more unpleasant than the appearance. His natural man is a stale leftover of the eighteenth-century imagination. In fact, man is man insofar as he is defiant of nature—so defiant that he is thus distinguished from every other creature. It is precisely his humanity that has made man, like his gods, a rather unpleasant creature, and has shaped both art and science, at man's highest heroic pitch, into something more powerful than beautiful.

Set into the context of Reich's attack on the family as the nucleus of all authoritative institutions, his repeated calls for a do-it-yourself adolescent sex education acquires political signifi-

[21] Or a temporarily defeated one, in Freud's famous version.

cance. Sex education becomes the main weapon in an ideological war against the family; its aim is to divest the parents of their moral authority. Reich ignores the facts of prolonged infancy and pedagogic love. Indeed, for him sexual love is opposed to pedagogic love, the latter creative of authority, the former subversive of it. The first place in which equality must be achieved is in the family—thus destroying it. American children seem to me more than a little Reichian.

Reich assumed that by encouraging freedom in pre-adolescent sex play, and free adolescent intercourse, a unique generation would be trained, one politically enabled by a general capacity for freedom. But sex remains sex; politics remain politics. The sense of freedom cannot be shunted, like railroad cars, from one track to another; happily promiscuous children will not necessarily grow up to be creatively democratic socialists. The combined assaults of Marx and Freud have not yet clarified the ambiguities of how power can be shared in industrial mass culture.[22] If it is not quite clear that power follows property, it is even less clear that power follows repression. There is only the charm of novelty in the Freudo-Marxist interpretation.

Novelty is not necessarily truth, although in a commercial culture, administered by salesmen, it may seem so. By assuming that adolescence is actually the "prime of life," Reich expressed his hatred of all doctrines of maturity, including the psychoanalytic version. There is something adolescent about the Reichian theory; for him all hope rests with the possibility of creating revolutionary children.[23] Freud, on the other hand, once said that revolutionary children were unwelcome from any point of view.[24] In fantasy, Reich led a children's crusade against all authority, including the authority of the proletariat. He turned

[22] A wider distribution of goods, or diffusion of property, has little to do, it seems, with having a share in modern government.

[23] As for Dewey, all hope rests in the possibility of creating open-minded children.

[24] Open-minded children appear even less welcome, because they grow up with the understanding that what they hold in mind is, at best, a point of view.

social causality upside down: it is as if only revolutionary children could breed a revolutionary regime. Because he theorized in terms of an adult world, Marx could not possibly be subversive enough. With John Dewey, Wilhelm Reich is one of the great theorists of the child as the agent of social change.

Without a psychology, Marx had neglected to include in his strategic calculations, according to Reich, the established "character structure of the masses."[25] All political revolutions must fail so far as they remain strictly political, or economic, and do not extend to the repressive morality of everyday life. It was not enough for a socialist revolution to eliminate middle-class property holdings. However notably a revolution might succeed on higher levels, it would founder on the low and trivial ones. Family beer parties, the wearing of evening dress, the "middle class bedroom"—these, and "thousands of other little things" would have to be changed to bring about a change of characters so radical that they could change the world.[26] Habits of domestic living are concrete ways in which ideology internalized authority. Because working people are "infested . . . with reactionary attitudes," they could not tolerate that clean break in their own private lives which a truly revolutionary regime must make with its predecessor. Unless a revolution conquers the bedroom it cannot conquer, for then ordinary people could not "develop their own . . . natural forms of living."[27] Without a rearrangement of intimacy, men would continue to identify themselves, if not with the old rulers, then with the old rules of conduct. It is these lingering particulars that brake a revolution and finally reverse its logic. Revolutions must persist for at least a generation and run ever deeper into everyday life. Otherwise, as Reich advised his Marxist readers in two books that exhibit his polemical energy, they could never clean out the "conservative infestation of the workers."[28] Politics was anyway behind the

[25] *The Mass Psychology of Fascism* (New York, 1946), p. 3.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 58.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 59.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 61.

times; it had to catch up with the social changes that have in fact actually destroyed the old moral order already.

First, the revolutionary must cleanse himself. What was later called "the authoritarian personality" existed on the left as on the right. "Red fascists" are no better than black ones. The Russian revolution was a tragic case of political revolutionary elites that could not muster the necessary moral ruthlessness to push the revolution beyond politics to a more profound moral level, where alone a revolutionary politics can be sustained. Reich rejected the Red god as yet another who had inevitably failed. When the Bolsheviks had abandoned "Kulturbolshevismus," they handed back the opportunity that history had handed to them. For Reich understood that modern mass industrial societies converge, however their politicians may differ. Confronted by Oblomov, the Communists found more to admire in Henry Ford than in Don Juan.

Neither Freud's theory of the instinctual forces nor Marx's theory of objective economic forces, taken separately, made sense to Reich. The world awaited a Freudo-Marxist. In making the connection, Reich thought he saw the limitations of both his predecessors. History, for example, was no longer the history of class war. On the contrary, history again expressed the war between the different levels of human character. "There is no such thing," Reich declared, as "a mechanistic relationship between social position and character structure."[29] Of course, Marx was aware that a rich man could be a revolutionary, and poor men deeply reactionary. But Marx felt no need for a psychology with which to elaborate this truism. Reich's elaboration is therefore no more than that, and by no means a step far beyond Marx, as he had thought.

The vulgar Marxist correlation between social position and character structure persuaded Reich no more than it convinces the Freudian wing of contemporary sociology—Fromm and

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

Riesman, for example. But Reich developed an even simpler correlation. For social position, as the analytic unit of revolutionary theory, Reich substituted sexual training. For the proletariat, Reich substituted another exploited class, composed entirely of women, children, and adolescents. Analytic universals were thus maintained even at the cost of sense.

Theoretical categories, too passionately held, generate their own facts. As an ardent feminist, Reich discovered that the first revolutionaries in history were females. His heroine precursors of the moral revolution are the courtesans, "women who rebel against the yoke of compulsive marriage and insist on their right to sexual self-determination."[30] But Reich's feminism extended only to women of the revolutionary type. For those women who want nothing more than "to be taken care of"—the "Little Woman"—he had no less contempt than for the "Little Man."[31]

Yet Reich did not wholly emancipate himself from the romance of the workingman. There is a quality in Reich's respect for the worker of the future that may remind the American reader of Veblen's nostalgia for the industrial craftsman. Like Veblen's technologist in relation to work, Reich's idealized worker is downright honest in relation to sex. A worker "differs from the average middle class individual by his open and matter-of-fact attitude toward sexuality." For "sexuality" read "work" and there is a Veblenian instead of a Reichian fiction. Moreover —again like Veblen's technologist—Reich's worker is "incomparably more accessible" than a bourgeois to objective forces of social change. How this is to be reconciled with Reich's equally vehement assertions that the masses have been even more susceptible to ideology than the classes cannot be discovered from a reading of Reich—except that the ideal is potential and the real actual.

In this pairing of Veblenian and Reichian sentiment we get another bitter taste of anti-intellectualism. Like all revolution-

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 78.
[31] *Listen, Little Man!* (New York, 1948), p. 108.

aries, Reich takes as his ideal not the man who thinks but the man who acts; the thinking man makes himself ill with subtlety or impotent with moral agonizing. Here we can see the revolutionary sentiment running counter to the entire Western intellectual tradition with its ideal of discursive rationality. I have said that reactionary sentiment has no monopoly on anti-intellectualism; its revolutionary antagonist shares the same violent disgust with theorizing.

To be anti-intellectual is, essentially, to be anti-theoretical. And, since we are in an anti-theoretical phase, even in our academies, we must expect our intellectuals to be actually anti-intellectual. Nothing is more fiercely anti-intellectual than the Reichian—or Veblenian, or pseudo-social scientific—flattery of "matter-of-fact" thinking. Of course, facts do not speak for themselves; they speak only when theory teaches them to do so, and then only in the voice and with the resonance that theory may lend them. Without a theory, facts are mute, or gibberish. "Matter-of-fact" thinking unites genuine revolutionaries and reactionaries; such a style is heavy with admiration for facts successfully established, which become, like power successfully used, unchallengeable. To weave elaborate suspicions of fact is nowadays subversive. It is an affront to popular science. There is a hidden relation between the worship of fact and the worship of power. From Reich's point of view, power does not corrupt; only the absence of power corrupts. His Freudo-Marxism was a therapy of power.

Later, as we shall see, Reich came to worship power, literally. His theory of cosmic orgone energy is a mystique of ultimate power. The final discovery of the nature of power drove Reich almost mad with delight—and with contempt of those who did not acknowledge this ultimate power. This power was a fact, and it was better therefore than any of the ideological powers men had discovered and used before. As the possessor of this new Fact (Reich would have used the capital letter), he grew less and less tolerant of those who did not see its simple factu-

ality. There is one intolerance worse than that of a dogmatist: that is, the peculiarly modern intolerance of those we might call the "factualists." Reich is a rather pure, because extreme, case of a "factualist," wild with the sense of possession and unable to tolerate any criticism; for all criticism, to him, must be a denial of the facts. Nobody may criticize except himself, Reich asserted. We can understand the genesis of his arrogance; facts are never critical of themselves. The worshipers of facts—be they Reich's fantasy facts or the statistical facts of our survey researchers—compose the most powerful of all the forces inhibiting serious criticism. Whether the factualists consider themselves conservative or radical, or strictly scientific, makes little difference. Being anti-theoretical, they are anti-critical. Over against the arcane use of theory as practiced by theological and metaphysical cadres of older cultures, the new cadres offer the brutalism of facts—and assume that, because they oppose what remains of the old cadres, they are somehow progressive and less intent on achievement of power.

Reich's insistence that his theories were facts is so emphatic as to be a parody of science grown absolutely certain of both its form and its content. All the old theories are treated in the image of a "plague," as against the therapy of his new facts. The young world is plagued with parental ideas; they must be cauterized. No comfortable distance separates the Hitlerian image of a "Jewish world plague"[32] from the Reichian image of an "emotional plague."[33] Indeed, the "plague" turns out to be the familiar enemy of Fascists and libertarians alike: Judeo-Christian moralism, together with all the philosophies that have been spun out to rationalize this ancient symbolism of repression.

The world of fact is summed up by Reich in the first of his god-terms, "Life." He regularly capitalizes or italicizes the

[32] And Nietzschean image: in practical or political terms, Nietzsche's denunciations of Jewish moralism as the revenge of the weak against Roman virtue and warrior power take on a sinister color—brown.

[33] *Selected Writings* (New York, 1960), p. 469.

word, as if thus to express the ultimate power he has captured in it. In one place, the use of the word as a god-term becomes explicit: "God is Life," he announces.[34] But, if we reverse the relation of the terms—"Life is God"—we more nearly get Reich's meaning. There is all the difference between the two statements. In one, life becomes an attribute of God, who may be more than Life, as in the basic saying "God is." In the other, God is denied in the very structure of the subject-predicate relation; life becomes the ultimate reference, to which is added the honorary title of divinity. To mean, as Reich did, that "Life is God," reverses the Christian and Jewish sense as he intended. Another way of saying "Life is God" would be: "The end of Life is merely to live"—as Reich did in fact say. Any other statement describing the religious apprehension was to Reich a mere "mystification," serving the purposes of an authoritarian culture even more powerfully than the property laws.

"Mystification" is an old Marxist standby. It is ideology with incense, helping the "masses" not only to think and feel in ways contrary to their own best interests but to believe in it wholeheartedly as well. To develop the polemical idea of mystification in psychoanalytic depth one need only link it, along with everything else, to the family. All religions are understood as varieties of mystical experience, and mysticism itself derives in turn from what Reich called the "family fixation."

The primary function of the family, we learn, is "the inhibition of sensual sexuality."[35] Since, for Reich, sexuality is the mode of freedom, it follows that religion is always in the service of authority. With religion, the "masses" first mystified themselves. Theology was the first of all "forms of fascist, imperialistic, dictatorial mysticism," because it was first in religious speculation that there occurred the "mystification of vegetative life sensations," by which men alienated themselves from their natures for the first time. There is only one form more inhibiting

[34] *Ibid.*
[35] *The Mass Psychology of Fascism* (New York, 1946), p. 116.

than religious thought: family sentiment. "Mystical distortion" is brought about first by the patriarchal authoritarian order of the family, which the state duplicates and religion projects. More fundamental to the understanding of society than political economy is sex economy. With Freud added to Marx, science and revolution join forces. Reich had no doubt that, as the first Freudo-Marxist, he was the scientist of the revolution to end all necessity for revolutions.

If the revolution finally were to come, how would the new man differ from the old? In Reich's book *Character-Analysis*, the vision of a "genital character" is posed already against the well-established presence of a neurotic character. Here, Reich follows Freud's method: the normal becomes an ideal, the abnormal all too real.

Freud altered the classic conception of character. In that conception, character was assessed in terms of response to external challenges: a man was courageous or cowardly, weak or strong, according to his discernible actions. Freud drove the standard inward: how men responded to internal danger—to the instinctual drives—was the key to their characters.[36] The visible traits of character—how we walk, look, talk, gesture—become symptomatic expressions of the way this inner threat is handled. In the Freudian definition, character is the congeries of typical ways in which each man defends himself—mainly against his deeper self.[37]

Freud did accept a basic part of the classic notion: restraining the instinctual demands does actually train character. Weakness or strength of character makes sense only in terms of whether the repressions—or more conscious controls installed by therapy—are adequate. The neurotic suffers from an unfortunate weak-

[36] Nevertheless, Christianity has long established the internality of character (Matt. 5:28).

[37] See Anna Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense* (London, 1937). This remains the definitive exposition of the Freudian theory of character formation.

ness in the apparatus of restraint; having become ineffective, the repressions needed to be replaced by an affective analytic sense. (Freud never even considered that the transformation of character necessitated the elimination of repressions. Not all repressions had to be replaced but only those that led to symptoms instead of to adequately functioning character traits. Freud himself never consciously aimed at the total personality.)

Reich aimed at the entire range of character traits as symptomatic and in need of transformation. Taking his hint from Freud's work on anxiety, Reich decided to evaluate as well as to describe the repressed character.

A repressed character is afraid of himself—more precisely, of his own impulses. Instead of relieving the fears, as Freud sought to do, Reich idealized the impulses. This was a mistake Freud never made.

As a moral revolutionary, Reich is defined by his ideal of "the unafraid individual," one who "satisfies his strong libidinal needs" rather than suffers from them.[38] Animals "do not suffer from stasis of libidinal energy"; they are unafraid. There is only a short step from Reich's analysis of character, so much praised by professional therapists, to his advocacy of the *vis animalis*—for animals are his therapeutic ideal. They do not suffer from repression; neither, we learn, do primitive Negroes.

> I love the birds and deer and chipmunks who are close to the Negroes. I mean the Negroes from the jungle, not the ones from Harlem, in stiff collars and zoot suits. I don't mean the fat Negro women with earrings whose inhibited pleasure turned into the fat of their hips. I mean the svelte, soft bodies of the girls of the South Sea whom you, the sexual swine of this or that Army, "lay"; girls who do not know that you take their love as you would in a Denver brothel.[39]

The longer Reich thought about what we call "character" the more it seemed to him the symptom of all disease. Character is

[38] *Character-Analysis* (2d. ed.: New York, 1945), p. 161.
[39] *Listen, Little Man!*, p. 42.

the universal malaise. Treat it as a disease, and there is some chance that, at last, character can be changed completely: change the character, change the world. Through the release of the "armoring," of defenses against libidinal impulses, therapy had emerged as revolutionary. The act of liberation was to be the orgasm.

There is a line leading straight from Reich's still respected volume, *Character-Analysis*, to *The Function of the Orgasm.* One is accepted, the other rejected out of embarrassment at Reich's advocacy of a conduct to which analysis had led him. Moral scientists analyze the repressions; moral revolutionaries advocate their abolition. It was Reich's ambition to make the leap from analytic *isness* to the *oughtness* implicit in such analyses. As a therapist, Reich tried to stop the waste and misuse of instinctual energy in the process of connecting and solidifying the contents of character. As a revolutionary, he advocated the repudiation of those identifications with ego ideals by means of which the character forms itself, like a wall, around the impulses. Thus, he inferred from his analysis of character that the controlling dynamics of our inherited religious culture must be done away with. In sum, Reich opposed the moralizing of life. Building character was a fraud which authority perpetrated on life. The often-praised technical brilliance of *Character-Analysis* owes much to the heat of Reich's argumentation. This book is based upon a single polemical motif and elaborated in tendentious detail: various innocuous impulses are consumed in the formation and maintenance of the wall between the id and the ego; they are repressed, and suffer in the purgatory of the Freudian unconscious. In the process of repression, the impulses are transformed and reversed;[40] the price is a rigid and overcomplicated character structure. The ego grows more and more apart from its instinctual resources. The result is not merely a neurosis; rather, a neurotic. The entire range of character traits has been infected.

[40] For example, anal impulses transformed into traits of politeness and passivity.

There is not much here that is not vintage Freud—except for the important point that Freud never trusted the instincts. *Character-Analysis* has been largely overpraised, the more roughly to censure Reich's later books. His critics resort to the old and dubious interpretative trick of dividing a writer's earlier works from his later, so as to disparage the one or the other. To accept *Character-Analysis* as a solid piece of scientific writing, while rejecting its successors as fantasy, amounts to a refusal to face the significant correlation of science and fantasy in Reich's mind. This is not to praise his later works or dispraise the earlier, or vice versa. From a certain point of view, they are all of a piece—including the illustrations with which Reich relieved the dull verbosity of his style; increasingly, these became pure Thurber: so economic in line yet so grand in their reference that they can only be called comic. Reich was an unconscious cartoonist, lampooning the intricate mechanical drawing of science by peppering his writings with diagrams, mainly fertile female circles and potent male arrows lying down together; or heavy lines superimposed atop one another in clumsy but sincere embrace.

Opposition is never enough; ideologists of the moral have to offer new ideals in the very act of diagnosing the failure of the old. In this case, Reich felt compelled to balance the reality of the abnormal with a counter-ideal of normality. He focussed all his admiration for strength and his disgust at weakness in the idea of a "genital character." It is a *counter-ideal;* the normal, even though it is not yet realized, cannot be an "ideal" in the established sense of that word. Rather, in Reich's polemical sense, the "genital character" runs counter to all character ideals which, precisely because of their ideality, are neurotic.

Actually, according to Reich, we are all "mixed types";[41] but very little genital and mainly neurotic, for rather like the perfect

[41] *Character-Analysis,* p. 165.

neurotic we have built our defenses so high as to be enclosed by them. Character is the prison of impulses; inside it, we learn stiffness until we grow so immobile that we no longer wish to move around and take what is needed to feed the soul. The neurotic, however he may appear on the outside, is poor inside. Health is to the individual as revolution is to society—a taking of what is needed. Being definitely "unafraid," the ideal character "satisfied his strong libidinal needs even at the risk of social ostracism."[42] The neurotic character, on the other hand, has a fear of freedom. Once weakness is built into his own psyche, his impulses safely exhausted in the building, the neurotic grows proud: he calls his weakness "character." This is the sharp impression Reich wished to convey of our inherited moral condition; it is an impression more softly conveyed by Fromm, Horney, and by other, more polite, diagnosticians of our time. The moral revolution may have softened, but its softness and spread is understood all the better when examined in all the mantic fury of Reich.

Reich portrays the genital and neurotic character types in symmetrical opposites. For the neurotic, take merely the negative of the following "genital character" traits, listed in Reich's own curious jargon: "post-ambivalent" (meaning: free of the Oedipal complex and all other constricting conflicts and strains); "aggression-sublimated" (meaning: cultured but quite able to use his fists and feet when provoked); "sex-affirmative" (meaning: able to take his women and leave them); "ego-ideal negative" (meaning: unfettered by the aspirations of his parents and with a "high degree of harmony between id and super-ego"); the "genital character" is

> very gay but also intensely angry; he reacts to the object-loss with depression but does not get lost in it; he is capable of intense love but also of intense hatred; he can, under appropriate conditions, be childlike but he will never appear infantile; his

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 161.

> seriousness is natural and not stiff in a compensatory way because he has no tendency to show himself grown-up at all cost; his courage is not proof of potency but directed toward a rational goal . . . he can open up to the world as intensely in one case as he can shut himself off from it in another.[43]

The "genital character" can lose himself in ecstasy and find himself in rejection; he can charge and retreat, give and take—all at low cost to himself; in short, the perfect external man, successor to the self-conscious and yet unknowing figure of the neurotic who is trapped in his inwardness.

Externality is the character without which the portrait of Reich's new man would not be complete. Being so outgoing, the public man is "capable of criticizing and altering the social situation," but without evoking in himself or others that most dubious of all incitements to change: moral indignation. In Reich, the ancient ideal of the man of power, as described to Socrates by his young friend, Callicles, was dreamt again. Now, however, the superior man has become a democrat. He may live his full life, allow his desires to become as mighty as may be and never repress them, serve his passions in full maturity without contradicting either his conscience or his reason, gratify every fleeting desire as it comes into his heart—and all without cost to others. A better nature will not have to suffer inferiors, as Callicles imagined, and finally be defeated by them. In the Reichian vision, there will be no inferiors, none to "sing the praises of temperance and justice out of the depths of their own cowardice."[44] All men will come of princely stock, for all will follow the same lordly impulses. Self-fulfilling, they will not need the consolations of religion; rather, each will be his own prophet of pleasure.

It is in the nature of psychotherapy that a certain number of patients should become disciples. Yet, hard as Reich worked on

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 169.
[44] *Gorgias.*

them, none of his patients ever became, in his estimate, anything like "genital characters." Such failure was of course understandable. Working together in their therapeutic community at Rangeley, Maine, even the therapists could not help but bring some repressions with them.

The atmosphere being what it was, they could not rid themselves of the "plague." There were times when even a therapist

> is apt to say of himself: "I'm no good today, I have the plague." In our circles, such attacks of the emotional plague, if slight, are handled by one's withdrawing for a while until the attack of irrationalism subsides. In serious cases, where rational thinking and friendly counsel are not enough, one clears up the situation orgone-therapeutically. . . . To me and the close co-workers, the acute attack of the emotional plague is such a familiar phenomenon that we take it with calm and master it objectively. . . . It happens, of course, that such an attack of the emotional plague is not mastered. . . . We take such accidents in the same manner as one takes a serious physical disease or the death of an esteemed co-worker.[45]

We have met this "death" in older communities, when a member no longer lives up to his vocation; he has died to God.

Because therapy and theory are always so closely linked, it is not surprising that Reich understood his therapeutic community as a scientific research center. People came to assist Reich in his research, and in this work they elaborated their cure. Although he was not himself aware of the fact, Reich was thus making the characteristic religious effort to found a community in which vocation was itself therapeutic. Therefore, Reich's work, while remaining in his mind scientific, was also of a religious nature, as he finally had to admit. As he continued his highly personal and unverifiable experiments, the basic concept of orgone energy expanded, until he himself recognized that this was indeed God and that human beings, if they would be saved from destruction, must conform to God's laws. His fantasy system enlarged and,

[45] *Character-Analysis*, p. 249.

in doing so, grew more and more internally coherent. From the earliest theoretical break with Freud, on the beneficent nature of instinct, to the final years of preaching the divinity of instinct in its cosmic expression, Reich achieved a continuity of thought which satisfied at least himself. Freud's theory of libidinal impulses led Reich to the therapy of the genital embrace (orgasm). In time, he discovered that matter too embraced and created more matter. Finally, he discovered that even in the heavens there was embrace. His doctrine was complete, internally coherent, and therefore, to him, a saving truth. Everything had meaning and value. From the microcosmic level of the "genital embrace" to the macrocosmic "cosmic superimposition," the world sought to reconcile itself to itself, in a dutiful Hegelian unity of dualities. The All had been reconstructed by a science, Orgonomy, which, being at once biological and moral, did not fragment reality as its mechanistic predecessors had done. With the discovery of the creation of the ring of the aurora, of the meaning of hurricanes and galaxies, Reichian psychotherapy expanded into a full-fledged system of cosmological belief. Science and religion were at last reconciled, as Reich had reconciled man to his nature. Therapy had led beyond community—to cosmic unity.

The founder of this religious science had few fully committed followers. Among these, a number followed because Reich satisfied their religious yearning.[46] But others followed for other

[46] See a letter of thanks written to Reich by a Norwegian disciple, Ola Raknes, in *Orgone Energy Bulletin*, Vol. IV, No. 4 (October, 1952), pp. 207–214. The Reichian doctrine solved Dr. Raknes' lifelong search for a faith. From the age of ten upwards he went to "every prayer meeting in the neighborhood and also to church." He "never succeeded in being converted in spite of all [his] attempts." He became an academic, lectured at the Sorbonne, had a family, discovered James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* and promptly "was in an ecstasy of new thoughts and feeling." The ecstasy wore off, his religious problem remained knotted. Dr. Raknes began to solve his problem in the best way open to academics: he began to write a book about it. At the same time he turned from philology to psychoanalysis, going into training analysis with Karen Horney and later with Otto Fenichel. But,

reasons. Among those who were not propelled into the therapeutic community by their own religious inclinations, the most interesting by far were writers and artists. That some first-rate creative talents were attracted to Reichian doctrine gives it the importance of symptom, if not the stature of truth.

Nobody really likes competition. Psychoanalysis is itself a rather literary effort, a matter of talk—incessant talk, analytical talk. In this, the writer feels himself an expert; language is his own medium. Freud competes with him. But Reich, in his later phase, invented a therapy that did away with talk; he appealed to the unfamiliar and therefore more authoritative world of the physical. Life could not be lured into the body by talk; one had to sit, in the appropriate apparatus, silent and receptive. Silence, in itself, can be therapeutic for a word-artist.

Reich seems an unlikely sort to attract artists. Seeing everything as he did, in terms of domination and freedom, nothing had aesthetic significance to him. There is the unmistakable straightness of an aesthetically blind man about Reich's argument, a two-term analysis without much room between them for ambiguity or surprising turns. But Reich did not attract portraitists of the conventionally beautiful, or commercial artists; rather, he attracted men who, proud in their alienation, drew and wrote against the grain of society. It is the poor shape of little people that William Steig, as the most devoted of Reichian cartoonists, translates from the angry diagnoses of his master into the cathartic laughter of cartoon. Unlike the scientist, the modern artist believes he must live in opposition to his society or go down to defeat in his work. Reich supplied some artists with a way of opposing.

There are other reasons why Reich attracted artists. Flattery, if it can be built into a doctrine, will always attract those who

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although he had become an analyst, Dr. Raknes sought something beyond analysis. Indeed, psychoanalysis did not satisfy his "craving for unity and harmony." When he accepted Reichian doctrine—and became a practicing Reichian—this craving was satisfied, the act of conversion was at last accomplished. The letter has a religious form throughout.

succeed in finding themselves there. The successful of the seventeenth-century world of business managed to associate themselves with Calvin's idea of the elect. Reich made it easy for the artist to be flattered by his doctrine: in his understanding, that type comes nearest to being a "genital character." The artist was downright lucky in his work. "That which is 'natural' in man, which makes him one with the cosmos, has found its genuine expression only in the arts, particularly in music and painting."[47] Because, "all that . . . is *genuinely* revolutionary, all genuine art . . . stems from the natural biological nucleus," the artist, merely by being himself, is a "genuine revolutionary."[48]

To be a revolutionary, and yet not in any political sense, must have appealed to a generation of artists who, having lost faith in Marx without resigning themselves, with Freud, to the world as it is, hankered after a doctrine that would transform the world by a new feeling for it. Religion is where therapy leads when it takes on hope. In this sense, religion is much like art, and both express a terrible futility, instructing us as they do how we ought to feel rather than how we ought to act in the world. Freud refused to hope; being analytic, his attitude was anti-religious. Desperately, Reich kept adding to Freud's limited therapeutic doctrine until it had swollen unrecognizably with all the fantastic hope of a religion.

When Caesar falls ill, the religious feel well. The artists and writers who followed Reich were, like him, defeated men of the left; for the defeated who, nevertheless, retained their pride of alienation, Reich's brave announcements of an end of politics turned failure itself into a kind of victory. Such reversals have occurred before, and brought more than solace to the defeated. To declare, as Reich did, that politics was the gravest symptom of a sick society was to hint at the cure; as a first step toward sanity, it was useful to become anti-political. Moreover, the symptom being ever more grave, the cure was ever more immi-

[47] *The Mass Psychology of Fascism* (New York, 1946), p. viii.
[48] Reich's italics.

nent. Political society had reached its crisis of sickness in Hitler, who was "political genius" incarnate. "With Hitler, politics reached a peak of development." This "magnificent unmasking of the essence of politics in general" brought the end in sight. A new dispensation was near at hand. Reich's jargon may have been novel, but the hope which he expressed with it was pathetically old. He translated straight from Marxist into Freudian terms. As the politics of capitalism in its dying phase, Fascism was interpreted as the sickness of all politics. But, when politics failed to die with Fascism, Reich dropped the Freudian form of his anti-politicism; his opposition to all politics became "religious," in our major sense of that abused word. More precisely, it is religiosity, faith cut loose from all institutional connections and disciplines, that has become the established Western way of retreat from politics. In practice, Reich retreated into his therapeutic community, to await the fall of the world as it stands. In theory, he repeated the dream of an innocent world that had been expressed in different languages by the defeated in earlier ages of empire and torture. Politics itself was the anti-Christ. "I believe," Reich concluded, writing in 1933, "that the twentieth century, with its gigantic catastrophes, ushers in a new social era, an era free of politics."[49] It is the familiar modern cry of a religiosity that, parodying faith, fails to engender a sense of power or security against the forces of darkness from any conceivable institution and therefore poses against real dissolution a fantastic newness of everything—a newness so new that in the minds of these religious it maintains forever all vitality and no shape.

Meanwhile, because the ever-new is never born, there is a private and ideal normality to be set over against the pathology of social life: that normality as expressed in sex and love. Reich's anti-political sexualism was part of the artist's and the intellectual's arsenal of ideas against the very idea of politics. Sex, as an anti-politics, can be seen idealized in George Orwell's represen-

[49] *Op. cit.*, p. 340.

tation of the "proles" in *1984*; more significantly, only Julia's sexual vitality has preserved her from becoming a dry party woman. Not intellectual insight but sexual appetite permits her to reject the ideology of the party. She is a natural revolutionary, one emotionally unable to take Caesar seriously. Another example of sexuality used in drawing a portrait of an ideally anti-political man is D. H. Lawrence's Mellors in *Lady Chatterley's Lover*.

Reich experienced in his career a fundamental shift in revolutionary sentiment: away from the classic aim of public social correction, toward the present transitional aim of private self-transformation, even using movements of public correction. Put differently, the shift is from a conception of society in terms of justice and injustice that connects Plato and Marx, that is, from conservatism and communism, toward a conception of society in terms of health and sickness; the opposing side is sick, while we, in our very struggle, are healthy. That latter belief is not new; a study of it will reveal, of course, the inevitable connection between social movements and religious psychotherapy, if not necessarily between the spiritual doctors of, say, the Christian missions and the materialist doctors of contemporary psychotherapy. That Reich and other preachers of a religious psychotherapy were emphatically anti-Christian does not entirely disguise the emphatically remissive rather than interdictory religiosity, as distinguished from faith, of therapeutic preaching in the moral revolutionary mood. Indeed some Christian preachers have adopted the same remissive style, challenging many of the interdicts of their own cultural tradition.

In Reich's work later the preaching grew louder and more explicit—more desperate, less hopeful. The Freudo-Marxist phase reached a climax in the mid-thirties, with the publication of both *Character-Analysis* and *The Mass Psychology of Fascism* in 1933 and of *The Sexual Revolution* in 1936. After 1936, Reich's religious apprehensions grew, until, at his death in 1957, they displaced both his Freudianism and his Marxism. During his

last years, Reich's biotherapy developed into mysticism, complete with its surest sign—the "Oceanic" feeling.[50]

That same sign can be found in Lawrence.[51] Being above all a scientist, Reich was very precise about the ocean: it was an "orgone ocean . . . from which . . . all being, physical as well as emotional, emerges." Individuals are redefined as bits of "especially varied and organized cosmic energy." In this way, Reich was able to find God—hiding, but only to be the more easily found—within man. At the same time, the "cosmic orgone ocean" is God. That ocean *is* the heavens, not symbolically but literally. Thus, Reich returned unawares to one of the most primitive of all conceptions of God, in which deity does not reside *in* heaven but is, rather, identical with it. When accused of being a primitive, Reich proudly accepted the accusation as a sign of superiority. It was his passion to recapture what he considered was the organic sense of wholeness characteristic of the primitive, as against the mechanistic sense of fragmentation he considered characteristic of the modern and scientific world view. The "primitive animistic view was closer to the [truth]" of "natural functioning" than the modern scientific.[52] Reich merely "rediscovered" in his self-therapy the "true religion" with which primitive man had first asserted not himself but his oneness with the universe. In spite of all "mystical distortions,"

[50] The dry, or land, version of the "Oceanic" feeling is, in Reich's jargon, the "meadow experience." Intellectuals can never experience life; they live, literally, too much indoors and, psychologically, too much "inside"; one must go outdoors and "outside," into the "meadow," in order to feel (learn) the energies (rather greenish-blue in color) of life (which has its truth in the scientific conception of orgone energy).

[51] Other similarities to Lawrence's mysticism may be noted. For example: Reich writes to the emotionally impoverished sick man—"In the depth, you are what a deer is, or your God, your poet or your wise man" [*Listen, Little Man!* (New York, 1948), p. 34]. Again: "I found that your mind is a function of your life energy, that, in other words, there is a unity between body and mind. I followed this track, and I found that you reach out with your life energy when you feel well and loving, and that you retract it to the center of the body when you are afraid" (*Ibid.*, p. 94). That last is exactly Lawrence's point, in his notion of the solar plexus as the growing point of emotion. See the following chapter.

[52] *Cosmic Superimposition* (New York, 1951), p. 104.

Reich found therefore a "rational core" within all forms of faith. Now, in the science of Orgonomy, that core had been recovered and, at last, made rational: the existence of God had been demonstrated; "it," not "he," was the objective rational power governing the universe. Pre-scientific men had imagined that this objective power was a spirit or a person, or three persons. Reich knew what every scientist knows: that God is power—physical in the universe, at the "root of all being and identical with it." He decided to worship what he knew. Science, in the nineteenth-century image of energy, became his religion.

Now that the existence of God had been demonstrated (in experiments which only Reich appeared able to conduct), "it" could be put to work instead of being merely worshiped. For this old Marxist and strict scientist, use was the highest adoration. Certainly, "it" was there to be used; the cosmic power had "finally become accessible . . . can be handled, directed, measured, put to useful purposes by man-made tools." Indeed, God was good because He was useful. Although "it" could be misused, and thus turned wrathful, even deadly, in its natural condition "it" was therapeutic, for the life of the universe affirms itself. Man need only accept the universe, and his religious problem, no less than all others, would be solved. With certainty of ultimate success, when the techniques of application will be refined, God would cure the illness of living. Already in theory, partly in practice (for the techniques were not yet perfect), God could be used "to treat certain diseases." The power that is God could be used "to lift a weight, or to blast rocks, or to penetrate matter with rays so that the inside becomes visible."[53] By using ultimate power, Reich thought, man asserted himself as God.

When Reich escaped Marx and Freud, it was only to return unawares to Hegel. A new level of self-consciousness would be achieved, the final level, in which men would no longer be intellectual and sicken themselves into a shell of thought: rather,

[53] *Listen, Little Man!* (New York, 1948), p. 50.

in new self-awareness, the cosmic orgone energy would, as man, become "aware of itself." In thus becoming "aware of ITSELF, knowing about itself, growing into consciousness of itself, what is called 'Human Destiny' is taken out of the realm of mysticism and metaphysics; it becomes a reality of cosmic dimensions; it merges *understandably* with all great philosophies and religions of and about living man, as conscious design of one's life."[54] The general and special revelations of all religions were thus joined in the general and special disciplines of all science.

This rediscovery of God, gradually elaborated, caused a tremendous "shake-up of the discoverer's emotions." In the last years, Reich took to referring to himself more and more in the third person. In fact, he had reached the end of his development: from his beginning as a psychotherapist he had ended by successfully imposing upon himself an experience of conversion which he felt was appropriate to his stature as a scientist. "What shook him to the very roots of his total emotional and intellectual existence, was the tremendous impact of the working of an *objective* functional logic in the natural functions beyond his personal being." Having gone through his therapeutic Freudo-Marxist phase, Reich understood, at last, as he told his followers, "the absolute necessity of the emergence of the idea of 'GOD.'" The world had meaning. Such a realization was bound to cause the old atheist an "emotional upheaval," especially since the idea of God had forced itself upon him, out of the logic of his own "scientific position."[55] Happily, this was no remote and transcendent God, but one "functioning within himself." It was the "logic of nature," at work for him. The least he could do was work for it; however foolish the unenlightened might consider him, he could do no other. Reich felt a call, as surely as if his vocation were more traditionally religious.

Reich's pantheism was traditional enough: the organic identified with the real and both with God. All is God, and God is

[54] *Cosmic Superimposition* (New York, 1951), p. 104.
[55] *Ibid.*, p. 107.

All. Moving as it did from All to God, rather than from God to All, this pantheism needed no theology. Reich's religion remained atheistic. Like Lawrence—as noted in the next chapter—Reich had an imagination too creatively impatient to study the history of his idea. Had he done so, he would have been disappointed to find that his modern faith had an ancient history—indeed, that he had not discovered God at all; rather, as he aged, Reich discretely acquired this figleaf of a god to ornament the nakedness of his materialist monism.

That tremendous emotional shake-up was not orgone energy wasted. With his discovery of God, Reich, in his own case, brought the therapeutic process to a successful conclusion. His religiosity satisfied him immensely; therefore, it had the social function of truth. Certain conversion experiences are accompanied by feelings as if, in his own rebirth, the subject has been privy to creation. Reich saw God creating man as a "bit of streaming, convulsing nature." From this original creation, man had intellectualized himself into a state of permanent anxiety, first of all with reference to his own beneficent impulses. Anxiety, then, was the source of negative religion; "denials" and "defamations" of the "insuperable drive toward the genital embrace" will turn into the moralizing authoritarianism of churches and states. Institutional religion, like Freud's Unconscious, represented man in his state of anxiety, body and mind set at odds. Artists and critics, the founders of modern negative religiosity, had made Freud's error, mistaking the "natural genital" for "perverted . . . secondary . . . drives."[56] Modern civilization merely compounded this error with that of "mechanist" science, adding further anxiety by splitting off nature from man's impulses; rigid with fear, man turned against himself. To be for

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 108. For this reason modern art, including the "sex" novel, is unpleasant. It has the cognitive duty of being unpleasant and ugly, even when dealing with pleasure; while earlier art, in its service to the faith, expressed the obligation to find beauty even in the ugliest of all subjects.

himself, man needed only to break through the repressions to "post-ambivalence."

Mankind refused; it remained ambivalent. By 1945, the doctor had completely lost his patience; the Reichian canon grew rhapsodic as much in hate as in love. Reading the later Reich is like going to a pacifist meeting: one is a little frightened to witness so much aggression displayed by men pleading an end to aggression. Until such time as the redemption is already established, nothing so dampens the ardor for redeemers as the experience of meeting them. The most original theorist of Sick-Sick-Sick, Reich does seem more than a little sick himself. As the one true physician, he lords it over the reader-patient, expressing himself in the third person, although not capitalized; after all, he is a Scientist, and Rational, capitalized.

It is while talking about himself that Reich appears most moved. There is more than a trace of Jack London's *Sea Wolf* in Reich's posturing. He describes himself, first of all, as a "great and lonely man." But this description is not accurate enough: a "very great man" would do better. He asks himself personal questions of worth, and answers in a way that would embarrass even a mirror on a wall: "You are likened to the intellectual giants in the history of science. You have made the greatest discovery in centuries." Yet, despite the love that this very great man bears, not merely for himself but for all ordinary living animals around him, they are afraid of him; they actually resent him. Having lost the protective shell of his neutrality toward the sick, this psychotherapist ended by suffering with them—suffering all the more in the role of their rejected redeemer. "The great man suffers for your misdeeds in your place." He is a "pariah . . . driven . . . into loneliness," into "exile," into being "queer," into "decades of heartbreaking suffering." It is as if Jesus had stopped, on the Way, to remonstrate with the crowd.

This identification with Jesus symbolizes Reich's main image of martyrdom. But, from his various references, a pantheon of

"true friends," all martyrs, can be reconstructed; with these he confidently expected posterity to put him on familiar and equal terms. We must wait and see. After Jesus comes Bruno; then Socrates, Rathenau, Liebknecht, Marx, Lincoln, Nietzsche, Lenin, Galileo, Wilson (that "great, warm person"). The official journal of Reich's community ran articles, even while he was still alive, that constitute a regular martyrology.

Reviewing the evidence of earlier martyrdoms, it occurred to Reich that perhaps humanity was not worth saving. *Listen, Little Man!* is one long shout of outrage at the sick of the sick society, determined, as they are, to remain sick. What infuriated Reich, mainly, was that although he had broken the monopoly on greatness, making it available to all, none chose it. The theoretical way was now clear; all men could be superior, do as they pleased, enjoy. In a healthy society, as stated earlier, the clinic would wither away like the state, for lack of patients. Yet even those he had personally "freed," in the "belief of being free," felt lustful rather than loving. Rejected, the redeemer threatened to reject mankind. They had failed him, as they always failed their redeemers, invariably choosing little men, often in the name of the great: Paul over Jesus, Hitler over Nietzsche, Robespierre over Danton, the Freud of culture over the Freud of sex—the examples are all Reich's. The "Little Man" cherishes his tyrants, as he does his character; he is not "alive inside and healthy."

Nevertheless, Reich reassures us, in his Parables, that he will not abandon the unredeemed. The "lonely eagle . . . to this day, has not given up hope" that he will hatch more than "little chicks." Reich's parables carry resonances from the word of his truest friend, Jesus.

Addressing a hypothetical Peter, Reich advises him, as the representative figure of the sick, on how to heal himself: "The answer is: Build your house on rock. The rock is your own nature which you kill in yourself, the bodily love of your child, the dream of love of your wife, your own dream of life at the

age of sixteen." There is something adolescent about this plea for the dream of adolescence. Reich's faith is in youth, and perhaps more pathetic for that.

Finally, as much in anger as in sorrow, Reich turned away from saving the sick, or even the sick society. The "plague" was killing the planet. As an emergency measure, Reich hastened to the saving of this small lump of the cosmos. In those last years, he turned more and more to the consolations of cosmic politics. Not that he lacked colleagues. Other scientists, in other worlds, were undoubtedly at work on the very same problems, and with the same ideas, the discovery of which was his allotted task here on earth. Thus, the therapeutic doctrine of *Character-Analysis* was fully elaborated into the scientific theological fantasia of Reich's last years. The original god-term, orgone energy, successor to Freud's libido, acquired a complementary devil term, "DOR," successor to Freud's death instinct, which Reich, in an earlier period, had denounced as unscientific and speculative. DOR was "Deadly Orgone Energy"—made deadly by the efforts of mechanist scientists in the service of sadistic politicians.

Reich's eschatological sense grew into panic: the last emergency was upon us. Mankind was spreading the plague into nature itself. The good earth was being laid waste—becoming infertile and, finally, a desert—as men projected outward the emotional desert of their inner lives. To Reich, the "waste land" was no poetic image but the planetary counterpart of human "armor." In this emergency, his vocation as a scientist must be not merely finding out about nature but saving it. If he could not save souls, then he would save matter. Reich became a "Cosmic Orgone Engineer," making rain and other fertility devices.

Other characters, very likely genital, on other planets, were similarly at work. The cosmos was threatened; the devil, DOR, had been getting stronger, sustained by atomic blasts, which

were poisoning the atmosphere. It was possible, of course, that, in order to protect life on their own planets, the Cosmic Orgone Engineers in outer space had decided to help earth-man destroy himself. Deadly Orgone Energy was apparently due not only to the work of our mechanist scientists but also "to cosmic orgone engineering by the people who have been visiting our planet in spaceships ('flying saucers,' as they appeared to some) from other worlds." At least this is what Reich told his disciples in a talk delivered at the headquarters of the community, Orgonon, Maine, in August, 1954.

These "CORE men," as Reich called them, familiarly, although from another planet, were his last hope. Surely they intended to save, not destroy. "Obviously they are concerned about the far-reaching effects of our periodic explosions" on their own worlds. They could stop these harmful explosions either by destroying us through DOR illness and turning our world into a desert or by pushing us toward health and good sense. Since, unlike earthlings, "CORE men are in touch with orgone functions and undoubtedly unarmored, it's easier to believe their intentions towards us are benign." The only fully accredited Cosmic Orgone Engineer on earth continued, despite provocation, to harbor only the most benign intentions.

It is not at all evident that when Reich was dying, martyred, in prison, he suffered from the suspicion that his martyrdom was absurd. On the contrary, he could see that, although the revolution he had preached went deliberately unheeded, the age itself was revolutionary and was so not merely in the superficial sense. He expected a showdown: for Life or against It. Was he, then, in the unshakeable integrity of his ardor, completely mistaken?

Despite his doctrinal eccentricities—perhaps rather because of them—Reich is not a stranger to the moral revolution of our time; rather, he is an expression of it. Of course, that revolution is not being conducted on Reichian terms. Man, the "preserver of higher values" does not yet understand himself as the same man who is "an orgonotic energy system," but man is more and

more inclined to believe that once he has fused the two conceptions of himself—the moral and the natural—his problems will be solved. Whether man will ever understand himself in a specifically Reichian way is not the issue; rather, the issue is how far Reich's eccentricities reveal something important about the less flamboyant efforts of science to solve the religious question which the Jews and the Greeks long ago set for us. The very clarity and detail of Reich's vision drove him into an ecstasy in which science and prophecy grow confusedly together. Reich's style duplicates those convulsive and involuntary contractions and expansions of the musculature which describe, to his satisfaction, the characteristic activity of life affirming itself. All pleasure is expansion; anxiety, and all illness, contraction. Reich cultivated expansiveness: it was at once his cosmic theory and his personal therapy.

Reich yearned for a revolution of mood. When both Freudianism and Marxism failed to make that revolution, he invented his own, although it came to have an almost entirely private use. But he never went entirely mad; he always had disciples. How else may madmen be known except by the quality and degree of their isolation? Reich's religiosity rioted wildly in search of a mood that can no longer be formulated in credible ways, or sustained without forming little cults, from which nothing can issue except eccentricity. Nevertheless, though publicly labeled an eccentric, Reich was anything but a fool. On the contrary, he was wise enough to know that love is the supreme form of energy. His doctrine of love is, however, very modern. Most of us, as modern men, have no idea at all of what is superior to our knowledge, transformable as it is into power. Love, too, is reduced to a struggle for power. Reich let his stubborn ambition to remain a scientist run away with him; combining with his religious impulses, his scientific ambition led him to a pathetic fancy of love as something like electricity, bouncing off the inside of metal-lined boxes and so to be captured by a technique, like other forms of energy. Other religious temperaments have

shared this desperate hope, and developed routines of preserving the mood of love beyond its passing moment.

But, pathetic as Reich's method was, it is well to be reminded that love is the ultimate power. We are in grave danger of forgetting, now that doctrines of love must run a gantlet of fatally clever objections. Psychotherapists specially need reminders. Perhaps, once adequately reminded, therapists will cease trying to repress, as Freud did, their own religious impulses. They are bound to become better therapists, or at least less damaging ones.

In his religiosity, Reich gave up trying to understand altogether. Finally, Reich offers the ecstatic attitude as superior to the analytic. This messiah of the body is not to be pitied for his martyrdom, any more than he is to be laughed at for his doctrine. For, leaving Freud at the edge of the last desert, littered, as Reich saw, with dying gods and murder machines, he escaped, as few men do, into the very heaven of an idea.

# CHAPTER 7

## *The Therapeutic as Mythmaker: Lawrence's True Christian Philosophy*

*The purest religion is the most refined Epicurism. He, who in the smallest given time can enjoy most of what he never shall repent, and what furnishes enjoyments, still more unexhausted, still less changeable—is the most religious and the most voluptuous of men.*

*True Christian philosophy.*

—Blake, *Marginalia*

David Herbert Lawrence spent much of his creative energies contriving a second faith,[1] something to succeed what he considered false Christian philosophy and its successor, the sterile rationalism of science. In *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious* and again in *Fantasia of the Unconscious*,[2] Lawrence made his main efforts to explain that second faith, otherwise expressed in his art. As doctrinal counterpoints, these two books together take on the importance, if not the excellence, of his art. Each is a heaven of an idea, a vision, significantly like those of the psy-

[1] "The second faith of intellectuals," wrote Karl Mannheim, "bears the features of a contrived mythology." See *The Sociology of Culture* (London, 1956), p. 152 *et seq.*

[2] D. H. Lawrence, *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious* (London, 1923); *Fantasia of the Unconscious* (London, 1930).

chologizing prophets examined above, of man at last released from his inwardness.

When first proposed in 1921, Lawrence's doctrinal externalizations of man inside-out were laughed away by the reviewers, without exception; what scant notice *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious* received was good-humored, treating it as a bizarre and often incomprehensible new testament in the religion of Sex, ardent to supersede the then not very old testament of psychoanalysis. In the first few pages it does appear that Freud is cast down quickly to the role of Judas, fingering the gentle Jesus of an Unconscious for the police forces of civilization, leaving Lawrence alone in his true discipleship. The attack on Freud is not incidental to the presentation of his own doctrine. Lawrence saw in psychoanalysis yet another turning of man in upon himself, worse than religiosity, precisely because it aspired to a scientific discipline of inwardness. Yet Lawrence failed to credit this discipline with the results for which it was practiced; the turning outward that signified freedom from inwardness, was defined by Freud as the resolution of neurosis. The quarrel Lawrence picked with Freud was more on means than ends. Both sought the end of the division between inner and outer life from which derived the characteristic cultures of commitment with its attendant illnesses of inwardness, as men clung to some mean idea that would help them get out of themselves. For Lawrence, the first healthy step was to stop having so many "ideas," false escapes, by way of which the poor thinkers were driven further in upon themselves. The world of "ideas," Freud's included, was the symptom of the disease at the root of our culture—false efforts at self-cure.

After Lawrence found out how completely his presentation had been misunderstood, he immediately tried again—belligerently, even somewhat peevishly. "I stick to the solar plexus," he announced, thus challenging the "dear reader" of the second volume with the fact that his message is the same as in the first.

Only the "few" will understand, he proclaims, in an unhappy effort to appeal to the snobbishness of his readers. Apparently very few even pretended to understand, despite the fact that this was their second chance, coming only a year after the first.

*Fantasia* is a restatement and elaboration of his doctrine as it was stated in *Psychoanalysis:* it had an equally bad press. To the evident pleasure of his meaner critics, Lawrence the artist had strayed too far from his art and had thus exposed the incompetence of the prophet who urged the artist on. The few critical friends Lawrence had at the time delicately ignored both books, preferring to avoid the embarrassment of defending the artist against his urges toward prophecy. The embarrassment lingers on; friendly readers generally assume that the artist in Lawrence can still be distinguished from the prophet, and that his fiction can be properly enjoyed as such, without submitting to the pathos of learning from it those lessons Lawrence considered uniquely true to life.

The critical enemies of Lawrence were never thus confused. T. S. Eliot and Wyndham Lewis, to name only two, attacked the lyric fiction of Lawrence precisely because of the moral polemic embodied in it. In *After Strange Gods*, and in a number of articles, Eliot shows toward Lawrence all the cold intellectual fury of an inquisitor close on the hunt for a major heretic and yet never quite able to trap him. Even Eliot's customary ecclesiastic coolness as a critic fails him whenever he approaches Lawrence. For his ingenuity in explaining himself imaginatively in prose fiction, poetry, and essays, the reputation of D. H. Lawrence has been stamped with some very ugly labels. He was essentially a bad writer, Eliot announced, and moreover, sexually morbid, a snob, boor, uneducated, wrong-headed—finally, worst of all, rather unintelligent. The name-calling in which Lewis indulged shows that writer in a more than customary bad temper. Lawrence is said to purvey "Freudian hot-sex-stuff," to write a prose that is little more than an "eloquent wallowing mass of mother-love and self-idolatry," to support the cults of

"homo" and "child," to be a consummate "nigger-lover"; for relish, Lewis adds the silly judgment that "Mr. Lawrence is, in full hysterical flower, perhaps our most accomplished English communist."[3] No other writer in the twentieth century, except Freud, has been subjected to so much abuse from so many otherwise intelligent people.

That these two men of genius have been treated with such excited prejudice characterizes that protective value which Walter Bagehot claims is the essential cultural function of stupidity. Because each, in his own way, had reached down to fundamentals, each stood accused of being at once irrelevantly eccentric and outright dangerous to the public at large. To the literary and scientific guardian classes of mediocrity in our culture, genius is always a thing of the past; it may be discovered in books but not in the flesh. Freud resented the separation from society that his genius caused him. Lawrence sought, as well as suffered, his messianic alienation. "Entire separation, that is what must happen to one: not even the nominal shelter left, not even the mere fact of inclusion in the host. One must be entirely cast forth." Lawrence advised his sometime friend Bertrand Russell to seek this alienation, if Russell hoped to become something more than an academic philosopher. Lawrence's withdrawal proves the seriousness with which he took himself. His "utter hatred of the whole establishment—the whole constitution of England" was not merely a consequence of his bitter personal and social experience, first as a member of the lower classes and then as a misunderstood writer; rather, Lawrence's isolation was in a measure self-imposed. As an isolate, desperately seeking community, he self-consciously transformed himself into an uncompromising critic of our culture. Underneath the dead levels of conformity which Lawrence recognized decades before their knowledge became commonplace, he detected in himself the panic of isolation that grips modern men, too much bound up in themselves, even in the act of love. What needed breaking,

[3] Wyndham Lewis, *Paleface* (London, 1929).

first of all, were both those religious and rationalist forms of self-consciousness by which the best in our culture are infected, making them the worst.

For these hundred years there have been sporadic attempts to encompass within rational science the irrational, from which religious emotions grow. Freud proposed the containment of that emotion by a science of the irrational; on the contrary, Lawrence proposed the transformation of that emotion, toward an end remarkably like that of Freud: the abolition of internality. Quite apart from the anti-scientific line followed by Nietzsche and Schopenhauer in philosophy, and by Hamann in theology, the psychologist Carl-Gustav Carus pioneered in the scientific effort to limit the cost, in personal capacity, of an inwardness founded on Christian premises. Prosper Enfantin made the most strenuous efforts among the French scientists of moral life, aiming specifically at combining the rational and irrational in a scientific movement that would also be religious in character.[4] In England, a book titled *Mental Physiology*,[5] written by William Carpenter, made an original English approach to unconsciousness. At the apex of this approach to the irrational from the scientific side stood Freud. But the line to Freud was not continuous. Rather, Freud's predecessors were sports of a culture that could only tolerate the religious emotion at its foundation by trying to find a method of examining it. Freud went beyond examination to diagnosis. He does not spring up as yet another sport among sports. Although Freud had read Carus and other less well known authors, his debts are not so easily assigned.[6]

From the other side, the approach to unconsciousness was in

[4] On Enfantin, see, *Freud: The Mind of the Moralist* (New York, 1961), p. 50, note *k*.

[5] William B. Carpenter, *Principles of Mental Physiology* (4th ed.; London, 1876). See, in particular, Part II, Chap. XIII, "Of Unconscious Cerebration," pp. 515–43; also his discussion of the "myth-making tendency in dreams," p. 584 *et seq.*

[6] See *Freud: The Mind of the Moralist* in its entirety, as an effort to assign debts and, likewise, to draw limits to those debts.

advocacy of it. As an advocate, Lawrence takes his origin from the powerful tradition of religious mysticism, both Christian and non-Christian, aiming at an integration of the inner and outer man. Despite the frequent violence of his literary voice, there is an interior tranquillity in Lawrence's prose, a confident walking in the darkness of understanding that will seem odd to those only who have no familiarity with the imagery of mysticism. Mystics have never suspected that the worst is in the dark, as rationalists always have. Nor have they avoided the use of sexual imagery. On the contrary, even in the Christian tradition, erotic language was freely used to represent a vivid imagery of ways in which the inward man reverses the object of his interest and reaches out toward God. Mysticism bred acceptance of what the more ascetic rationalist tradition called the "animal" in man; mystics of all schools often decried the isolate and manipulative view of life bred by intellectualizing about it. The oneness of all creation is perhaps the fundamental prehension of both Christian and non-Christian mysticism; to that prehension Lawrence held throughout his life and work. From its oneness with creation mankind has fallen by misattributing omnipotence to thought; Lawrence inveighs against all abstractions, including psychological ones. The original sin against life is abstract thought.

The contents of Lawrence's two main doctrinal works are rather unevenly divided between analyses of the effects of over-rationalizing our lives and the advocacy of a religious mood which is specifically irrational and erotic. The object of Lawrence's polemic is Freud, precisely because he was the genius who took the longest step toward rationalizing our erotic lives. Lawrence's analytic powers were limited by the passion of his advocacy; Freud could remain supremely analytical because he sought to advocate nothing. His analysis of the erotic life is no more an advocacy than an attack. For this reason, as Lawrence says early in *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious*, Freud can never "get down to the rock on which he must build his

church." The psychoanalytic movement cannot develop a cultic, passional character. Being analytic, the movement can never become communal. This is, at once, its limit and its salvation. It must remain, even at best, something less than a movement. Because a rational religion is a contradiction in terms, to Freud no less than to Lawrence, the psychoanalytic movement has no potential as a therapy of commitment. It is this therapy for which Lawrence pleads, once he has done with his polemic against Freud and defines his own position.

No one before Freud had made so deep an incursion into the mystery of "the origins"; for this quality of genius Lawrence does not grudge Freud his admiration. But Freud had plunged furthest into an analysis of the old therapeutic potential for a purpose that to Lawrence seems sacrilegious: to surround this potential with more powerfully rational controls, distributed, like oil derricks, along the superficies of life. It is this rationalist ambition to strengthen the machinery of control that Lawrence opposes. His attack on Freud, in the opening pages of *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious*, is directed actually against the latest Jewish lawgiver, now wearing the smock of the scientist, but even more dangerously compelling than his predecessors because he has forgotten the prayerful attitude that man ought to assume toward his own therapeutic capacity; instead, Freud went most profoundly to the issue of whether man still needs to exercise that capacity unconsciously, upon the old basis. It is not that Lawrence suggests a revival of any historic therapeutic contents. He merely wants to preserve the dynamic, which is in the form rather than the content. Lawrence was a literary methodist; he proposed prayerful attitudes without mentioning anyone to whom to pray.

In those halcyon creative years, before the full impact of 1914 had registered on the nerves of the middle twenties, it appeared (as indeed it had to advanced minds since the Enlightenment) that a therapy of commitment could be divorced from theology. Lawrence went further. There are long paragraphs, especially in

the *Fantasia*, in which he suggests what became, from the twenties to nowadays, the position of advanced sensibility: a private sense of well-being, divorced from an ethic of social responsibility based on the guilt feeling of the private man. Thus, in two books that were written soon after the war that shattered the liberal, post-Christian moral frame, Lawrence gave a lead that is still being followed by our unchurched virtuosi of remissive cultural motifs. Lawrence's indignation against Freud reflected his impatience at the fact that, by accepting the cultural controls as fundamentally unalterable, Freud supported, with new techniques of mitigation, the type of man produced by this very system of controls and remissions. By appearing to confirm the inwardness of the dominant type rather than stimulate a cleaner break away from inwardness, Freud stood condemned, in Lawrence's mind, as a powerful new apologist of the old culture, which had so perverted the "moral faculty" in man.

"First and foremost," wrote Lawrence of his disagreement with Freud, "the issue is a moral issue. It is not a matter here of reform, new moral values. It is the life and death of all morality." Freud knew what he was doing, even if his followers did not. "Psychoanalysis is out, under a therapeutic disguise, to do away entirely with the moral faculty in man." By "moral faculty" Lawrence meant the capacity, built into culture, to make therapeutically useful commitments. But, according to Freud, this capacity was now being lost in the culture, and therefore to the human product of this culture. Freud sought a therapeutic mode beyond commitment, separated at last from what Lawrence defended as the "old religious faculty." Both men had been widely censured for the immorality of their therapeutic interpretations of that same religious faculty at the end of its tether. The difference between them was that Lawrence staked his case on a revival of the erotic mode, as a therapeutic release from inwardness, whereas Freud hoped that the rational analytic mode would achieve the same end. Here if anywhere, it would appear, is a perfect case of the pot calling

the kettle black. Both men opposed the decayed internality of the post-Christian man. Each preached a doctrine of externalization, although Freud did it more obliquely. Lawrence accused the psychoanalytic discipline of being yet another style of inwardness—a danger Freud admitted in his pronounced fears about the Americanization of psychoanalysis. Nevertheless, the therapeutic mode developed by Freud is essentially alloplastic and aims far more systematically at an externalization of human vitality than any mode that Lawrence was ever capable of putting into words. For the limit set to the revolutionary reach of Lawrence's lyric vision of the inner man turned out of himself is Lawrence's postulate that this could only happen in religious terms, necessitated by the internal pressures of some new therapy of commitment. Freud, however, in his tentative way, was the more profoundly revolutionary figure, although it is admittedly difficult to imagine the Jewish clinician as the real revolutionary, clothed in his professional rectitude as he was and anchored besides in an orthodox bourgeois family. On the other hand, Lawrence lived so completely the romantic idea of the literary man that the imagination leaps to conclusions about the revolutionary character of his message without stopping to consider its contradictory elements.

"We are in for a debacle," Lawrence announced, rather too happily. It is an announcement in which Freud could have believed, given the clinical evidence he had collected from private sources and had noticed all around him in public relations as well. The "old world" of Reason was indeed "yielding under us," its thin dried crust of moral demands cracking up. But it was precisely a debacle that Freud strove to help this culture avoid, by shoring up Reason against further perverse outbreaks by post-Christian inwardness.

Coming to this ill-disciplined inwardness armed with his rationalist suspicions of it, Freud found there none of the "wonder of wonders" for which, Lawrence believed, men always wait.

Rather, when Freud came back from his journey he brought with him, Lawrence writes, "sweet heaven, what merchandise! What dreams, dear heart! What was there in the case? Alas, that we ever looked! Nothing but a huge slimy serpent of sex, and heaps of excrement, and a myriad of repulsive little horrors spawned between sex and excrement. Is it true?"

Lawrence offers his beautiful incantatory "No" for an answer. Of course, these "gagged, bound, maniacal repressions, sexual complexes, faecal inhibitions, dream monsters" that "ate our souls and caused our helpless neuroses" were there. But we have planted them there. As itself a secular support of the inherited culture, psychoanalytic rationalism found what it was trained to suspect in the dark corners (inhabited by the dark gods), of which it is afraid.

To achieve knowledge of a "true unconscious," from which all life-giving commitments derive, science would have to abandon its "intellectualist position" and embrace the "old religious faculty," becoming thereby not less scientific but at last "complete in knowledge." Here is revived the ancient self-confidence of the mystic. Knowledge, in the mystical sense, is primarily unconscious self-knowledge and is non-rational. It is acquired by impulse rather than by the process that creates the repressed contents which latter, in the Freudian sense, complicate impulse. Lawrence advocated therefore half the Freudian definition of the Unconscious, while fulminating against the other half.

Rationalists had learned something essential about the complex nature of knowing a century before Lawrence accused them of ignorance, taking Freud as a representative figure. In the nineteenth century, rationalism lost its naïve intellectual arrogance precisely by making sense of the apparent insanities that eighteenth-century rationalism had taken for a folly characteristic of religious beliefs. The Resurrection, for example, was no longer dismissed simply as a deliberate fraud. Such an old rationalist wives' tale as the one about Christ recovering from a coma, after which he could not convince his disciples that he was still a

natural man,[7] did not survive later rationalist sophistication. The shift in the style of rationalist argumentation from that of Voltaire or Gibbon, on the one hand, to that of Strauss or Renan, on the other, corresponds to a transition from an outright hostility toward revealed religion, on the one hand, to a general sympathy toward the need for mythic explanations, on the other. This need had found in Jung the most sympathetic response, for his archetypes are myths that explain themselves. Jung's analytic psychology aspired to become revelation merged with science—each man's revelation therapeutically viable.

Lawrence's sympathy for the religious need was not really different from that of Jung. His departure from the rationalist tradition lies in a reversal of the direction of his suspicions. It is Lawrence's suspicions of the universal claims of Reason, in contrast to the suspicions of eighteenth-century rationalists against the universal claims of Faith, that mark the difference between the hope of that century and the experience of our own.

That Lawrence, like Jung, took no specific religious statement seriously, except insofar as it was a symbol of something else, brings him uncomfortably close to their common opponent, Freud, who had not taken a religious statement seriously either —save as a symptom. The only difference between symbol and symptom is that between advocacy and analysis. In Lawrence, the compassionate nineteenth-century science of religion was transformed into the characteristic religiously intimate poetry of the twentieth. Our lyric, with its tendency to evoke private worlds without end, has gone creedal at the same time that our prose has gone anti-creedal. Tapping the intimate pneuma of life, Lawrence is the purest of modern poetic talents, even in his novels, and certainly in his short stories. Probing the same nagging intensities of personal concern, Freud is the most signifi-

[7] Lawrence reworked this rationalist fancy for his own purposes in *The Man Who Died*. In his version, Christ finally convinces himself of his natural manhood and is thus saved from his earlier spiritual folly.

cant of modern prose talents, anti-creedal in his very intention.

Whenever science refuses to maintain creative contact with the irrational, it grows ever colder and more remote from "life" as Lawrence understood it. At least those rationalists who, with Freud, returned to a therapeutic examination of the committed consciousness that held their fathers, admit that their own scientific instruments derive from therapies of commitment. As rationalists, obsessed with the idea of examining the refuse of moribund and corrupt religiosities, our epigonal Freuds are really engaged in fighting one mode of internality with another. Because psychoanalysis is a secular paradigm of religious self-knowledge, it aims at abolishing itself. The logic of abolition is in the psychoanalytic effort itself, and in the next culture. As the ideal type of psychological man there is the therapeutic. Now the psychological man of this post-religious century is struggling to make his deeper and more subjective processes clearer as neuroses, rather than as gods, as his ancestors had done. Later, probably, the therapeutic will have externalized his emotional life successfully, and psychology will then cease to be a post-religious discipline; rather, it will probably supply the language of cultural controls by which the new man will organize his social relations and self-conceptions.

Lawrence admits that such objectifications must differ from one historic period to another. He has no more faith in the Christian God who died finally in 1914 than in any of the Aztec gods dead far longer, which he tried to revive, experimentally, in his novel, *The Plumed Serpent*. Gods have lived, but their particular life histories are invariably conditioned by the different projections of the human self-conception out of which they are worshiped. What Lawrence really disliked were the religious conventions of our times; he could not rightly claim that we have no god-terms. Our Holy Ghost, as Lawrence knew, is now in the machine, where it took refuge after its home in the soul was condemned by modern scientific housing ordinances as too ancient and rundown.

The way the Ghost got into the machine is remarkably similar to the way God got into heaven. Whatever the differences between the therapeutic and the scientific man, they cannot become so great as Lawrence believed. The therapeutic will make a dynamic technology of the emotions, but not yet another divine mystery setting limits to the dynamics of the "inner" life. As a scientist, Freud was already aware how little the differences mattered; that his own science ultimately must amount to an interminable therapeutic process or it would not be a science in the strict, modern sense he intended. Yet such a process seemed culturally impracticable. For this reason, Freud did not mind admitting, as he did, that his science, too, like any other worth the title, included hypotheses that could be judged "myths"—"Just-So" stories—in a pejorative sense.[8]

Now, two therapies may oppose each other, one claiming to be more scientific, but the scientific therapy arises less from within the Unconscious than does the unscientific one. Of course, Reality Principle notwithstanding, the *esse* of the external world remains its *percepi*. But the critical difference between religious and scientific therapies is in the locus of control and in the criterion of assessment. In religious therapies, the sense of well-being is measured against the commitment, which is said to "transcend" it. In scientific therapies, the commitment is measured against the sense of well-being, which is said to be "immanent" in the commitment. Finally, all commitments are alterable by therapeutic criteria. In this way, rationalism came to abolish any particular content by which a commitment was justified. All that remained was the form of internalization, which likewise had to be seriously modified, according to psychoanalytic theory.

Just what will replace the irrationalist form and creedal content is not yet clear. Nor did Freud, as a rationalist, pretend that

[8] "I think it is creditable to such a hypothesis," wrote Freud, "if it proves able to bring coherence and understanding into more and more new regions." *The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Standard Edition* (London, 1953——), XVIII, p. 122.

the functional equivalent of religion as the predicate of culture could be discerned merely by turning up the volume of the "still small voice" of Reason. On the contrary, Freud was anything but sanguine about the future. The rationalist tradition experienced a chastened culmination in Freud. Freud's rationalism is the exact reverse of its crude counterpart of the eighteenth century, which had rejected all psychic products as somehow fraudulent. Understanding his patient's perceptual and social world as expressions of the percipient's intelligence and emotions, Freud erased the gap between therapeutic rationalism and self-assertive romanticism. Lawrence did not understand this subtle reconciliation. The condescension in Lawrence's criticism of Freud's "idealism" shows up Lawrence's impatience as a critic. A less polemical approach to Freud would indicate with what care he carried rationalism to its self-transformative reconciliation with romanticism. Lawrence suffers from the fundamentalism of his faith in the irrational; so strict is his advocacy that he fails to appreciate the final sinuous turn that Freud gave rationalism, separating therapy from commitment without thereby converting rationalism into yet another religious content. Freud did not preach a rationalist faith for the future; the weakness of Lawrence is that he felt compelled to preach an irrationalist one.

On the other hand, the fundamentalists of rationalism with their ignorant irreligions are still with us; they are to be met specially among the most highly trained and culturally emancipated people. Despite the cruel failures which their counter-dogma of technological determinism has suffered, they refuse to realize that everything great and good springs, as Lawrence believed, from a new fusing of man's inner and outer life, not simply from further changes in social and technological arrangements. The product of such rearrangements will serve only to distract men temporarily from the prison of their inwardness. This faith in the externals of things, rather than in the externalization of feeling, has had the effect of making man think less and

less highly of himself rather than more and more so. This effect was attained although the faith was coated with the religion of humanity, which Lawrence despised as a rank sentimentalism no less profoundly than Freud. Pride of place was not missing in all the religious epochs of the Western psychohistorical process. That pride is now in danger of being abandoned. Compare Lawrence's daring to put the self at the center of the universe, imagining it also as the hot creative stuff from which even the remotest cold stars derive, with Russell's characterization of man as a passing and miserable accident in an indifferently creative universe. On the contrary, Lawrence proclaims, "it is the [life of the] universe which has resulted from the death of the individuals." In its anthropomorphic sense of the oneness of things, this therapeutic effort is breath-taking in its challenge to the scientific relocation of man in a more modest place in the universe. The myths here presented, as the doctrinal intuitions animating Lawrence's art, are sometimes carried along by a high good humor; but even when he is frolicsome Lawrence never loses his essential lyric seriousness of purpose—unless the accolade "serious" be denied to every poet by the predominantly prosaic mind of the emergent culture.

As to the fundamentals of social theory, Lawrence stands near Freud, although in the ardor of his polemics he himself remained unaware of their agreement. As a literary man, Lawrence cannot be expected to contribute anything more fundamental than intuitive agreement with that complete and erroneous reversal of the trend of social theory with which Freud has confused the scientific temper of our century; but such agreement is remarkable enough for its very rarity. Consider the theory that has dominated our understanding of relations between man and society since at least the second quarter of the nineteenth century. In the sociological tradition, the self is society individualized. The smallest unit of scientific analysis is the individualized social self. Freud did not abandon this position, which dominates all the social sciences. Nevertheless, by concentrating on all the

painful vicissitudes of socialization, which begins for every human being by virtue of his birth into a family, Freud has opened the way to a revival of romantic theorizing about that polite fiction of our historic Western binge of inwardness, the socialized individual self. This dichotomy between inner man and his outer conduct is precisely the point of modern neuroses (in contrast to primitive culture) that Freud attacks. The romantic pre-social component in his theory, instinctualism, is not Freud at his best or most relevant. Lawrence mounts his own attack against what he thought to be a Freudian version of dichotomous inwardness—"mental consciousness," he calls it. The attack was gratuitous, although understandable. Misled by the vulgarizations of psychoanalysis when it first became fashionable in the twenties, Lawrence marked Freud down as the new leader of the old individualist camp. Aiming as he did to liberate the religious impulse in readers he considered mis-educated by rationalist dogma, Lawrence failed to understand how undogmatic was his chosen rationalist opponent. Deliberately taunting his readers with examples of their own rigid dichotomizing of the categories of life, Lawrence commits what should be to him the sin of dichotomizing; Freud is put too strictly in that rationalist and "scientific" movement which, in confirming the sick internality of the Western personality, was giving yet another gasp of life to a dead religion. It is as if Freud were another churchman, engaged in nothing more than the construction of a new confessional box, rather than the most ingenious anti-churchman of the age.

In advocating the irrational during a time he considered fatally rationalist, Lawrence carried his understanding of the modern artist's alienation from the inherited culture too far. For he expressed thus his uncertainty about the quality and worth of his own participation in the unconscious. Like Walt Whitman, in whom he was greatly interested, Lawrence was not a direct expressionist of remissive unconsciousness but a painfully self-conscious protagonist of what Hegel first called "mansoul." It is

questionable, however, whether any great modern artist can escape the double burden of having to relate himself analytically as well as expressively to his culture, no matter how profoundly he himself may manage to remain on intimate terms with it as a participant observer of its unconscious life. The modern artist cannot belong where there are no communities in which membership can be taken for granted.

With his sense of blood ties, Shakespeare participated in the unconscious life of his time perhaps more profoundly than any other man who has ever expressed himself in writing. He lived in the period just before the era of economic liberalism—with the market as its master model of society—split off "liberty" and "individuality" from community and finally from the social self. His direct and publicly cognizable transformations of the irrational into art were therefore still possible. Lawrence had to be stimulated to his polemical rather than participant observations by reading Frazer's *Golden Bough* and *Totemism and Exogamy*. Shakespeare needed no armchair anthropologist to recall the sacred heart of genuinely popular culture. The signs of its life were then still all about him. The psychohistorical process had not yet reached what we call "modernity." By Lawrence's time, the organic community of extended families had been superseded by societies of mutual manipulation. The family had begun to lose both economic function and emotional authority; the role of the mother had been distorted into dominance, and the father's degraded to that of the permanent *other*. Only in moments of erotic union, thought Lawrence, was it still possible to feel that silent capacity for "passional communion," the commonplace bond not merely between lovers but also among members of the same family. It is an edifying picture, but one for which no anthropologist has found a live replica anywhere. Our "primitive" societies are after all not primitive in the historical sense, of being nearer the origin of social forms.

Without pretending to be writing history in any historian's meaning of the art, Lawrence, with his imagery of blood, sun,

and earth, came closer than any other modern artist to a rueful sense of what the simplicity of passion might be, were it possible, in a culture rid of a dominating self-consciousness. "Blood" is perhaps the most common metaphor for passion in our literary language. The rhetoric of Shakespeare runs with a unifying consciousness of blood against a disuniting consciousness of mind. Having to be didactic, Lawrence writes awkwardly of "blood consciousness." But the time needed a teacher desperately, as he knew. Lawrence is the lesser artist because of his pedagogic inclinations. But his blood metaphors remain traditional, expressing for him, as for Shakespeare and others between, the possibility of leading the impassioned and yet social life. There is nothing sinister (or proto-Fascist) in Lawrence's use of ancient blood metaphors. Pathetically, he raised them from long disuse to compete against the contemporary machine metaphors of human passion, which, according to Lawrence, emptied passion of its social content. What is sinister, as a symptom, is our revulsion against blood metaphors when not kept under glass, as approved museum pieces—or, what is worse, as laboratory specimens.[9] Such metaphors have been dismissed as dirty or reactionary—even Fascist. Thus, manipulative self-consciousness has progressed to that stage of moral sickness which is confronted by Freud. For this progress of the disease, Lawrence blames the rationalized machine civilization into which he was born. But alienation, as he sensed elsewhere, was characteristic of the human condition long before the rationalizing of life by technological science. The blame is upon our ideas, not upon our things.

Alienation was originally neither a Marxist nor a psychiatric tool of understanding the human condition, but theological and specifically Christian. In the act of cognition—of desiring to

[9] The pleasure of Shakespeare has been destroyed for generations of schoolboy readers, who have encountered him thus with the blood let out under the sterile guardianship of old maid teachers. Worse, because more deeply significant, is the prophylactic against family romance administered widely nowadays as part of every young person's mental hygiene.

become something more or other than what one might merely continue to be—the old Adam disobeyed God and thereby became estranged from the divine in himself. That unchanging inner part of life thus became unknown to him, repressed by his new commitment to the changing outer part. In the original version of the doctrine of alienation, man may cure himself only by accepting God's forgiveness, through Christ, and thus, in imitation of the divine mood, love not only his neighbors but also himself—in the discovery of his incapacity to change himself. When Catholic institutional theology made this self-reconciliation a routine, the early Luther tried to recall Western man to the necessity of leading an inner life at one with the outer; the doctrine of justification by faith alone derives from Luther's effort to correct the individualist turn of Catholic theology, and from his sensitivity to the overwhelming need of man to love himself in the world, as God had loved him. Lutheran doctrine was misused, to support the inner man rather than to render life more catholic. When Luther saw what violence his liberation of the inner man from his inwardness had let loose, he hedged in remorse against the consequences of his own position. The later Luther became far more the institutional Catholic than the revolutionary Protestant. Lawrence, however, polemical enthusiast for the same liberation, but without that experience of organizational responsibility which is thrust like an object lesson upon every revolutionary, rejects all hedgings. Welcoming as he did the imminent end of a culture created out of the divine ordering word (*logos*), he is not appalled by the "scream of violence," which to him expresses not death but the birth, in "pain and splendor," of true individuality.

The freedom for which Lawrence argues, especially in the later parts of *Fantasia,* is not the civil liberty considered by political philosophers; rather, Lawrence returns to the more traditional, religious conception of freedom as a condition of reconciliation between the inner and the outer life. The "bread question," as Lawrence mocks both Marxist class politics and

liberal welfare politics, is not the essential one. In his advocacy of the impulsive Unconscious—the essential unique nature of every "individual creature," which appears in "defiance of all scientific law, in defiance even of reason"—Lawrence renders a modern version of the religious sense of freedom. On the "soul question," in its intuitions of what freedom really is, "religion was right and science is wrong." According to this "fearfully religious" man, as Lawrence once described himself, we moderns are captives not of regimes but of our own lust for reasoning from the outside in. His science of the soul is a form of "idealism," writes Lawrence—the most terrible default of a sick internality growing ever more dependent on an ever more alien outer technological order.

The politics of Lawrence resembles in remarkable ways that of Prosper Enfantin and other Saint-Simonians about whom Lawrence apparently knew nothing. In a letter of July 26, 1915, to Russell, Lawrence writes out his sketch of a new hierarchal organic society that would permit communal passion. This society would culminate, as for Enfantin, in "one real head, as every organic thing must—no foolish republics with foolish presidents, but an elected King, something like Julius Caesar. And as the men elect and govern the industrial side of life, so the women must elect and govern the domestic side. And there must be a rising rank of women governors, as of man, culminating in a woman Dictator, of equal authority with the supreme Man." Of this hierarchy, Lawrence, again like Enfantin,[10] at times imagined himself the head. Lawrence thus fits into that underground tradition of speculation about the religious rehabilitation of modern society which motivated significant political as well as literary movements in nineteenth-century Europe. Note that a woman governor of the "inner half of life" gives woman really the lesser say: over private life. That inner half is dominated anyway by the masculine thrust, from the outer half. There is a

[10] Enfantin actually put his fancy experimentally into institutional practice.

tremendous aggressiveness against women in Lawrence—an aggressiveness which psychoanalysis has explained superbly in case histories of religiously burdened men.[11]

In the course of his correspondence with Russell, Lawrence declared himself unequivocally on the relation between culture and a therapy of commitment. "There is no living society possible but one which is held together by a great religious idea." Rid as Lawrence thought he was of Christian moral demands, he argued gratuitously with the anti-Christian Russell for just the "opposite principle to Christianity: self-fulfillment and social destruction, instead of self-love and self-sacrifice."

That opposite principle of Lawrence would admit, for the sake of immediacy in the externalization of the inner self, the scream of violence, as natural to man as the arched and stiffened back is to a baby having a temper tantrum and the showing of teeth is to animals. Our culture has established the pretense that a show of teeth means a smile and that love is benevolent in character. The less pretense, the less man would be trapped by internalities that were the moral residues of a Christian belief system. There was a period in Lawrence's life when he felt messianic enough to hope for an assembly of men and women who would form the "nucleus of a new belief," launching a "new center of attack" far removed from politics. In this respect, Lawrence shows himself as the most genuine of modern heresiarchs, chief and father of all the little heresiarchs—father-killers, ambivalent mother-lovers, professional immoralists, prematurely beaten generations of men who can conceive of no more creative acts than projecting their own dispirited inwardness upon the world and imagining that thus they may escape themselves. In his criticism of the rationalized organization of the inward life that is modern culture, Lawrence is truly revolu-

[11] See Freud's analysis, in the form of a case history, of Schreber's *Memoirs*, in "Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia," in *The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Standard Edition* (London, 1953——), XII, pp. 12–82.

tionary. He suggests a break away from psychologizing, not an extension of it. To him, psychologizing is a late variety of decrepit Christian culture, with sex in the head as the functional equivalent of intellectualizing about God.

Perhaps Lawrence would have been a less happy auditor of the scream of violence had he lived a little longer. He missed the noises from Nuremberg; he could not hear the screams in the neighborhood from which Freud was extricated, despite his reluctance to leave for Lawrence's still "idealist" England. Rationalist distrust of the irrational finds good cause in the bloody history of mankind. Lawrence read more than enough history to know better.[12]

As it has turned out, no age has been more horrific than this remissive period in the psychohistorical process. As Jung believed, neglected elements of the Unconscious have revenged themselves for the ignorance of rationalist science. Repressed as theology, the Unconscious has manifested itself in all sorts of perverse religions; witness twentieth-century Germany, the great center of rationalism in the nineteenth century. We have paid dearly for the victory of rationalism—a victory that Freud, in his wisdom, wished to meliorate if only for the sake of preserving the weak hold over life that secular, uncommitted Reason had achieved in the course of fairly recent maneuvering. With his tremendous intuition into a historical development of which he had little grasp in any detailed or documentable way, Lawrence knew that Reason contends mainly with impulse, and with what he considered to be the legitimate and undeniable power of love. An argument, as he rightly sensed, is rationalist, or "ideal," when it is pressed against the possibility of some religious affirmation of living in the here and now.

Because not only his own English community was being rationalized, but all communities alike are now well along in the same process, it was futile, if not dangerous, for Lawrence to

[12] Indeed, Lawrence wrote a history of the world, for adolescents.

insist as he did that men ought not to arbitrate their passions, primarily through their analytic intelligences, or even postpone them. Analysis can judge not only passion but also itself; as the common judge of both, it can be superior to passion without killing it, as the Romantics had feared. On the other hand, passion is the common divider of men—in particular when passion becomes attached to the world of ideas. A fresh wave of religiosity, in the form of an indifference to received cultural controls, while teasing out the pneuma of intimate relations, will not of itself either bring social peace or at last crown the power of love. Thus to save mankind from fixation upon its ideological follies demands an intellectual grasp of the issue no less profound than the experience of the power of love that Lawrence communicates in his art. Merging again the intellectual and the experiential, theory with therapy, Freud's insight appears to be far more realistic than that of Lawrence. By contrast, in its deliberate avoidance of a restraining intellectualism, Lawrence's erotic doctrine permits a violence of expression in which anger and hatred represent more powerfully encouraged motives than that of love.

Lawrence was, after all, the most talented believer in the irrational yet to protest against that manipulative Reason born of the wedlock of power with profit that characterizes rationalist culture in contemporary Europe and America. This culture has barely survived its own remissive intellectualism, mainly by taking up those remissions into the larger system of religiously expressed controls. Reason itself became a prime article of faith. It is time again for the thoughtful of the culture to realize that creative remissions are basically religious in character and serve the superordinate controls. In our time, not science but religion must carry once again the power of criticism, if not that of love. Being religious, Lawrence's criticism goes at least to fundamentals, however little it may appear to justify its own eroticism except as a protest against the hegemony of Reason. It is inevi-

table that Lawrence's criticisms, encaged as they are in a network of affirmative myths, should be disputed; but they cannot be entirely rejected, except at our peril, let alone ignored.

In the theory tentatively presented in the introduction of this volume, the religious problem is identical with the moral and the moral with the cultural. As systems of moral demands, every culture produces its communication modes, its aesthetic. In his two doctrinal works, Lawrence strives to preserve on the religious and moral level what elsewhere he protects on the aesthetic level: that aura of divinity around the person which Christianity has left behind. Lawrence follows the ancient theologically rooted distinction between person and personality; the latter, in its usage by the scientific and the liberal of our culture, is in process of destroying the former by pulling it to pieces and showing it to be composed of nothing except social parts. The person has been diagnosed as a kind of intersection of environments and influences. Everything, in fact, is thought to exist in the modern individual except his own "pristine consciousness," his hidden self or soul. While looking for a way out of self-absorption, Lawrence preached again the incommunicable, inalienable soul, in which traditional culture once could see its most beautiful self-image. What a mixture of motifs Lawrence has compounded for his doctrine!

The "old religious" faculty in favor of which Lawrence writes, in opposition to mechanist science, is specifically the irrational power of love. With such praise, the pallid reasonable religions favored by the educated classes for two centuries are criticized by implication. Our moral demand systems, Jewish and Christian, were originally developed in direct conflict with a religiosity that Lawrence raised up from a grave it had long shared with certain forms of mysticism, and with scattered heretics in Christian culture. Thus, if Lawrence argues for a revival of religiosity, he argues for the same reason against both the established liberal concentration of the self and any revival of a church-centered culture based on the ascetic type of per-

sonality. Lawrence was not a religious intellectual in the sense in which we can apply the term to T. S. Eliot. But it is not unknown for the profoundly religious intellectual to oppose churchliness, as, for example, in the case of Kierkegaard, who opposed the Christianity of his time.

If Lawrence's doctrine carries cultural significance, in what sense then may we rightly speak of the religious dimension in his work? By advocating the "old religious faculty," Lawrence had in mind the freer expression of man's basically erotic character. But in doing so he made the religious capacity a part of that aesthetic attitude which we have called "therapeutic"; his doctrine is a highly literary expression of the remissive motifs that dominate the present phase of the psychohistorical process.

The stage of his cultural development being therapeutic, Lawrence considers the divine as essentially erotic in character; it is a position variously held at least since the time of Plato. But Lawrence is a modern advocate of Eros, and therefore quite un-Greek: the divine is realized characteristically in the sexual relation between a man and a woman—and then, in pathos, only fleetingly. Being far better educated than many of his detractors, Lawrence was also aware of alternative conceptions of the divine, both pagan and Christian. But he rejected a culture dominated either by *Agape* or by Reason—by the Christian concept of love or by the Greco-Christian scientific *logos*.

By design, *The Plumed Serpent* is a novel of pagan religiosity, raising the possibility of converting a Western woman to a primitive Indian cult. In imaginative rehabilitation of the Aztec ritual, Lawrence rightly understands sun dancing as an imitation —or a dramatic representation—performed in substantiation of the divine concern with the human being. The lady, Kate, is quite cultured; she knows all about socialism and is beyond commitment in any of its Western institutional appearances. But she accepts her religious duty when it is presented to her sexually, and enters upon the social enjoyment of marriage to the high

priest of the cult. Thus, she chooses to participate directly in a passional community instead of merely observing it, as her European upbringing inclined her to do. An embarrassment even to ardent exegetes of Lawrence, *The Plumed Serpent* runs together just these motifs—the sexual, the instinctual unconscious, and the religious—which in the European culture have been strenuously kept apart. For the literary descendants of Lawrence, the European compartmentalization of the sexual and the religious motif has been too successful, won at too great a cost not merely to the sexual but also to the religious quality of Western culture.

Lawrence felt that the Christian possibility had ceased entirely in 1914. His great story *The Man Who Died*, written a decade afterward in contemplation of the definite historic ending of the Christian passion, has a didactic edge. It portrays Jesus himself admitting the error of becoming a Christ. Upon his resurrection, Jesus vaguely understands that he cannot return in honesty to his quest for moral authority. He rediscovers his amatory humanity—the true divinity in him—in a directly sexual way, taught by a blond votary of the Isis cult. There follows the true resurrection of Christ as Jesus. As a man, he has recovered his identity. Lost before in an ideologically encouraged confusion about his mission, Jesus now has no mission; he has achieved, in his encounter with an Oriental erotic religion, his own innocence of consciousness. The arrogance of carrying a moral demand in his very person has entirely evaporated. He understands now that he has misled his poor followers by searching for God the Father in the wrong place. Salvation lies only in the intimate, private life.

In *The Man Who Died*, Lawrence shows himself the most powerful advocate of a remissive religiosity in modern English literature. In *Psychoanalysis*, and at greater length in *Fantasia*, he tried to explain what this remissive religiosity amounted to. In sum, he declared his trust in the irrational, in precisely that human energy distrusted by culture. Moreover, he declared

himself for an innocence of mind that will permit the Western man to accept himself again as being in harmony with other parts of the universe. His passion was for the private message, often given esoterically. But the message is clear in his own intimate correspondence with men he considered candidates for his revolutionary moral instruction on how to save themselves, and thus possibly culture. "For heaven's sake," he writes, in all seriousness, to the supremely intellectual Bertrand Russell, "don't think—be a baby, and not a savant any more. Don't *do* anything any more—but for heaven's sake begin to *be*—start at the very beginning and be a perfect baby: in the name of courage."

This appeal to "child consciousness" will puzzle only if it is not taken in the context of Lawrence's insistence on the innocence of the child. Not that Lawrence believed that the child was innocent of sexuality. Rather, this sexuality is precisely the condition permitting the innocence of childhood. For in its unconsidered sexual drives—to and from objects—a child cannot abide by any fixed ideals. From this, Lawrence makes it follow that little children, if understood, may lead men toward the good life. To Lawrence, taking thought is not a virtue. The degree of goodness and the relation of goodness to truth depend upon how well men learn to stop taking thought of themselves. Of the cardinal virtues, Lawrence would preserve only two: fortitude and justice. Restraint and prudence do not seem conducive to the good life to him, as they were to Christian moralists—and, significantly, to Freud. More importantly, theorizing about life conspires with vice to render all virtues ambiguous. Lawrence prefers the purity of ignorance to the impurities of our civilizing education. Such a desire for the possibility of a free man to express himself spontaneously has not appeared in literature drawn so powerfully since Blake's *Songs of Innocence*.

Freud, on the other hand, felt that culture, however burdensome, could be trusted more than spontaneity. It is understandable therefore that Lawrence should oppose so vehemently the

Freudian doctrine. Freud too intended to help mankind break away from its habitual fixation upon ideals; but, from long clinical experience he knew better than present the child as a counter-ideal. There is nothing in man, except his trained intelligence, that is not already in the child. In order to overcome the child in himself, while not denying it, a man can only resort to this added quality: the moral contents of intellect that constitute, in fact, culture. No two doctrines could be more dead set against each other on how to treat the quality of childhood in maturity than the doctrine of Lawrence and that of Freud.

Lawrence never really knew children. He saw them without the aid of either clinical or parental intimacy. Otherwise, he would have noticed their craving for order. However changeable, under manipulation by more adult minds, the passions of a child are so dogged that they remain active in adult memory—or so painful, in frustration, that they have to be repressed. The passions of childhood far outlast their objects and at times develop therefore the quality of an obsession. Badly informed as Lawrence was about children, nevertheless, he could commend with confidence to adults the spontaneous and arbitrary purposiveness of the childlike in man, and do so for his own didactic purposes.

From his idealization of the passions as he supposed they were, fresh in childhood, Lawrence derived, in part, his two main criteria for the living of life: first, the need to unite with another in the alternately straining and easing relationship of love; second, the special masculine need for a "passionate purpose" in life, quite apart from an erotic engagement and its release. The second need is satisfied in tension, as Freud thought too, with the first. There is a strain of misogyny in both Lawrence and Freud: women distract men from those missions in the world upon which they must embark. Femininity is specifically anti-cultural, embodying remissive rather than controlling forces. Given his ambivalent attitude toward high culture, Lawrence's mixed hostility and awe of the feminine becomes more understandable.

His hostile manliness constantly serves as a critical balance of his awe of the feminine, permitting him to reject it. Alone, or in the company of like-minded men, a husband must set out from his home to make something new and better in the world. If passionate purposes are to be effective, they must be steady; and if they are steady, then they develop inevitably into "fixed ideals."

Yet just this steadiness of purpose, Lawrence considers, needs breaking. This second and higher satisfaction of the religious need in the working half of mankind, consisting in passionate purpose, dissolves under analysis into mere passion for purpose. Lawrence arrives, in a literary style packed with the ballast of religiosity, at a spurious therapy of commitment to nothing in particular. Culturally, the canon of Lawrence's writing expresses his nihilism as an artist.

Like the faith of those for whom faith means mainly a continuing capacity to believe in the possibility of finding themselves, not in finding something beyond the exercise of seeking, Lawrence's personal religion is all going to church and never getting there. The erotic life in his fiction seems always more strongly argued, compensating for the weakness of the other urge, that toward passionateness of purpose. Yet such a development of purpose is, for Lawrence, the final stage in erotic life.

Ultimately, Lawrence believed, each self in its distinctiveness has one purpose only: to come into the "fullness of its being." Any fixed direction or fast commitment can only distract from this fulfillment. To recognize the fact of otherness, to accept the good life as an erotic crucible that can, for sacred moments, fuse together self and another—these alone can proximate fulfillment. Thus, taking for granted both the distances and proximities of love completes in maturity the innocent eroticism of childhood.

Freud, with his ingenious talent for self-suspicion, no longer believed in such fulfillments. He begins really where Lawrence, for lack of sufficient analytic patience, leaves off—at the com-

patibility of love and hatred in family relations, at the mystery of the ambivalent relationship that unites man and woman, and from which they patch their domestic arrangements. It is not at all clear whether even the higher animals are not self-divided into both subject and object, burdened with the rudiments of a double consciousness. Lawrence's piety toward the possibility of living in continuity with the universe, which he elaborates in his discussion of the alienation from true selfhood in the latter half of *Fantasia*, specifies his religious hope for a condition of innocence, a return to that naïveté which can persist beyond the oceanic feelings of identity known at times to mystics and perhaps (Lawrence thought) to life in the womb. The Lawrencian God represents precisely what Freud called an "oceanic feeling."[13] In fact, Lawrence explicitly invokes elsewhere the "Oceanic God."[14] Nowhere, if not in man, does the Oceanic God represent that state of feeling in the residual psychological womb which cossets early infancy. In this state, the human being ordinarily experiences unqualified and unreflective love, in particular from the mother (or, at least, from the pre-Freudian mother). Lawrence makes an elaborate plea for this unmanipulative state of consciousness in *Fantasia*, having concluded that he had failed in putting across the same point to the readers of *Psychoanalysis*.

This state was better known to the ages preceding the emancipation of women—an advance in society which, like the political enfranchisement of the masses, Lawrence bitterly regretted for the corruption of innocence it had imposed on its beneficiaries. Limited by their sexuality, both women and the masses have been made unhappy by the political responsibilities conferred upon them. The biological warmth that kept families together

[13] See Sigmund Freud, *Civilisation and Its Discontents* (London, 1939), pp. 7–9.

[14] See *Phoenix, The Posthumous Papers* (New York, 1936), pp. 720–23, *et seq.*, in which Lawrence states explicitly in the course of his essay, "The Proper Study," that the proper study of man can only be conducted through a study of man's search for God.

was more and more missing from modern democratic culture. The family, more than other institutions, was atomized by the new free individual in search of as many of his selves as he could find. To Lawrence, only a biologically warm family, but not the freedom of self-searching, could preserve "the human being all his life fresh and alive, a true individual." Compared to this individual consciousness of contiguity with all other selves, our polite social consciousness created individuals in relations of manipulative tension with one another. The modern family, tolerant and atomized, represented to Lawrence our lowest point of alienation from other selves and not our harmony with them. The alternative to a family the members of which are casually warm toward one another is the cool democratic family of the emergent culture: a family educated in the liberal art of togetherness, well-tempered love, mutual consideration, and the modern option of treating first marriages as trial runs—a sort of growing-up period for grown-ups, with children as evidence of the intimate nature of the learning experience.

To save themselves from false otherness, in which they are mis-educated by an immoral intellectualism, individuals are urged to follow their own particular "Holy Ghost." In burnishing yet another dark literary mirror in which to catch the most remissive elements in Christian culture, Lawrence shows something more than literary artifice. As a post-Christian, he was profoundly troubled by the problem of how men in this time shall find their own God.[15] Nowadays, patently, there is no Savior—no cure-all, so to say. As the novels expressing his own fantasies of leadership indicate, the best answer to our religious need would be for the Oceanic God to throw up a fresh Savior. Lawrence was fascinated by the possibility of bringing religiosity (i.e., the simulacrum of faith) back into politics; the theme is adumbrated in *The Plumed Serpent*, *Aaron's Rod*, and *Kangaroo*. But, except in his literary fantasies, no erotic leader appeared. He abandoned hope of politics, and also of the possi-

[15] Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 727: "How Shall Man Find God? That's the Real Problem."

bility that the soul could be rehabilitated through the agency of one fatherly man. The search for God would have to be carried inward first, each man coming to terms with the incommunicable love that is his own soul, and retraining his own will.

Lawrence's sense of the divinity of loving appears anything but Christian. Pagan fertility meant more to him than Christian charity. Yet even in his deliberate revolt against it, the Christian inheritance dominates Lawrence. This dominance expresses itself in his fiction in the pathetic groping for charity between his violent lovers. The more violent their erotic feelings the more his lovers grope and stumble after charity. There are scores of passages in Lawrence's writings where he thunders loud enough against our contemporary confusion of "mental lust" with fleshly love to satisfy the strictest Christian postmaster.

The desire Lawrence built into the uncomplicated act of having of an *other* is the more pathetic for his intuition of the impossibility of its satisfaction. Desires that bring genuine union also bring about a marriage. Sexual union, however, puts the partners in a family way. Love, when complete, complicates life further, for it will involve now a group that grows along the line drawn by the original love relation. The ultimate question that tests erotic behavior is whether one can become a good parent. Bad lovers make bad parents. Especially in *Fantasia*, Lawrence concentrates on the consequences of the original love relation for those loved. Without that sense of otherness which balances the capacity for warmth between lovers, in the role of parents they would kill their children with domineering kindness; on the other hand, alienated from each other, they would use their children as substitute lovers, as Lawrence knew mothers often to do.[16] It is not the child but the parent (and, in particular, the

[16] Or, as an alternative, the alienation of the parents may express itself in the "freedom" they permit their children. Lawrence noted the decline of immediacy not only in love but likewise in authority. Instead of direct relations of authority, the family is run by oblique manipulations of guilt feelings, which train the child to habitual dishonesty in later life and lead moreover to not infrequent confusion of the sex roles.

modern mother) who invents the incest problem. Only toward the end of his doctrinal volumes does the attack on Freud's idea of the incest taboo, with which Lawrence begins, become clear and more plausible. The reader has to be patient with Lawrence: he was never a systematic writer but something better—a seer.

As a concept, the incest taboo, like any other Freudian hypothesis, represents a scientific projection of the false standards governing erotic relations within the family. Thus, the incest taboo articulates the possessive love with which modern mothers, no longer libidinally related to their husbands, manage to keep their sons even after they become mothers-in-law. The sons, even when they marry, remain bound to the one true love they have known as infants. Freud merely "idealized" as it were this failure of parental willingness to recognize in the child an inviolate *other*, and thus projected the incest taboo into universal existence. The experience of anthropologists and psychologists with pre-modern and non-Christian cultures no more confirms Lawrence's criticism of Freud than it conclusively confirms the Freudian concept. But the weight of evidence inclines heavily to the side of Freud. The ubiquity of an incest taboo, even in cultures without our peculiar ideational condition of mothers fixated upon their sons, indicates that the Freudian concept is no mere projection into science of some occasionally distorted notion of intimacy considered proper from one generation to another. Incest taboos seem particularizations of a universal moral demand.

Nevertheless, Lawrence's practical advice on the conduct of family life seems to be sound; it is also sad, for in the personal life of this pointedly prophetic figure the love relation with his mate, Frieda, remained childless. As a prophet, Lawrence drove himself, as much as he was driven, in search of the exemplary life. To accept himself he had to indulge in the absurd fantasy of rejecting England. "Fullness of being," "fulfillment of self," always seems to carry this implication of hysterical arrogance, inexhaustible in its capacity to answer all questions—even national ones—with expressions of self-concern. Viewed from the

perspective of prophecy, the personal life of D. H. Lawrence was a failure. Because of his ambition to be an exemplar, his life shows the more conspicuously its patches of familiar compromise. He was a second husband. His wife had already had two children by a man whom she no longer loved—if ever she had done so. This preacher of family as well as of conjugal passion never experienced in his own life that which he advocated. His own family history could only have taught him what it is he had to criticize, not, except by abstract negation, what to praise. Moreover, while preaching sheer physical exuberance, Lawrence was a sick shell of a man. The gospel of health was carried in a thin, hollow vessel. If ever strength of will and intelligence triumphed over weakness of body, this triumph belongs to Lawrence, the panegyrist of the body.

Further, in contradiction of his own stated doctrine, Lawrence could not avoid transforming the love relation between man and woman into a model therapy of commitment, complete in its very limitation. In reading Lawrence on love, it is well to remember that, in his inherited religious sense, the object of love is by the nature of the case incapable of being possessed; the worshiper has no means of satisfying his desire completely. For Freud, incompleteness is in the nature of satisfaction; for Lawrence, incompleteness derives from the object of satisfaction. Lawrence divinizes the sense of otherness. Men and women must naturally want to possess each other completely, just as they must also want to be free of each other. They are unable to fulfill either impulse of this duality of life to their satisfaction. By virtue of this sense of the *other*, remote yet tense with erotic capacity, Lawrence portrays people as most exquisite isolates—ultimately even from themselves: the self, being the God in every man, cannot be fully entered into. Between the moments of advance and withdrawal, there is that painful middle distance within which we practice our civilities toward those for whom we harbor most uncivil emotions. Notice the suffering of husband and wife in the story, "New Eve and Old Adam," another

of the many Lawrence stories metamorphosing the Christian search for God into a secular search for the *other*. In this story, the wife accuses the husband of withdrawing into himself at the same time that she has succeeded in disengaging herself from him and become "in the deepest sense . . . free of him" so that "above, in the open, she [could] live." Such an isolated life of freedom must, Lawrence proposes, corrupt the very individuality of the soul, whose nature it is to seek another. The corruption of freedom is nothing like the innocence of one "private, sacred heart" seeking the beating rhythm of another. Expect more than a complementarity of separate life rhythms and every marriage must seem a "comparative failure"—as the "Old Adam" concludes about his own. If one accepts the "real separation of souls," then marriage becomes all it can be. Eros must be cherished, tenderly pursued, loved for the exercise that it gives in the chase and prized in moments of capture. Lawrence believed in the ultimacy of means and in the illusoriness of ends. This is the ultimate meaning built into all secular therapies of commitment. His moral doctrine is one of the most modern: neither an ethics of responsibility nor an ethics of conscience, but an ethics of action. Figures as far apart as Georges Sorel and John Dewey would have understood perfectly this aspect of the Lawrencian gospel. That others, like Paul Tillich, committed to their own doctrine, adapt the Lawrencian gospel too easily measures the default of thought in some of the highest reaches of contemporary Christian theology.

For Lawrence, there is perfect action in the act of love; in it, we become free of both conscience and responsibility. We merely *are;* we cease to care, consider, reflect. This doctrine of ecstatic erotic action is in no way original to Lawrence. He may have read it in Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy*, for which he developed a youthful enthusiasm. For brief moments, wrote Nietzsche, we become "primordial Being itself, and feel its indomitable desire for being, and joy in existence. The struggle, the pain, the destruction of phenomena appear to us something

necessary . . . considering the fertility of the universal will." Generation is holy. Passion is holy. Screams of violence are more full of life than the hushed tones of tolerance. Only the isolates, the quieters of life, who act thus in the name of thought and care, offend Lawrence.

"Blood consciousness" is nothing new in the English literary tradition; Shakespeare had it, as already mentioned. What is new in Lawrence is his hymn-singing attitude toward the physicality of life. Lawrence's piety for the body is not vulgar; it is merely gratuitous. The world affirms itself. What is needed is not a religion of affirmation; rather, a vital religion of denial. This does not mean that denial will estrange man further from life, but that it would permit a human being, tempted as he is to constant affirmations, to criticize them, freed now from the treacherous involvement in life. Nevertheless, Lawrence's hymns of affirmation are understandable, particularly in their insistence on the sexual. All such affirmations are not an expression of aesthetic sensibility as they were for the Greeks. Rather, the emphasis on the sexual in modern culture and the obsession with private aspects of life are an implicit criticism of the ugly and deforming thing that our sociability has become. The tradition of literary psychologizing expresses an almost complete absence of faith in the controlling motifs of Western culture.

Lawrence's erotic fiction has the function of critical myth. Narrow-minded partisans of the rationalist tradition find him therefore a morally subversive writer, for they invariably advocate living on the surface of consciousness, as far away from the religious unconscious as they can get. Lawrence's literary psychology is based upon his critical religious sensibility. Ultimately his psychology and religion merge. The "pure Unconscious" contrasts sharply with the impure Unconscious, defined by its repressed contents, as proposed by Freud. In its purity, the Unconscious is identical with (in Lawrence's further explanatory phrase) the "pristine consciousness," which in turn describes the state of "innocence" that man must seek. Here, in the

term "innocence," the psychological and religious terms in Lawrence's vocabulary become one.

It is the purpose of Lawrence's fiction as critical myth to permit an experience of the divine to be encountered anew. Outside art, the numinous experience is not ordinarily available to modern men of culture. In this sense, all great art is therapeutic. Myth, and an art which expresses the mythic, permits a second level of experience; the experience of the divine comes to the reader through the imagination of the writer, this time indirectly, and is endowed with the form of his own life and his special concerns. For this reason, the interest in the personal history of the writer is inextricable from an interest in his fiction; the two interests feed on each other.

The Freudian therapeutic process parodies the mythic. As a second experience, it is intended to reduce rather than renew the meaning of the first. Lawrence, too, is therapeutic, but with the intention of renewal rather than reduction. Art, as therapy, takes on a certain theurgic (or supernatural) quality, exactly the reverse of therapy applied scientifically. Thus, in his theurgic capacity as an artist, Lawrence could write that "a book is a holy thing, and must be made so again." For this reason alone, Lawrence's life would be part of his art, for it went obviously into the making of his books. Correspondingly, his art reveals the pathos of his life, for the two are as far apart as an interpretation can be from that which is interpreted.

Fiction has taken over the teaching functions of myth in modern culture; this fact describes its importance. Lawrence's fiction mirrors the activity of myth in numerous instances. *Fantasia* opens with a critical little "just-so" story about the creation of our world as the opposite of the beautiful world that once was. Where there are seas now, there was land; what once was knowledge, is now "ritual, gesture, and myth-story."[17] The entire Lawrencian art has the prophetic intention of recall-

[17] See the Foreword to *Fantasia*, pp. 4–6.

ing us to "half-forgotten" knowledge, buried as emotion in the unconscious.

Lawrence would not have approved the scent of sanctity that now surrounds art. Yet that scent is as inevitable as the scent of churches. The cultured of this era strive to relate themselves to art as to a way of recapturing the experience of the divine in which otherwise they no longer can believe and participate. Through the mediation of a writer, painter, composer, movie director, the work of art is experienced as a thing in itself, bracketed and raised above the ordinary workaday world, yet related to that world as revelation is related to that which is revealed—superior and saving. The work of art becomes that *wholly other*, present and yet inviolate, by means of which the cultivated may escape, for the time of this relation, their self-isolation. Thus, for significant numbers of people in contemporary culture, the aesthetic relation takes on religious import. To some it may become even more important than direct human contacts, or as somehow superior to such contacts because of the relative frequency with which passional communions may occur in confronting the surrogates of life in art.

There is certainly a parallel between the neurotic and the artistic process: in each case, surrogates may become more satisfying than the real thing. Even an art that preaches life, as Lawrence's did, may perversely sacrifice life to art. For when art becomes invested with religious meaning, it may become the vehicle of nothing more than its own continuance. In art, the producer may secure for himself the communion missing from his lived life. Although a mere consumer undergoes a milder therapy, through his relation to the finished work of art, the cult of the art object current in Western culture, quite apart from its dynamics of prestige, illustrates just that vicariousness of the erotic opposed by Lawrence.

Coming out from behind the fictional arts to speak directly for himself in his polemics against Freud, Lawrence argues vigorously for each man steering straight toward his own sort of

collision with the power of emotions; this Lawrence considers the very core of religious experience—an experience of self. It is this ruthless driving inward, toward the hidden self as the quarry, that characterizes at once the motif of Lawrence's fiction and Freud's psychotherapy. In very different ways and yet for similar purposes, both encourage as well as express the dominant inward movement of our time, as a first means of carrying men outward, toward a new externality.

Notwithstanding the heated polemic, Lawrence did not exaggerate the difference between his own and the psychoanalytic encounter with instinct. In the therapeutic situation, psychological man apparently achieves a variety of that encounter of conflict in wills that the religious man must have always experienced. But the Freudian contact with the Unconscious is in effect a homeopathy of religious experience, an effort to eliminate its fixed inwardness by paralleling and subjecting it to the closest intellectual scrutiny and review at decisive stages of its development. As an experience of self-encounter, the therapy is bracketed and controlled; in the transference, the sources of erotic feeling are made transparent. Held up to the light of the intellect, every motive, including the intellectual one, is seen through and thus put in question. To Lawrence, such approaches intellectualize the genuinely erotic out of life, thus destroying the possibility of achieving innocence—or, what amounts to the same thing, externality. This, in fact, was Freud's intention. Lawrence is right to pose his own religiosity against Freud's scientific approach to the Unconscious. In the psychoanalytic situation, Freud guides the therapeutic collision between Reason and that force which religious men have long recognized and agreed to call divine: the force in its definitely irrational form, love. Yet, through Reason's guidance of love, Freud hoped to achieve that same externalization without cursing it with that dangerous old word for inexperience, "innocence."

During the shaping period of Western culture, it was in the

Christian way that the encounter with love was critically represented. Augustine's *Confessions* explain the encounter as it occurred in one man; but they explain, at the same time, how Christian myth for so long had stabilized the encounter, not as art but as theology. The erotic drive, truly the greatest expressant of the religious experience as it was felt in the Christian era, was fully recognized by Augustine as coming upward from below into every aspect of ordinary life at the superficies of consciousness. In the Christian myth of encounter, as exemplified in the personal experience of Augustine, the violence of erotic feeling is pierced by the counter-eroticism of God, which descends from above downward and assumes the aspect of authority, through the "Word" or "Reason" or "Logos" incarnate in one man. It was precisely this rationalizing element in the Christian erotic myth that Lawrence rejected. The Logos, the commanding order of the universe, was for him neither the first word nor the last. Love cannot be identified with reason; this is precisely the "mental consciousness" that Christianity criticizes in the myth of the fall of man from innocence to knowledge. The new Eve of Science, linked ancestrally with rationalist theology, continues to recapitulate the myth of the first fall in such efforts as Freud's to link erotic experience with a technique of knowing.

In the writings of Lawrence, love is made to sanction as well as heal the separation between subject and object which he considered the original sin of "mental consciousness" through which all men daily recapitulate the first fall, led on to more and more self-destructive knowledge by science. When, through erotic experience, we repair the damage done by abstract thought, we are in fact loving the divine substance in things. Lawrence's intuitions are, essentially, post-Christian. In the Christian myth, loving oneself derives from experiencing the fact that one is loved by God. But, in the Lawrencian version, God having died, nothing remains except self-love. Coming thus at the very end of the personalistic tradition—as one finds it variously expressed in the

Song of Solomon, in Augustine, in the doctrine of Luther—Lawrence deliberately played on the Christian mythology. He is caught in his time, a Trinitarian who understood that the first two Persons had gone the way of all myth-figures and that only the third, the Holy Ghost, had some chance of survival.

Lawrence's concern with the Holy Ghost is no cheap resonance of the religious motif; rather, that resonance is essential to the doctrine at the roots of his art. After all, Trinitarian Christianity is responsible for our present inclination to attribute an aura of divinity to the person as such—an inclination derived from the original attribution of personality to God. The Hebrew God was a distinct person: in the Christian myth, that person became more complicated, expressing an awareness of the complexity of love which no longer could be understood merely under the rubric of Law. Thus, in Augustine, the three persons of the Trinity—Father, Son, and Holy Ghost—become analogous to the three parts of love. The Father is the original He who loves; the Son originally the one who is loved, as God-man, and therefore (as Jung rightly says) an archetype of the Self; finally, the Holy Ghost is the power of love in that Self. In another place, Augustine analogizes the Trinity to memory, intelligence, and will. All that remains alive in this myth is the third person, will, upon which is founded both the Freudian science and the Lawrencian art. Freed from theological encumbrance, will—the third person, Holy Ghost, power of love—survives as the object of Freud's analysis and Lawrence's advocacy. But, as Freud knew and Lawrence did not, behind the Holy Ghost is the figure of the Mother, the original third person of the Trinity, now returning to psychological power. In the age-old struggle between Father and Son, Lawrence, through his art, enacted the role of the rebel Son and sided with the figure of the Mother, as Christianity did in its struggle against the patriarchal faith that is Israel. Having abandoned that patriarchal faith, yet feeling the gravity of his loss, Freud became a conservative of culture in the name of science rather than faith,

meliorating the tension between Father and Son and reducing the remissive power of the Mother. Like every true revolutionary, Lawrence, in his avowed post-Christianity, himself expresses a powerful unconscious motif in the very tradition against which he reacted. In Lawrence's art, as in the Christian unconscious, the Holy Ghost is specifically the sexual agency, which traces back, as Ernest Jones brilliantly said, to the "fantastic 'woman with the penis,' the primal Mother."[18] It is to this primal Mother that both of Lawrence's books on the unconscious are really devoted. And by reason of this devotion, Lawrence is called sex-mad by those who, unaware, worship gods rather than goddesses. Yet Lawrence himself is not an unqualified worshiper of the mother-goddess, in her disguise as the Holy Ghost, which Freud insisted on further depersonalizing as Libido. There is an ambivalence in Lawrence's art that almost shatters it, for although Lawrence is self-converted to the underlying feminism of the tradition of the Holy Ghost, he is unwilling nevertheless to accept the homosexual consequences of that conversion when it occurs outside the Christian symbolic frame. In his ambivalent advocacy of the returning feminine, Lawrence found in Freud an ideal enemy: for, far from advocating the sexual anti-culture for which Lawrence stands, Freud set out to devise explicitly masculine (read "rational") means for its control.

Freud possessed a coherent and conservative imagination, the one conservative genius of modern culture, defending in it only what can possibly be defended. Lawrence's was an incoherent and revolutionary imagination—incoherent because heavily on the side of the remissions. In our own immediate time, the incoherence of the remissive imagination, as we find it expressed in art and poetry, is a consequence of the decline of the necessary

[18] Yet the Holy Ghost is male, a change of sex which psychoanalysis has explained as at once an accommodation to the Hebraic maleness of the Christian god-term and a symbolic resolution of the Oedipus complex. See "A Psychoanalytic Study of the Holy Ghost," in Ernest Jones, *Essays in Applied Psychoanalysis* (London, 1923), pp. 415–30.

and permitting condition out of which remissive imagination can develop: the vitality of the received controls. Once the dialectic of controls and remissions had been shattered, the remissive imagination was distorted. Because we have no real churches, we can have no reformations.

What ties Lawrence close to an ancient reforming tradition is his belief that the decisive function in man is will or desire—not intellect. Here, in his polemic against Freud, Lawrence reproduces the great struggle in Western culture between voluntarism and intellectualism. Lawrence, the voluntarist, trusts will; Freud, the intellectualist, trusts reason. To Lawrence, therefore, Freud is the great enemy spokesman, engaged to the analysis but not to the advocacy of the Unconscious from which there might develop, as Lawrence hoped, a culture freed from missionary morality, in either theological or psychoanalytic terms.

Freud as destroying faith

# CHAPTER 8

## *The Triumph of the Therapeutic*

*There is a whole civilization to be remade.*

—Camus, *Notebooks**

Lawrence, Reich, and Jung made representative efforts to go beyond the analytic attitude. They exhibit, in their writings, various uses of faith in a culture populated increasingly by psychological men. Each attacked the connection between morality and a culture about which they expressed strong disapprovals.

To speak of a *moral* culture would be redundant. Every culture has two main functions: (1) to organize the moral demands men make upon themselves into a system of symbols that make men intelligible and trustworthy to each other, thus rendering also the world intelligible and trustworthy; (2) to

* That he tried seriously and with high artistry to clarify a post-Christian symbolic that could combat the emergent culture, measures the great contemporary importance of Albert Camus as a writer. Camus accepted the possibility that spiritual preceptorship in modern culture has fallen to the literary intellectual. Without a language of faith, Camus wrote in a mood far more "conservative" than that of many advanced and enlightened Christians, who have a genius for accepting almost any position, so to say, that is grossly anti-Christian or simply vulgar—especially in sex and art. On sexual life, Camus wrote, in his *Notebooks,* that it "was given to man, perhaps, to turn him aside from his true path. It is his opium. In it everything goes to sleep. Outside it things take on life again. At the same time chastity puts an end to the species

organize the expressive remissions by which men release themselves, in some degree, from the strain of conforming to the controlling symbolic, internalized variant readings of culture that constitute individual character. The process by which a culture changes at its profoundest level may be traced in the shifting balance of controls and releases which constitute a system of moral demands.

Those who transmit the moral demand system are a cultural elite, exemplifying those demands in their character and behavior. But an elite cannot merely teach or write of the moral demand system without acting out some part of it. However the labor of exemplary enactment is divided, no culture survives long without its elite, those cadres which demonstrate the particular balance of control and remission in the culture itself.

No culture of which we are aware has yet escaped the tension between the modalities of control and release by which every culture constitutes itself. Cultures achieve their measure of duration in the degree that they build releasing devices into the major controls. These are the devices that modern psychotherapy seeks to develop; it is this development which gives to psychotherapy its present importance in the history of our culture.

There remains a tension between controls and releases, even when the releases are devised cleverly (or dialectically) enough to allot to the controls their superordinate function. A cultural revolution occurs when the releasing or remissive symbolic grows more compelling than the controlling one; then it is that

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which is, perhaps, the truth. Sexuality leads to nothing. It is not immoral, but it is unproductive. One can give oneself to it for a time when one does not wish to produce. But chastity alone is connected with personal progress. There is a time when sexuality is a victory—when it is released from moral imperatives. But it quickly becomes a defeat afterwards—and the only victory is won over it in its turn: that is chastity." On poverty, Camus is nearer the classical tradition than the modern therapeutic. "What can a man better desire than poverty? I have not said misery nor the hopeless toil of the modern proletariat. But I do not see what more can be desired than poverty linked with an active leisure." (See "A Writer's Notebook," *Encounter*, Vol. 24, No. 3, March, 1965, pp. 28–29.)

the inherent tensions reach a breaking point. Roman culture may have been moving toward such a breaking point when Christianity appeared, as a new symbolic order of controls and remissions.

At the breaking point, a culture can no longer maintain itself as an established span of moral demands. Its jurisdiction contracts; it demands less, permits more. Bread and circuses become confused with right and duty. Spectacle becomes a functional substitute for sacrament. Massive regressions occur, with large sections of the population returning to levels of destructive aggression historically accessible to it.[1] At times of impending transition to a new moral order, symbolic forms and their institutional objectifications change their relative weights in that order. Competing symbolisms gather support in competing elites; they jostle each other for priority of place as the organizers of the next phase in the psychohistorical process.

In all cultures before our own, the competing symbols took the form of languages of faith. A language of faith is always revelatory, communicating through some mouthpiece of the god-term a system of interdicts—a pattern of "thou shalt nots," or taboos. The language of science is not revelatory but analytic; for this reason, the scientist can never claim that his own terms have a prophetic function. His work is non-moral, that is, without interdictory purpose. So far as the therapist casts himself in the role of a social scientist (e.g., Freud), he seeks to analyze interdictory symbolisms, not to assert them. Yet, as we have seen, modern therapists must use a language of faith. So far

[1] As in the case of Germany during the Nazi period, or ancient Rome when it became less a city than a mob. Jung noted, in 1912, that "We can hardly realize the whirlwinds of brutality and unchained libido that roared through the streets of Imperial Rome. But we would know that feeling again if ever we understood, clearly and in all its consequences, what is happening under our very eyes. The civilized man of today seems very far from that. He has merely become neurotic. For us the needs of the Christian community have gone by the board; we no longer understand their meaning. We do not even know against what it is meant to protect us." "Symbols of Transformation," *Collected Works*, Vol. 5 (New York, 1956), pp. 70–71.

as their languages are "scientific" and yet moralizing, they depend upon counter-interdictory symbolism, "heretical" or negative conceptions of the interdictory symbolism itself, releasing rather than controlling. Jung was a prophet of the "subterranean God," as opposed to the "Heavenly Father." Reich's energic "Orgone" opposes all "spiritual" principles. A language of faith may be, therefore, controlling or releasing, interdictory or counter-interdictory. It contributes vitally to what Mannheim called "collective definitions," not mere hypotheses or replaceable theories but rather a "source of collective habits and actions."[2]

A language of hypothesis is culturally neutral. Commitment to hypothesis is made to be abandonable. The scientific psychologist, as clinician, aspires to be neither interdictory nor counter-interdictory. Because the clinical attitude aspires to moral neutrality, its therapeutic effect is culturally dubious. Clinicians continue to vacillate between interdictory and counter-interdictory symbolisms, depending upon a diagnosis of the individual patient's own conditional relation to these symbolisms. No culture has yet produced a third type of symbolic—one that would embrace that historic contradiction in terms: a "scientific culture." If, and only if, a neutralist symbolic becomes operative, may we speak of a scientific culture. For the present, clinical psychologists often try to produce an interdictory effect with counter-interdictory analytic symbols, an ambivalence Freud himself did not have the genius to overcome, except at the expense of an already weakened interdictory symbolic. Neither Jung nor even more conservative therapists have known how to resolve this ambivalence except by tempering their radical attitude toward culture with an obdurate conservatism toward the social order.

Every system of moral demands must operate within some social order. No less than its predecessors, the neutralist symbolic would have to create institutions appropriate to its expres-

[2] Karl Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Culture* (London, 1956), p. 97.

sion, and even enter into shifting class alliances. As in the history of the Christian culture, a symbolic may be carried to power by a class very differently positioned in the social structure from that class in which it originated.

The next culture, with its component symbols, and with institutions embodying these symbols arranged in a normative working order, probably will require, in order to establish itself, (1) a new institutionalized inequality of demand and remission, (2) an ideal character type designated in these studies as the "therapeutic." Under foreseeable ideological and technological conditions, this emerging moral ideal is unlikely to be a workingman; on the contrary, the therapeutic will be a man of leisure, released by technology from the regimental discipline of work so as to secure his sense of well-being in highly refined alloplastic ways.

The term "inequality" of demand and remission is used advisedly. Every culture has hitherto required that the modalities of control dominate, that expressions of the "unwitting part of it"[3] be disciplined and rendered institutional. Whenever a releasing symbolic increases its jurisdiction to the point where it no longer serves to support the incumbent moral demands, but rather contradicts them, that culture is in jeopardy. Such freedoms were signatures on the death warrant of previous cultures.

At the close of a culture, the releasing modalities themselves begin to look and sound like controls. They are harbingers of the next culture. Some fresh imbalance is required before the succeeding system of culture can be born, bringing into being a new symbolic of expectations, and, moreover, institutions appropriately organized to enact those expectations, translating the high symbolic into rules of social conduct. In the realm of culture, equality of controlling and remissive functions, rather than inequality, is the mother of revolution. When the cross becomes a symbol of power or beauty, suppressing the historical reminder of a particularly brutal instrument of humiliation and

[3] See Introductory p. 5, footnote 2.

death, then its own moral authority, under the Christian rubric of "cross-bearing," is threatened. Remissive components within some psychohistorical moral demand system may be underdeveloped, or overdeveloped. All symbolic and institutional devices balancing remission and control must be examined within multiple perspectives of historical change before the examiner can arrive at any judgment about the fixed moralities of a culture. But precisely those fixed moralities cannot remain permanently fixed. There are particular historical moments of imbalance in a dialectical order of controls and releases. The imbalances are subject to "correction" in the very process of maintaining themselves. Thus even the most stable moral demand systems are inherently liable to change. The primary process of cultural change refers to shifting jurisdictions over categories of social action by controlling and remissive symbolisms of communal and individual purposes.

One distinctive characteristic of modern remissive symbolisms, such as have been examined in the preceding three chapters, is that none has yet had the power to organize the erotic illusions that hold together aggregates of men for communal purposes. Doctrines of release in a culture cannot, of themselves, develop into new modalities of purpose unless they are subtly transformed and institutionally elaborated, as for example in the case, now all but closed, of Christianity.

In modern culture, there is a major question about the motor by which new purposive energies might be generated. Only with respect to nature does physical science produce transformative control devices. With respect to culture, it is still unclear whether the social sciences will produce control devices, as Comte hoped, or in what sense they may help create and install fresh convictions of communal purpose. Scientific psychotherapies often consist in attacks upon control-release systems which have failed as motors of communal purpose, according to criteria set up by patient, profession, or society. A judgment by psychotherapy upon itself as a remissive device itself in modern culture

depends on how it conceives a preferable control-release system. Yet this is precisely the level of conceptualization with respect to its functions within a culture which psychotherapy tries, when understood as a science, to avoid.[4]

We have some clues about the functional imperatives of psychoanalysis—desired and realized—in modern culture. Freud considered that his symbols were exempt from the cultural process by which remissive modalities become controlling, although rationally ordered ego controls are intended to operate remissively. Being analytic rather than remissive, the Freudian doctrine was never to be put in systemic service to either interdiction or release, under pain of ceasing to be analytic. Because Freud's doctrine was anti-communal, it could be used as a theoretical basis for elaborating a strategy of self-realization for the therapeutic. Americans, in particular, have managed to use the Freudian doctrine in ways more remissive than he intended, as a counter-authority against any fresh access of communal purpose. Yes !

By mid-century, the controls and the remissions from those controls have grown so nearly equal that the one works no better than the other. More precisely, the old established controls are enunciated so vacuously, and in such hollow voices, that they sound like remissions; and the remissions have become so elaborately stated, by some of the most charming voices in our culture, that they seem rather like controls. Such are the contrarieties of a revolutionary epoch. No one knows the internal voice, or external look, of the new devices of control and release that will succeed our failing ones. That even Freud expected them indicates the hold of the inherited configuration of culture over even the most radically inquiring minds.[5]

On the other hand, a heavily remissive psychotherapy may become a permanent institutional fixture of modern culture—a kind of secular methodism for those who remain obstinately

[4] See Freud, *Standard Edition*, XXI, p. 144.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 143.

uncomfortable in their pleasures. Structurally induced conditions, such as the decline of an ethic of work, may, like individual neuroses, seek their own pathological resolution. The new saving symbolic may never arrive, although from time to time, in various places, its arrival has been announced and new remissions experimentally tried. What appears now fairly certain is that the control-release system inherited from an older, mainly agrarian, culture into our technologically advanced, urban one cannot renew itself. Whether or not an innovation will occur is likely to be determined by the requirements of affluence accumulating in the hands of the therapeutic himself. With their secondary needs automatically satisfied, men may no longer need to have something in common, as an end, to love. The organization of indifference may well succeed the organization of love, producing a culture at lower cost to individual energies. Indeed, by this reorganization the interior life would cease to press its sickening claim to superiority.

The strange new lesson we have begun to learn in our time is how not to pay the high personal costs of social organization. The revolution continues in a remissive direction, beyond that rationalism Max Weber called "disenchantment," toward the dissolution of old systems of moral demand, with their requirements of almost total social cooperation in order to survive hard reality in a world characterized by scarcity. The present swing in the direction of release may not be orbital but more extended and historically more permanent, based on the automaticity and ease with which an infinity of created needs can now be satisfied.

Remissive motifs other than sexual have dominated earlier phases of the psychohistorical process, expressing the ideological breakup of great communities, but always at the same time preparing the ground for fresh internalizations of control. But the modern cultural revolution has built into itself a unique prophylaxis: it is deliberately not in the name of any new order of communal purpose that it is taking place. On the contrary, this revolution is being fought for a permanent disestablishment

of any deeply internalized moral demands, in a world which can guarantee a plenitude produced without reference to the rigid maintenance of any particular interdictory (and counter-interdictory) system. This autonomy has been achieved by Western man from common and compelling mobilizations of motive. Stabilizing the present polytheism of values, there is the historic deconversion experience of the therapeutic, proposing an infinity of means transformed into their own ends.

Interdictory systems are still deeply rooted within us, of course. A cultural revolution does not occur as a discernible event, or as a plurality of events, nor does it occur swiftly within a few years, as does a political revolution; only afterwards, when the revolution itself has been incorporated into the new system of controls, do such mythic condensations of cultural change occur. Moreover, in significant ways, a cultural revolution may run with or against the indicated direction of political change. For example, the first Christian culture revolution accommodated itself from the beginning to the ruling classes of its time.[6] Christian doctrine began by distinguishing between culture and politics, concentrating its efforts at change upon the former, thus preparing a theoretical way for the Constantinean accommodation.

Cultural revolution is usually distinguishable from political revolution, which may assault the social order and leave the moral demand system fundamentally unaltered. Our cultural revolution has been made from the top, rather than from the bottom. It is anti-political, a revolution of the rich by which they have lowered the pressure of inherited communal purpose upon themselves. Seen in this way, the Negro protest movement in the United States will have to become more profoundly cultural if it is to succeed politically. Yet the American Negro is himself limited in his demands by the successful revolution of the rich. Being an American, the poor Negro believes that he too

[6] Probably as a result of the lesson learned from the disastrous Jewish attempt to maintain an identity of culture and society.

can live by bread alone. What the Negro asks, essentially, is a place at the American trough. But to gain that place, he is constrained to ask for something more than his share of places. His moralizings become an embarrassment, for they hint at the acquisition of something greater than a place in a vaster suburbia.

Indeed, cultural revolutions before our own have asserted some limit on the race for status and satisfaction, and have promoted interdicts to limit and displace the dynamics of acquisitive appetite. Western culture has been dominated by an ascetic modal personality. Even the Calvinist bourgeois was to have his capital as if he had it not. Ours is the first cultural revolution fought to no other purpose than greater amplitude and richness of living itself. Is this not what is meant by the "revolution of rising expectations"?

Our revolution is more Freudian than Marxist, more analytic than polemic, more cultural than social. There is no reason why, as the reluctant leader of moral revolutionaries, Freud should have threatened the social order. Of course, he knew that a revolution, to be thorough, must transform the property relations in society.[7] Nevertheless, his diagnosis of our "communal neurosis" takes no account of property relations. Culture, not the social order, takes the point of Freud's analytic attack, as it does of Jung's reconstructions in terms of religious psychology. Attacking the culture, such insights as the subjects of this volume propose could be adapted as safeguards against all inherited therapies of commitment. For the culturally conservative image of the ascetic, enemy of his own needs, there has been substituted the image of the needy person, permanently engaged in the task of achieving a gorgeous variety of satisfactions.

What is the logic of choice by which one symbolic begins to displace another? How do god-terms change? The present volume is not meant to be a history of our cultural revolution. That

[7] *Op. cit.*, p. 143.

work will have to be done in monographic bits and pieces. We are too close to the subject. Moreover, a theory of the psychohistorical process has not yet been worked out. What has been attempted here, rather, is a tentative prospect of the revolution, drawing first some implications from various attacks on the failing cultural super-ego. Nor is this meant to be a defense of that inherited culture. Under the circumstances of a shifting balance of controls and releases, the classical internalizations of social authority, as an unconscious conscience, may be indefensible anyway. That it has been so ardently defended indicates not the eternal necessity of an unconscious conscience but rather that the initial cost of the modern cultural revolution has been a feeling of symbolic impoverishment.

The religiously inclined therapists are themselves engaged in the absurd task of trying to teach contented people how discontented they really are. Many would-be patients are recovering, it seems, from a pervasive feeling of impoverishment, so emphatically stated in the literature of the nineteenth century and of the first half of the twentieth. One main lesson is being more and more widely learned: that all compelling symbols are dangerous, threatening the combined comfort of things as they are. Even the religiously inclined grow more diffuse in their self-demand, praising "faith in life." And those without even this general faith—as, for example, Samuel Beckett, with his effort to be an artist working ultimately with a silent mankind, because the "silent God" has been used up—are hailed as most religious because they can find nothing to obey or await. All binding engagements to communal purpose may be considered, in the wisdom of therapeutic doctrines, too extreme. Precisely this and no other extreme position is stigmatized as a neurotic approach to paroxysms of demand for a more fundamental revolutionary dogma. It is in this sense that the contemporary moral revolution is anti-political; more precisely, it serves the purposes of the present anti-politics, representing a calm and profoundly reasonable revolt of the private man against all doctrinal traditions

urging the salvation of self through identification with the purposes of community.

In its reasonableness, the triumph of the therapeutic cannot be viewed simply as a break with the established order of moral demand, but rather as a profound effort to end the tyranny of primary group moral passion (operating first through the family) as the inner dynamic of social order. Crowded more and more together, we are learning to live more distantly from one another, in strategically varied and numerous contacts, rather than in the oppressive warmth of family and a few friends.

A culture of contacts is, at last, an historically accomplishable fact. Everything conceivable can be made universally available. Variety has become a term of control as well as remission. Confronted with the irrelevance of ascetic standards of conduct, the social reformer has retreated from nebulous doctrines attempting to state the desired quality of life to more substantial doctrines of quantity. The reformer asks only for more of everything—more goods, more housing, more leisure; in short, more life. This translation of quantity into quality states the algebra of our cultural revolution. Who will be stupid enough to lead a counter-revolution? Surely, even the rich are now emancipated enough from ascetic symbol systems to concede more of everything to everyone, without serious loss to themselves. They cannot be threatened by a doctrine that merely asks for more, for this presupposes that quantity determines the quality of life—and this very assumption expresses the religion of the rich.

To ever-diminishing restrictive effect, lip service is still being paid to the ascetic principle that "more" does not translate into "better." Nevertheless, our suspicions fade that the quality of life may not be a synonym for the standard of living, after all. At least, a high standard of living, in our post-ascetic culture, is considered the permitting condition for attaining a higher quality of life. That "more" equals "better" has been an idea supported by the failure of the Russian revolution to say anything more original. Carried though it was by the Marxist-Leninist

doctrine, that most recently ascendant variety of the Western commitment therapy, the Russian revolutionary movement attracted many of the religious by its promise to change fundamentally the self-serving character of modern social relations. Militant socialism developed in its most powerful variety as a secular version of militant asceticism. Viewed in terms of its place in the history of culture, the Russian revolution carried a conservative bias, even in its apparently releasing initial phase, preaching the ethic of self-salvation through identification with communal ends in secular terms. The present course of the Russian Communists appears set toward an ironic convergence of a culture growing less conservative and a politics growing less radical. An understanding of the dynamics of such a convergence would illuminate at once the study of both culture and politics.

Cultural revolutions may be viewed more as typical recurrences rather than as unique occurrences. Like a planet, a culture may move around in an elliptical course, slowly changing its moral direction. In this classical view, all revolutions are repetitions; certainly, there is nothing surprising in the advent of a revolution. It is to be expected, like a change of seasons. But there is another view: that a culture may reach a definite close. This may well be the closing time of ascetic culture in the West; releasing modalities have enlarged their jurisdiction, demobilizing moral motivation, opening up possibilities suppressed during the long tutelary struggle of that culture against nature.[8] In fact, Western culture may now be so divorced from nature that

[8] There is a resemblance between revolutions in cultural and social systems. In culture, too, a revolution may be taken to represent the overthrow of an established order, a substitution of some new ruling symbolism of personal sacrifice for the old. Social change is heralded, or accompanied, by ideological or cultural movements that are themselves training schools for some new therapy of commitment. The socialist movement existed as a cultural and psychological phenomenon long before it became politically significant. We do not know from what dynamic element of contemporary culture the next political thrust will develop—the two systems may now be experimenting with a trial separation leading to permanent divorce.

revolution has lost its earlier cyclical implication. A truly unique revolution would be one that would not generate any compelling therapies of commitment. In our urban technological culture, it seems both archaic and dispensable already to organize men into compassionate communities by what Freud called "erotic illusions." Instead, the therapeutic is more adapted to organization into administrative units, with what used to be called "indifferentism," or, more recently, "nihilism," as the general rubric describing social emotion. Not trained in a symbolic of obedience—indeed, entertaining the category merely as a convenience—Western man could be free at last from an authority depending upon his sense of sin. Even now, sin is all but incomprehensible to him inasmuch as the moral demand system no longer generates powerful inclinations toward obedience or faith, nor feelings of guilt when those inclinations are over-ridden by others for which sin is the ancient name.

Compassionate communities, as distinct from welfare states, exist only where there is a rich symbolic life, shared, and demanding of the self a hard line limiting the range of desires. The symbolic impoverishment of the Western communities cannot be corrected by analysis, nor by analyses of other analysts. Rather, the present correction of this impoverishment amounts to an effort to change the criteria of impoverishment. Perhaps the issue thus formulated can help us judge more accurately the continuing changes in the character of our culture.

The history of a culture—and of its social organization—may be written as a dialectic of the shift from evaluative to expressive symbolisms. Ethical despair becomes, in such a history, a transitional feeling. Earlier transitions have been felt as painful. In the degree that an ethos of control (that is, an evaluative symbolic) loses force, just so does a pathos of release (that is, an expressive symbolic) revenge itself in social analogues of individual symptoms. But from the classical repressive-sublimative organization of motive, our culture has veered toward an expressive-impul-

sive organization.[9] The way in which the inherited culture was structured by internalized love and externalized hatred describes the ambivalence in its therapies of commitment. Opposing commitments depend upon the same dual therapeutic modes.

Paralleling those commitments that are the symbolic structure of community is the social structure. No therapy before the analytic has produced salvations or cures except through a social system penetrated by organizational commitments—these commitments legitimizing the order of vocation and personal relation from which the sense of community is derived. We are privileged to be participant observers of another great experiment by Western humanity upon itself: an attempt to build upon the obsolescence of both love and hatred as organizing modes of personality.

In every vital community there has been a cultural elite, sometimes distinct from political or social elites, carrying doctrines of communal purpose as its motivating characteristic. The test for the cultural elite has been its capacity to express, in a symptomatic language of faith, the self-effacing moral demands. Western society nowadays scarcely even pretends to produce a cultural elite in the sense indicated; it boasts many highly educated and gifted people, but none are therapists of commitment.[10] No successor therapists to the religious professionals have emerged. It is conceivable that therapists of commitment grow less and less necessary to the imaginations modern men have of each other.

A cultural elite may have either a critical or a supporting relation to the upper classes, politically or economically defined;

[9] The cultural significance of advertising, for example, has been usefully analyzed under this general rubric. See Jules Henry, *Culture Against Man* (New York, 1963), pp. 3–99, also p. 317, *et pass.*

[10] Not excepting the discouraged professionals of the old normative institutions, themselves more than half persuaded that they are protected remnants of a dying culture, struggling to find avenues of relevance to the present age.

historically, that relation has been supporting in the main. By "cultural elite" are not meant intellectuals, necessarily; rather, such an elite may be either anti-intellectual or fiercely intellectual, aesthetically sophisticated or hostile to the arts. The significance of these or other characteristics can only be established when the contents of the moral demands shaping the elite's general plan of life and its impress upon the social class structure have been studied. That intimate connections develop between social classes (that is, aggregates defined in terms of property and status), on the one hand, and culture classes (that is, aggregates defined in terms of moral demand), on the other, has been a proposition accepted in general by liberals and conservatives alike, as well as by democratic and aristocratic theorists. It is characteristic of power to be associated with culture. To rule is to become exemplary or, at least, to sponsor cadres practicing the praise of rulers as far as decorum, in that culture, would allow.

Yet, there have been periods in history when a cultural elite, opposing refinement with aesthetically coarse moral demands, has risen in critical passion from both the lower social orders and from disaffected members of the higher.[11] Culture in its primary sense, a moral demand system, is not the equivalent of a technical education or of aesthetic refinement. To take yet another step in the development of this historical perspective: Culture classes have been ambivalently related to social classes throughout Western history. The upper social classes rarely preserve a strict moral demand system. Associated with them, an elite culture class grows less strict. Moral reform, no less than social, must push up from below. Even in Nietzsche's pejorative variation on this theory, the dialectic holds: the cultivated, with their high arts and literature, are too comfortable to deploy righteous indignation; and the lowly are sunk too far into their peculiar resorts of comfort. Moralizing belongs to the ambitious middle range of the Western social structure, if it may be

[11] The first four centuries of the Christian era were such a period.

properly located anywhere at all. But the proper locus is more ideological than structural, it seems. Not class position but creedal preoccupation, as an alternative to refinement and aesthetic perception, is the driving force of moralizing movements. In all the writings of Calvin there is scarcely a reference to the beauty of the landscape surrounding Geneva. He was far too busy regulating the manners of Genevans, including the exact length of the ladies' skirts.

That social and culture classes may be ambivalently related is, of course, an empirical generalization, and thus subject to a run through the gantlet of historical objections. But, until practically our own time, this generalization can be substantiated over and over again. Some evidence of sustained opposition between social classes and culture classes may be cited.

In the seventeenth century, some artisans and sections of the lower middle social classes in Western Europe developed powerful motifs of control, complete with normative institutional modes for exercising those controls, as in the case of the English Puritans or the Dutch bibliolaters. The leadership of these movements entertained the ambition of a cultural elite, offering their resolutions of ambiguous moralities as fresh options for the organization of consensus. On the other hand, at times a group or movement competing for elite status would withdraw from the struggle to alter the culture system, so as to maintain the purity of the moral demand for itself alone. This describes the basic difference between sects of withdrawal and sects of militancy in Western cultural history. Yet even sects of withdrawal may preserve a certain militancy and aspirations of catholicity. By maintaining their community as a whole as an exemplary institutional embodiment of their proclaimed moral demand system, the withdrawn sect would preach a prescriptive remedial lesson to the society external to it; this society is treated pejoratively as "the World," an immoral system of remissions, as opposed to the correct conduct of the corporate life.

So far as it offers counter-interdicts, aiming first at release

from (or radical reform of) the established moral demands, a challenging elite[12] appears deviant or even downright immoral to the cultural establishment which is carrying out the maintenance functions of the dominant demand system incorporating the official scientific wisdom of the period. Yet, by offering modes of release, a challenging cultural elite may become the spiritual preceptor of the moral demand system that is thus being born. There is a hint of this ambition in Freud, when he proffered, as a successor to both the established psychiatrists and to the pastors of the older dispensation, the psychoanalyst in the role of a "secular spiritual guide."

Who are those who now are spiritual preceptors? The affluent and powerful often have not been the morally supportive class. What happens if an entire society grows rich, technologically loaded with bribes, and is dominated by preoccupations that may be best defined as anti-creedal? What cadres offer a powerful rationale of abandonment of the disintegrating cultural super-ego?

Certainly, Freud hoped the psychoanalyst would be the one to have some legitimate claim to spiritual perception. Yet Freud himself was reluctant to tamper radically with the cultural super-ego. As we have seen,[13] his orthodox successors have become even more strictly client-centered.

In the sequence of Western spiritual preceptors, the psychotherapist came before the professional revolutionary. Committed

[12] The probability of "youth" as an emergent Western cultural elite would seem quite high in the light of this tendency, for intergenerational tension becomes greater as industrialization—and the concomitants of this process as it has been experienced—progresses. However, as products of the analytic attitude, today's youth may attack the culture system but rarely the social, thus precluding its involvement in the creation or propagation of new (or old) commitment systems. The historical trend of youth as cultural elites is, today, almost entirely a non-Western phenomenon. For a more detailed analysis of the role of youth in American society, see Erik Erikson (ed.) *Youth: Change and Challenge* (New York, 1963), especially the chapters by Talcott Parsons and Kenneth Keniston.

[13] See Chap. 4, pp. 102–106.

Communists claimed they possessed a spiritual perception that was in fact the (propaedeutic) necessary to the creation of a new moral order. And before the Communists, there were, of course, the Christians. Indeed, the entire effort of Christian socialism can be best explained as an attempt to renew the spiritual perceptions of the Christian doctrine by transfusions from the outside—from a competing and hostile therapy of commitment. The tragicomic fate of Christian socialism was that it became more aesthetic than ascetic. In another respect, the failure of Christianity resembles that of Communism: both have been wrecked by success; neither could resist incorporation into social orders that were partly their own creation. In the doctrine of the Church, however, Christianity still preserved its capacity for spiritual perception. That the Church is, supposedly, *in* but not wholly *of* this world supplied a critical principle of renewal which is basic to all Christian therapies of commitment. The Church, as an institution, is vital only inasmuch as its symbolic is detached from the established social order, thus preserving its capacity for being the guardian critic of our inherited moral demand system.

The Leninist doctrine of the Party maintained no doctrinal reserve about the social order, over which it developed a stewardship in theory and practice more complete than that ever claimed or practiced by the churches. No director of the faith has proved less perceptive spiritually than the professional revolutionary turned Party functionary. Having lost the nimbus of resistance to the precedent social order, he operates more in terms of bureaucratic self-interest than in those of communal purpose. More precisely, Party interest becomes identical with communal purpose. The Gletkins have no gods, and usually cannot be driven therefore to personal despair by a Party which devours its own members. For those in search of new gods, after 1914–1919, the attractive pull of the professional revolutionary was accounted for, probably, by a residue of his earlier charisma as a spiritual preceptor proposing, in his political acts and thought, a new moral order. Nowadays, that charisma is rarely

to be found, because the Communist moral order appears anything but new. As a Party functionary, the Western or Russian Communist no longer represents a cultural elite. Nevertheless, the Marxist political functionary remains *culturally* conservative —he is a "Hebraist," as compared with the "Hellenes" that dominate the national politics of the West.

There persists a revolutionary impulse throughout the West; but it is cultural rather than political, and therefore more difficult to describe than the political revolutions of the East. That revolutionary impulse is in evidence not only in the writings of those specimen therapeutics examined in preceding chapters but in the writings and conversations of significant numbers of the educated. One British technologist has enunciated the doctrine of the therapeutic in a language so simple and clear that it is well worth while to quote him at length, to stand for countless other utterances heard and read: "Any religious exercise is justified only by being something men do for themselves, that is, for the enrichment of their own experience." Attached as he is to the word "Christian," the writer even seeks to make Jesus out to be a therapeutic, as Lawrence and Reich did before him. "Jesus," we learn, "used the word 'God' to . . . refer to the vital energy of personal life itself, the energy of love." Living in a culture no longer religious, "people who center their lives on ritual, sacrament, and constant reference to some supposed plan underlying experience are just as cut off from vital personal contact with others . . . as is the individual neurotic." The technical psychological term, this writer concludes, following Freud, for "such a way of living," carried over from the previous culture, is "paranoid fantasy-obsession."

What, then, should churchmen do? The answer returns clearly: become, avowedly, therapists, administrating a therapeutic institution—under the justificatory mandate that Jesus himself was the first therapeutic. For the next culture needs therapeutic institutions. "Society as a whole needs patterns of community life which will help ordinary people to fulfill them-

selves in much the same sort of way that psychiatrists help those who are specially troubled. Building up such community life would surely be a directly Christian activity, in my sense; but the training for those who are needed for it would be rather different from any sort of training clergy at present receive." The writer understands that churchmen will be able to become professional therapeutics "only if they break away radically from almost all, if not all, of their traditional religious pursuits."[14] Here speaks the therapeutic, calmly confident that community life no longer needs "some supposed plan underlying experience," that is, no longer needs doctrinal integrations of self into communal purposes, elaborated, heretofore, precisely through such "supposed plans." It is in "traditional religious pursuits" that such plans are reinforced and the self integrated into a saving corporate purpose. Without such incorporating plans, the self has found fulfillment in an even more elusive condition.

Both East and West are now committed, culturally as well as economically, to the gospel of self-fulfillment. Yet neither the American nor the Russian translations of the gospel can be transformed into a spiritual perception. Both the United States

[14] John Wren-Lewis, "What Are Clergy For?" *The Listener*, LXXI, No. 1824 (March 12, 1964), pp. 418–19. Argument for the therapeutic has entered strongly into the higher reaches of journalism. See, for example, David Gourlay, "The Churches," in the *Manchester Guardian*, May 21, 1964, p. 9. Gourlay is speculating on just what will be going on in churches a hundred years hence, assuming they will exist at all. "The church of tomorrow will be a place for the celebration of life, and its characteristics will be spontaneity and acceptance; the spontaneity of abandoned righteousness and the acceptance of the self-rejected. It will be a place of colour, movement, and vitality where young and old will not only look at what men of past ages have painted, listen to what they have written and the music they have made, but where they themselves will be free to paint, dance, talk, and express themselves in ways no longer easy in an age of automation, non-employment, space sickness, and leisure lostness. Few, if any, places in the new society will offer such arresting and beckoning horizons of human creativity. Political leaders will be glad to discover in the churches centres where somehow man's place and dignity in the world is mysteriously maintained in spite of all evidence to the contrary. Somewhere in the midst of all this there will be a small group of men and women helpers who, by dedication and training, will be able to serve and unite the community church in its life and interests."

and the Soviet Union are cultures of the new-rich—the United States, perhaps, even more so than the Soviet Union. Though it has begun to catch up culturally, the Soviet Union remains the more conservative system, with the Party, directly descended from the Church, striving to maintain a doctrine which asserts, at once, its social viability and truth. The Communist therapy of commitment must contend precisely with the new-rich of its own creation. In the United States, the rich have already adopted, it appears, the character structure of the therapeutic. No exemplary social stratum, above, restrains its elaborate and infinite sense of personal need. On the contrary, the Soviet Union and the United States are engaged in a common race to appeal to, and increase, the new-rich.

The leisured, or non-working, classes are the main resource from which the therapeutic, as a character type, is drawn. Emancipated from an ethic of hard work, Americans have also grown morally less self-demanding. They have been released from the old system of self-demands by a convergence of doctrines that do not resort to new restrictions but rather propose jointly the superiority of all that money can buy, technology can make, and science can conceive.

Certain naïve ascetic doctrines, which once did contain spiritual perceptions of great depth, such as that of holy poverty, now embarrass the churches, competing as they do for pride of place in a culture of affluence. Such perceptions are practically taboo subjects, specially among Americans, except negatively, when clergymen complain that they do not receive salaries commensurate with their status as professional men. Nor does the present ferment in the Roman Catholic Church seem so much like a renewal of spiritual perception as a move toward more sophisticated accommodations with the negative communities of the therapeutics. Grudgingly, the Roman churchmen must give way to their Western laity and translate their sacramental rituals into comprehensible terms as therapeutic devices, retaining just enough archaism to satisfy at once the romantic

interest of women and the sophisticated interest of those historical pietists for whom the antique alone carries that lovely dark patina they call faith.

The religious psychologies of release and the social technologies of affluence do not go beyond release and affluence to a fresh imposition of restrictive demands. This describes, in a sentence, the cultural revolution of our time. The old culture of denial has become irrelevant as a manipulable experience to a world of infinite abundance and reality. Carrying along inapplicable residues of "mystery" culture into the present scientific one, the ascetic labors in vain before the triumphant therapeutic to define a positive spiritual perception—except rejection of the therapeutic ethos. On the other hand, the therapeutic has arisen out of a rejection of all therapies of commitment, precisely by persuading halfway the recalcitrant among those who submitted to the old commitment therapies that they have acted out denials of knowledge and pleasure that no longer contribute to their spiritual health but, rather, to their mental dis-ease. So recently deconverted, the once-committed is unlikely to preach seriously against himself, except in terms of a historical drama, so that the therapeutic may enjoy his triumph. The obsolescent old-model man, representing a dying culture of scarce goods and absent gods, is losing popularity, even as a subject of didactic art. Ingmar Bergman's tormented souls are a bore, even more so than Antonioni's; at least the movie-Italians have progressed beyond the fantasy-obsessions of a disintegrating moral demand system for which Bergman has developed the image of the "spider-God." The anxieties of the ascetic were fit subjects for the art of, say, William Hale White, or George Eliot. The boredom of the therapeutic[15] fascinates Antonioni, Fellini, and the *nouvelle vague*—because they cannot escape the dying clutch of the old culture. American novels still agonize about pleasure as a way of life—but it is the agonizing, not the pleasure, which seems fraudulent.

[15] See, for example, the characters in *La Dolce Vita*, *Eclipse*, or *Les Cousins*.

In summary, each major contending cadre requires analysis in terms of its relation to contemporary character ideals. The deconverted is affected as much as the recalcitrant by the withdrawal of motive from economic and political life as the permitting condition of any spiritual perception that may develop to alter, toward a more operable imbalance, the present balance of controls and remissions. Thus far, no fresh carriers of a renunciatory symbolic have appeared able to establish themselves as serious claimants to a cultural elite status in Western society. Such a claimant may appear tomorrow, to capture the public modes of obedience; the dynamics of modern culture, however, militate against this possibility. There can develop no new (or renewed) system of interdicts from the therapeutic parody of a moral demand system; in consequence, all attempts at connecting the doctrines of psychotherapy with the old faiths are patently misconceived. At its most innocuous, these psychotherapeutic religiosities represent a failure of nerve by both psychotherapists and clergymen.[16] Finally, the professionally religious custodians of the old moral demands are no longer authoritative; although they still use languages of faith, that mode of moral communication has lost its ties with either the controls or the remissions valid among their adherents; preaching, which once communicated revelatory messages, is a dead art, wrapping empty packages in elaborate solecisms. The preachers have little of either controlling or releasing functions and retain therefore little power seriously to affect or alter the emergent control system. It is in this sense that the Christian and Jewish professionals have lost their spiritual preceptorships. Any functional equivalents to the old internal interdicts, whatever they may be, struggling to stabilize themselves and as yet without institutional conveyances, take on meaning insofar as they prove capable of providing a trained prudence to the therapeutic, anxious to

[16] For an analysis of psychotherapeutic religiosity, see, in particular, the chapter "The Religion of the Fathers," in *Freud: The Mind of the Moralist*, pp. 281–328.

increase his psychological capital without incurring dangerous risks.[17]

After the clergy, the political revolutionaries, and the psychoanalysts—there remain the artists and the scientists, as serious aspirants to the title of secular pastoral guide.

The scientists are a curious case. By tradition and training they are intractably modest. Claims to spiritual perception rarely occur explicitly in their work. Profoundly as that work has affected modern culture, the scientists have been non-combatants in the culture class war. With rare exceptions, they still accept the Ritschlian distinction between statements of fact and judgments of value. They make fact statements; the task of making value judgments belongs to other specialists, those elites that won exclusive custody over culture even as they gave up pretending they had authoritative knowledge of nature.

Notice the context within which Albrecht Ritschl, following Kant, had made his famous distinction. In Ritschlian theory, value judgments can only be made in reference to a communal perspective. According to Ritschl, Christian perceptions make sense only within the framework of a historic Christian community. The modern scientist has had quite another conception of himself; *qua* scientist, he has tried to extricate himself from all moral demands except those imposed upon him by the internal logic of his transformative endeavor directed against the natural world, all designed to overcome those gross miseries and necessities nature imposes upon mankind. The scientific community aspires to be supra-cultural, and is not qualified therefore to supply a creedal dynamic to that new laity, the non-scientists. In this sense, the scientific endeavor in its entirety, representing as it does the effort to create a non-moral culture, embodies the moral revolution. With a commitment that is strictly vocational,

[17] The Roman Catholic Church, practiced as she is for over a thousand years in rationalizing experience, seems far more likely to survive as a provender of prudence well into the age of the therapeutic, rather than those Protestant polities in the tradition of the free church, with their modalities of militant conscience.

the scientist personifies the latest phase in the Western psychohistorical process, one that refrains from laying down guidelines of moral intervention for the society as a whole. Whatever his professed intention, the scientist acts, therefore, as a spiritual preceptor to modern man. The therapeutic has everything—and nothing—to learn from the scientist, for in the established sense of the word, the scientist, as such, has no culture.[18]

The modern artist, too, has had the role of a spiritual preceptor thrust upon him. And, indeed, because modern artists move in the direction of release, there is a religious pretension inherent in the work of the moderns, reacting as they do to a situation in which nature has been taken out of their purview by science and technology. They have deliberately created alternative realities to those put in jeopardy by science. The inherent interest of modern art is not chiefly in experimenting with the representation of some microscopic reality, or in some correspondence with a presumed macrocosm, but, more importantly, in the production of a picture that would suggest, within its frame, the multiple and alternative realities through which the modern may enliven an existence divorced from both nature and faith. The artist represents what we are trying to become, the shape we are trying to take in our effort to escape the pressures of timeworn inwardness while also escaping the bondage of new internalities.

[18] Sir Charles (now Lord) Snow has called for a new class of savants, able to establish the culture of the therapeutic. See *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution* (Cambridge, England, 1960). In doing so, he is echoing positivist proposals, elaborated more fully by Auguste Comte, in his essay of 1821, entitled "Plan of the Scientific Operations Necessary for Reorganizing Society," which provides a brief but complete pendant to Snow's call. See Introductory, p. 9, footnote 7.

The Comtean ambition appears again in Reich's effort to combine Marxism and psychoanalysis into the theoretical predicate for a vast reorganization of society. See his *Dialektischer Materialismus und Psychoanalyze* (Copenhagen, 1934). In this sense, Reich aspired to be spiritual preceptor to a post-Christian culture. Since the neuroses suffered by millions are a result of the patriarchal, authoritarian education in which Western culture consists, the final issue, for Reich, was cultural change. And cultural change was tantamount to the prevention of neuroses, and, moreover, to the elimination of the "empty niceties of a false liberalism." (*The Mass Psychology of Fascism*, p. xi.)

It is for his professional effort at unfixed externalizations, valid first to his own psychological economy, that the modern artist has been handed a spiritual preceptorship. By exploring the range of presentable realities, quite apart from the "natural" or the "socially acceptable," the modern artist has broken his vocational connection with moral demand systems, beginning with that of the middle classes. In achieving an impersonality no less impressive than that achieved by modern science, painting, in particular, augured the emancipation from the classical moral demand system, rejecting the *person* as an object of aesthetic interest and concentrating on the self-fulfilling function of the work of art itself. Thus the art work has become, in a strict sense, a therapeutic mode.

To this quality of impersonality in our future togetherness, reference was made repeatedly, throughout the present volume, beginning with the Introduction. Freud had proposed this rejection of attachment to an inner experience no less than Lawrence. The latter wrongly accused Freud of encouraging a new outbreak of that sickly modern religiosity by which modern men turn further in upon themselves, either under the cover of Christian psychologizing or under that of humanism. This further turning in is precisely the opposite of what the present volume intends to convey by the therapeutic. His sense of well-being operates under the aegis of a technology aimed ultimately at his own emotions, so as to destroy the tension between the inner and outer life.

If yesterday's analytic thrust is to become part of tomorrow's cultural super-ego, it must take on an institutional form, defend itself not only as true but also as good and dig into personality as a demand system. Yet it is precisely this that the new arts and social sciences, in their very nature, cannot accomplish. They cannot create the ardent imaginations necessary to the forming of new communities; although they may prepare the way for a new public mode of existence, for the present they make life all

the more private. Like the old cultural super-ego, the negative communities of the next culture, so far as we can discern them in this respect, rarely utter hosannas; therapeutics, not yet settled in their mode, speak to each other mainly in harsh tones. Our spiritual preceptors practice their unkindnesses upon each other. A spiritual perception must have built into its releasing insight a vision of new stability, a promise of some settling pattern or supposed plan, and not merely the energy to reject the prevailing cultural super-ego; that latter sort of wisdom comes more and more "naturally" in contemporary culture. The "id" has always had "energy"; the cultural "super-ego" has aged into a fussy critic of the energetic. This moral revolution is occurring by default, not so much under the leadership of id-energy doctrines as under the bankruptcy of super-ego energies. It is the impotence of the cultural super-ego rather than the potency of the id that is the crucial fact of our time. For this reason, however, "nothing" can succeed the imperative mood—nothing except the therapeutic mood itself.

Historically, the Christian spiritual perception, which had attacked the established moral demands of its time, took on an institutional form, and, moreover, had a revolutionary effect on some aspects of the social system—for example, on the status of women. At the same time, the Church was incorporated into the social system and survived, powerful and yet defeated in its ideal intention by that very incorporation. Something similar may happen to the present revolutionary effort to transform the culture. Psychotherapy may be arrested at its present stage by a reconciliation with contemporary remissive religiosity, sanctioned mainly as a post-religious science of moral management. This seems to be the present state of psychotherapy in America.

There is an ambiguity in the very function of psychotherapy as the chief among those arts interpreting the deconversion experience of Western man to himself. To investigate all instances of failed mastery of moral energy raises the possibility of

controlling the moralizing process itself. Among those who followed Freud were some more willing to entertain the possibility of such a moral revolution. The range and quality of these varying theories, Jung's included, cannot be easily dismissed. Each constructed an explicit doctrine of release from the failing old controls upon some aspect or other of their intellectual encounter with Freud. None worked out the doctrine consequentially enough to become the founder of a new dispensation.

At this time, cultural revolutionaries can be described mainly in terms of their ideas about the culture against which they are reacting. Revolutions have been known to press in either direction, toward control or release. Most revolutions restore an imbalance of controls and releases at a new point. It is a telling indication of Freud's own ambivalence that the revolutionaries who most interested him were the great protagonists of control, not of release.[19] Freud's revolutionary attack on the European Christian culture as a system of moral demand makes more sense, however, when understood in the context of his larger theory of the dynamics of culture as a system of unwitting renunciations. Seen thus, his therapeutic interest is revolutionary, a tremendous argument for expressive remissions from failed controls, restabilizing the moral demands that are culture at a fresh locus of imbalance between controls and remissions. In this aspect, Freud represents the climax of the nineteenth-century tradition of scientific prophecy as a functional substitute for religious prophecy. His was the subtle climax of a rationalism in which a more modest moral demand system could use a prophylactic analysis intended to prevent an oppressive elaboration of those controls, which are always irrational precisely in their destructively reactive production of counter-imbalancing (that is, neurotic) remissions. Freud's analytic intricacies thrust the culture toward an apparent simplicity of controls, while elaborating the range of remissions, thus exactly reversing the normative order. Pro-

[19] Most of all, Freud was interested in Moses, the founder of the cultural elite from which Freud considered he derived.

scriptive symbols give way to prudential ones; but the prudent man cannot, as Freud thought, take his morality for granted—for that security derives from the proscriptive dynamics upon which he had trained his great analytic weaponry. What is moral is *not* "self-evident," as Freud declared in a letter to James Putnam.[20] What is moral becomes and remains self-evident only within a powerful and deeply compelling system of culture.

The new releasing insights deserve only a little less respect than the old controlling ones. One may expect official clamor for a renewal of the old demand system, which may well have no further plans of self-integration, but function instead to disguise a terrifying ignorance of the distinction between our present inwardness and ancient faith. The therapeutics must be understood precisely in their efforts to go beyond the analytic attitude, as the articulate representatives of a sharp and probably irreparable break in the continuity of the Western culture. None of their doctrines promises an authentic therapy of commitment to communal purpose; rather, in each the commitment is to the therapeutic effort itself. As Jung insisted, the therapeutic cannot claim more than a private value for his moral science. The therapy of all therapies is not to attach oneself exclusively to any particular therapy, so that no illusion may survive of some end beyond an intensely private sense of well-being to be generated in the living of life itself. That a sense of well-being has become the end, rather than a by-product of striving after some superior communal end, announces a fundamental change of focus in the entire cast of our culture—toward a human condition about which there will be nothing further to say in terms of the old style of despair and hope.

[20] Ernst L. Freud (ed.), *Letters of Sigmund Freud* (New York, 1960), p. 308.

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